The Crisis Of Leadership

By Amir Zia 
Feb 10, 2014
The News

Among all the challenges, the rapid erosion in the writ of the state against the backdrop of the growing and expanding influence of violent non-state actors should be the biggest cause of concern for both civilian and military leaders. The continued weakening of the writ of the state has all the potential to throw Pakistan into the deadly vortex of strife and civil war. 


Last year, many Pakistanis were celebrating the country’s first democratic transition from one elected government to another with a lot of hope and optimism. Today, many are wondering whether our elected representatives have the capacity and ability to grasp and deal with the grave challenges that threaten the very existence of the state and the society.
The signs of time are depressingly telling, while the response to the life and death issues faced by the nation remains weak and meek. The elected representatives seem to lack the vision, commitment, courage and integrity needed to confront any of the challenges faced by the country – from the issue of terrorism to that of a crumbling economy and the crisis of governance.
Among all the challenges, the rapid erosion in the writ of the state against the backdrop of the growing and expanding influence of violent non-state actors in recent months should be the biggest cause of concern for both civilian and military leaders. The continued weakening of the writ of the state has all the potential to throw Pakistan into the deadly vortex of strife and civil war.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has embarked on a dangerous course by accepting the Al-Qaeda linked local Taliban as a ‘legitimate’ stakeholder in the country and starting negotiations with their nominated committee. This move is all set to further weaken the state and its writ as it has allowed the Taliban and their sympathisers to dictate the agenda of political discourse and set the national narrative that has all the deadly ingredients to further polarise and divide the people on religious grounds. To their credit, the Taliban have always made it explicitly clear that they want to change the structure of the Pakistani state and scrap its constitution in line with their interpretation of Islam.
Even the outcome of the first round of the so-called ‘peace talks’ between the government- and the Taliban-nominated committees makes it evident what one should expect from this controversial process and how these non-state actors want to use it to their advantage.
The core issue of these talks, according to one of the Taliban committee members, Maulana Abdul Aziz of the Lal Masjid, should be the ‘implementation of Shariah’ rather than terrorism. The Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid has backed Maulana Aziz’s stand by saying that talks would only be held under the Quran and Sunnah.
With just one master-stroke, the Taliban successfully managed to (or should we say allowed to) shift the focus of talks and sidetrack the real issue of religiously motivated violence and terrorism. The Taliban note of dissent came when the echo of the official statement issued after the first round of talks had not even died down.
The government-nominated team hardly managed to bring the issue of all the suicide bombings and killings of innocent civilians and the security personnel into the focus. It seems that the Pakistani state and its institutions are being tried and held accountable rather than the terrorists who are responsible for more than 50,000 deaths since early 2002. 
Ironically, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and their respective allies have helped the Taliban achieve this upper hand both in negotiations and conflict. These mainstream political forces begged, pleaded and argued in favour of talks for months – deliberately ignoring the complexity and gravity of the challenge of extremism and terrorism and how it threatens the entire fabric of the society. 
The other major political parties, including the Pakistan People’s Party, appear divided and confused, failing to create any forceful alternate voice. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari does tweet aggressively against the Taliban, but his parliamentary party leader and other stalwarts definitely are on a different plane. 
In a nutshell, in the name of national consensus and so-called peace, the elected civilian leaders are all set to surrender the country to violent non-state actors. This strategy (if it can be called one) gives a loud and clear message that our weak-kneed government will yield to any terrorist group that raises weapons against the state and has the determination to kill and get killed for its mission.
Welcome to the Pakistan of 2014 where civilian leaders are ready to forget and forgive all the heinous crimes and mass murders carried out by non-state actors like the Taliban. 
And now compare this to the former British premier Margaret Thatcher’s iron resolve who once said; “To me consensus seems to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values, and policies in search of something in which no one believes…”
What great cause could be served, fought and won under the banner of so-called national consensus as advocated and interpreted by most of our civilian leaders? This only shows that none of them is ready to take the responsibility or has the guts to fight for his beliefs.
Our civilian leaders seem ignorant of the fact that a bad peace is even worse than a war. There are times in history when the only option available is to fight a war that has been imposed on a nation. And wars cannot be won without fighting. The policy of appeasing non-state actors has never worked in any country – from neighbouring India to Sri Lanka. 
The Indians dealt with all insurgencies – from Kashmir to East Punjab and Assam to Manipur – with an iron hand. Our Sri Lankan friends did the same while crushing the Tamil fighters, as did Saudi Arabia in the bloody siege of Mecca in 1979. The so-called fervour of the Islamic militants holed in the Masjid al-Haram did not deter the Saudis from taking decisive action against them.
There are many other such instances in modern history where courageous and determined leadership successfully managed to crush those who raised arms against the state.
But not so in Pakistan under the present set of civilian rulers. If the former PPP government dillydallied in taking ownership of the war against terrorists and left it only to the khakis to deal with the challenge, the Sharif government seems all set to handover Pakistan to the militants on a silver platter.
Perhaps, this is the short-cut Sharif has selected in an attempt to impose his style of Shariah, which once he wanted to do in 1999 and become the ameerul momineen. At that time his aspirations were cut short by the bloodless military coup of October 1999. Sharif seems to have picked up the thread from where he left it last, perhaps believing his road is now open and clear.
But aren’t our civilian lords and masters playing with fire. Aren’t they putting the country at stake by appeasing the militants and trying to cut unholy deals with them?
In politics, often a right decision becomes wrong if taken after too much delay. And here, it is the ‘tragedy of delay’ that is costing Pakistan dearly. Pakistan’s armed forces have all the capacity, courage and resolve to overcome this existentialist internal threat. The only thing the country needs is a courageous and determined leadership. Is there any elected civilian leader who can take up the gauntlet? The landscape appears too barren.

False Fault Lines

By Amir Zia
Monday, May 6, 2013
The News

It is necessary to remove the cobwebs of confusion about the legitimacy of this conflict, which has been imposed upon us by the extremists.

What are the dividing ideological frontiers in the fight against religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan? Have distinct battle lines been drawn between liberal secularists and Islamists? Is it only the former who oppose Al-Qaeda and its local allies, including the Taliban and their narrow interpretation of Islam and tactics of violence and terrorism? Is it a fact that all religious-minded people and various Islamic schools of thought support these militant non-state actors? Is the impression correct that all right-wing and religious elements want Pakistan’s armed forces to unilaterally end the operation against these militants?

Some right-wing politicians, opinion makers and analysts would certainly like us to buy this paradigm. Similarly, there are those liberals and secularists who want to simplify this protracted conflict on these so-called ideological lines. These two subjective interpretations distort the reality but, unfortunately, they dominate the narrative on the national media.

This debate has acquired a fresh intensity in the run-up to the May 11 elections against the backdrop of a surge in violence, and especially after Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s recent speech in which he focused on the internal security challenges, calling for a united national consensus against those who defy the constitution and attempt to impose their narrow world view under the garb of Islam.

However, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, the Jamaat-e-Islami and those analysts who tend to agree with these parties have been quick to shoot down General Kayani’s remarks, saying that the war against militants who are responsible for attacks on key military installations – including the GHQ – and the killing of thousands of security personnel and civilians in suicide bombings and other terrorists attacks remains an ‘American War’. An impression has been given that General Kayani’s speech must have made Pakistani secularists and liberals jump with joy.

Ironically, on the other side of this great divide, the Pakistan People’s Party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Awami National Party and their cheerleaders are also portraying this conflict as liberals or secularists against militants and their right-wing supporters. Yes, these three parties have suffered colossal losses at the hands of terrorists who escalated attacks on their leaders and workers ahead of the elections. It is also a fact that these parties remain unable to carry out their election campaigns openly – unlike their rivals, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. But this ‘us-versus-them mentality’ remains an oversimplification of a rather complex issue.

The first fallacy that has been created by extremists and their allies is that it is the Pakistani state and its institutions that triggered the conflict with ‘God-fearing, good Muslims’ at the behest of the US. But the facts are very different. The Pakistani state, even under the former military ruler Pervez Musharraf, only wanted to stop the misuse of its territory as a safe haven for militants from across the world and for orchestrating terrorism aimed at other countries as well as within Pakistan. The actual American War remains on the other side of the Durand Line in Afghanistan – and not in Pakistan. Islamabad stands justified in its efforts to establish the writ of the state on Pakistani territory and get the country out of the self-destructive path of being bracketed with militant non-state actors.

There have been several attempts and at least five peace accords with the Pakistani Taliban to abolish safe havens for foreign militants and terrorist groups, and stop the use of Pakistan’s territory as their resting, recruiting, training, planning and fund-raising facility. As a responsible member of the international community, Pakistan is obligated to do this. But the policy of negotiations and appeasement by the former military-led government did not achieve the desired goal.

The 2007 Lal Masjid episode proved a watershed event as armed and trained militants battled with the security forces for more than a week in the heart of the federal capital. The then government had no choice but to use force against these militants who challenged the writ of the state, tried to create a state within the state and resorted to street vigilantism. Any country – democratic or undemocratic – would have opted for a similar course of action to quell this kind of revolt.

In a nut-shell, it is these militants, who imposed conflict on Pakistan. The state had no choice but to respond for self-preservation.

The second major erroneous belief is that only Pakistani liberals and secularists support the war against terrorism. No, along with liberals and secularists, a vast majority of right-wing and religious-minded people also oppose the Taliban and their narrow interpretation of Islam. Religious scholars and clerics belonging to almost every Islamic school of thought including Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadis, the Sunnis and the Shias, have condemned the Taliban’s acts of violence, their defiance of Pakistan’s constitution and democracy, and brutal tactics of killings and mass murders.

Maulana Hasan Jan, a respected Deobandi cleric, who defeated Khan Abdul Wali Khan in his home constituency of Charsadda in the general elections, was killed by the Taliban because he condemned suicide bombings and declared them to be against the sacred principles of Islam. There have been many other such incidents in which religious scholars were silenced and even forced to leave the country for opposing the alarmingly narrow world view of militants, which is incompatible with modernity and progress.

Many right-wing parties, including the PML-N, also support efforts to curb terrorism, extremism and violence in the society, though during their election campaigns they have kept a meaningful silence in public over this issue.

Then we have various brands of nationalists in Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of southern Punjab who also oppose the Taliban and the likes of Al-Qaeda.

Last but not the least is the institution of the Pakistani armed forces, which in no way can be branded as secular or liberal. It represents all the diverse shades of Pakistan and is a vanguard of Pakistan’s struggle against extremism and militancy. Confusing the war against militants as that of liberals and secularists versus Islamists or religious-minded people is a deliberate distortion of facts, and it is dangerous for the country’s cohesion and unity.

General Kayani hit the bull’s eye when he said that “there is no room for doubts when it comes to dealing with rebellion against the state.”

“We as a nation need to forge consensus towards evolving a clear policy through mutual consultations. Considering this war against terrorism as the war of the armed forces alone can lead to chaos and disarray that we cannot afford,” he said in his speech on April 30 (Youm-e-Shuhada).

It is necessary to remove the cobwebs of confusion about the legitimacy of this conflict, which has been imposed upon us by the extremists. The handful of religious parties and their affiliate analysts should raise themselves above short-term political interests and back the armed forces in this war against terrorism.

The first step for them should be to condemn all those forces that resort to violence, terrorism, suicide attacks targeting civilians, political rivals and security personnel in the name of Islam. There should also be a consensus that any force or group raising weapons against the state, challenging its writ or openly defying the country’s constitution should be dealt with the proverbial ‘iron hand’.

But do the Jamaat-e-Islami, the JUI-F and the PTI have the courage and the intellectual honesty to act this way? Pakistan wants an answer. These forces should not disappoint the people again by siding with those responsible for brutalising our society and killing more than 50,000 people. They must act in the national interest. . A small, organised minority cannot be allowed to take this nation of more than 180 million people hostage.

Back In The Line Of Fire

By Amir Zia
March 24, 2013
The News

Staging a coup and calling shots while in uniform is one thing and being a vulnerable civilian is totally a different ballgame. Musharraf will have to adjust and adapt himself to this changed, tough reality.

Former president Pervez Musharraf has played yet another gamble – this time by deciding to return to Pakistan at a time when the country stands just less than 50 days from the general elections. Any rational review of his war-inventory and battle-preparedness would reveal that most cards are decked against him.
To begin with, his All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) is still a paper tiger. The APML is devoid of notable politicians and lacks organisational structure and political cadre. Most of the politicians who were patronised and cultivated by the retired general during his nine-year rule have already joined various traditional political parties. Those who are still with the former king’s party – the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam Group) – are in an electoral alliance with the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP). At the most, Musharraf will be able to attract some feather-weight politicians who have been unable to find any takers in the major parties.
The argument that the APML needed Musharraf’s presence in the country to attract some big names in its folds and build a team carries weight, but the former president is landing in Pakistan a little too late for this. The electoral battle lines have already been drawn and there is hardly any time left to organise or reorganise the party.
Secondly, Musharraf’s hopes to forge an alliance with his former allies will also be a hard bargain to strike. His former allies, including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), will have to think twice before offering him any tangible support. Under the changed political circumstances when the rightwing narrative dominates Pakistan, Musharraf with all his efforts for the UN-backed war on terrorism and close alliance with the United States, will prove more of a liability than a winning card. At the most, Musharraf may secure support for his own seat – which too will come with a heavy political price tag.
But the absence of a team and the dearth of political allies are not the only challenges the former military ruler faces. The bigger challenge will come from the superior judiciary, which is hearing a number of high-profile cases against him including those of the assassinations of Benazir Bhutto and Akbar Bugti, the Lal Masjid operation and the confinement of 62 judges. How Musharraf faces the heat of the court rooms will be a test of his endurance and nerves. The judges and the ex-general have a history and some bitter memories. The face-off would indeed be an interesting affair.
Yes, staging a coup and calling shots while in uniform is one thing and being a vulnerable civilian is totally a different ballgame. Musharraf will have to adjust and adapt himself to this changed, tough reality, which is indeed not an easy task. Although, conventional wisdom believes that the mighty institution of the army will not ‘tolerate’ its ex-chief being in trouble, Musharraf’s presence in Pakistan will be more of a headache than a relief for the military leadership in the current situation. Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in particular, would have preferred that his former mentor and boss remained happy and secure in foreign lands.
Many of Musharraf’s well-wishers realise that the number of his powerful foes on the home turf exceeds the number of his friends. Starting from Mian Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League to the disgruntled Baloch nationalists, and from the religious parties to the born-again democrats that include Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf, the list of politicians who have an axe to grind with the country’s former strongman is indeed a long one. Musharraf will be an easy punchbag for them all, both literally and metaphorically.
But the opposition by traditional political rivals will be akin to a walk in the park for Musharraf if one considers the threat to his life, which comes from al-Qaeda and local militants of all hues. Musharraf had several close encounters with death when he was in power. But perhaps militants will be breathing at his neck again more closely now as he is no more the army chief and president. Will his private security arrangements and the ones provided by the government be enough to keep him out of the reach of lurking assassins and suicide bombers? Pakistan of today is a much more dangerous and lawless place than the one Musharraf left in 2008. He will be practically walking through a minefield every day in Pakistan.
Given these odds, what chance does Musharraf have of keeping himself afloat in the murky waters of the country’s politics or of carving out a role for himself? Even some of Musharraf’s ardent fans and close aides are sceptical of his decision to return to the country, though they talk of behind-the-scene guarantees from the military establishment, Riyadh and even Washington.
But the hard fact is that similar guarantees were also given to former premier Benazir Bhutto. They could not save her from the bomb and gun attack in Rawalpindi weeks after the first suicide attack on her in Karachi on October 18, 2007. Who could know better than Musharraf what happened to Bhutto with whom he struck a deal and promised and delivered the National Reconciliation Ordinance? Ironically, Musharraf finds himself in a more or less similar situation today – but without the following of a mass party.
Then what prompts his return?
According to one of his aides, the hurly-burly of elections offer the best opportunity to Musharraf to stage a return. The focus will not be solely on him. All his political opponents and foes will be busy targeting one another during their election campaign. The compulsions of practical electoral politics for the main players are likely to override their dislike for Musharraf – at least for the time being. This will provide a chance for him to create some space for himself in the post-2013 elections scenario. He may find some willing allies after the elections, at least on the opposition benches, if he can survive his hard landing and prove his mettle in the initial uncertainties and challenges following his return to Pakistan.
Therefore, it was now or never for Musharraf, who by nature remains an adventurous soul and often thrives on brinkmanship and games of dare. It is second nature to him. From his controversial adventure in the mountains of Kargil, he managed to find the route to power in Islamabad. But then he was the all-powerful army chief.
Today, he is seen as small fry on Pakistan’s complicated political chessboard, though in many middle and upper middle class Pakistani homes his name still evokes nostalgia and "politically incorrect" inspiration, given the high price the country has paid during the five-year democratic rule in terms of economic mismanagement, the crumbling writ of state and the spike in violence and terrorism.
However, this fond nostalgia for the days gone by can’t help Musharraf much in making him a heavyweight player in the country’s power politics again. Will he be able to prove his critics wrong and manage to bounce back with a bang? His chances are indeed slim, but if one were Musharraf, it would be worth a try.
After all, a man misses all those shots which were never attempted.

Viewpoint: This War is Our War

The new government needs to realise that Pakistan has more to lose than even the US if it does not conduct the war on terror effectively.
By Amir ZiaNewsline -July 2008

There is no dearth of Pakistani politicians and analysts who brand Islamabad's fight against religious extremism and militancy purely an "American war." Notwithstanding the numerous UN resolutions, which have made it mandatory on all its member states to cooperate in the global war on terror or risk sanctions, a vast number of ordinary Pakistanis have been made to believe that the country could have avoided all the suicide bombings and terror attacks in its major cities and violence in the restive tribal areas, if the former military-led government had not committed itself to the US-led war against terrorism.
Even one of the key partners in the new ruling coalition - the PML-N - has been trying to whip up popular sentiment against the besieged President Pervez Musharraf by playing this right-wing card. In fact, its chief whip - former premier Nawaz Sharif - has been demanding that Musharraf be held accountable for last year's operation against the militants in Islamabad's Lal Masjid, accusing him of killing 'innocent' people. In an attempt to win the support of the traditional religious lobby and Islamic radicals, and channelise their anger towards Musharraf, Sharif seems to have deliberately overlooked the fact that the armed militants of Lal Masjid were resorting to criminal and terrorist acts - including kidnapping and harassment of foreign and local nationals, in their zeal to enforce a myopic version of Islam. No state can tolerate such unlawful acts, especially an open revolt against the government's writ in the federal capital. Acting out of political expediency, the members of the ruling coalition, including the PPP, announced compensation for the Lal Masjid militants, but this has only served to embolden the extremist elements.
No wonder the lobby opposed to the fight against extremists has become louder and bolder since the installation of the PPP-led government in Islamabad in March 2008. The deaths of thousands of Pakistanis in recent years, and the damage to the very fabric of our society, are being conveniently ignored or forgotten amidst the clichéd anti-US rhetoric of the religious and right-wing forces.
As the country remains in the grip of political instability and uncertainty because of the lawyers' campaign for the restoration of the controversial deposed chief justice, and the mounting pressure on President Musharraf to resign, there has been a marked confusion in the government's anti-terror war policy, which appears to lack initiative, drive and resolve. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani's government - under pressure from its allies and right-wing forces - seems to be sending mixed signals, both within the country and abroad, regarding its commitment on how to conduct this war against the backdrop of a rapid deterioration in the law and order situation in parts of the NWFP. Emboldened militants have increased violent attacks not just in the tribal region, but also in nearby settled areas of the NWFP.
The Taliban extremists are executing people, burning schools, hitting at government installations and the security forces, and targeting women. The dark shadow of their activities is no longer confined to the remote mountainous region; it is fast spreading its tentacles in the populated areas as well. How can one hold talks with these forces who refuse to pay heed to reason? Should the government allow the creation of states within the state, in turn, allowing a rapid Talibanisation in parts of the NWFP?
The international community was becoming increasingly wary of Pakistan's intentions and its capacity to reign in militants, as the government is desperately trying to bank on the faltering talks in an attempt to restore peace in the volatile tribal region.
In the past, the pro-Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants used peace talks to re-group, re-organise and re-entrench themselves in the lawless mountainous tribal belt. This led to not just increased violence against US-led forces in Afghanistan, but also undermined whatever little writ the state had in its tribal belt.
The same mistake of appeasing the militants should not be repeated. The government should act to establish its writ and not give any ground to militants to make parts of the country a safe haven for international terrorists and use its territory for unleashing terrorism across the globe. This country of 160 million people should not be allowed to drift into complete anarchy and chaos.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's statement that his country had the right to send troops across the border to chase militants taking shelter in Pakistan, perhaps reflects the sentiment of his powerful NATO allies, who remain concerned about Islamabad's efforts to sign peace accords with militants. Karzai's statement remains in line with the UN Security Council resolutions - 1373 (passed in 2001) and 1566 (passed in 2004) - which make it mandatory for all its member states to deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support and commit terrorist acts. These resolutions also direct the member states to prohibit their nationals and entities from making funds, financial assets, economic resources, or any other related services available to those who commission or participate in the terrorist acts.
This has put the Gillani government in a quandary at a time when it is struggling to maintain balance between international expectations and obligations on the one hand, and growing pressure from the religious and right-wing forces, including some of its own allies, to change the course of the war against terror, on the other.
On June 25, the government announced that it was handing over powers to the army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, to take action against militants in the NWFP. The PPP-led government has to take ownership of this fight against extremists and terrorists, rather than give an impression that it has been dragged into an unwanted and unnecessary conflict. The Gillani government should fight this war boldly on the ideological front and help build public opinion in its favour, providing security forces the necessary cushion to weed out terrorism from Pakistani soil. The much-neglected Islamic seminary reforms also need to be pushed on a war-footing to stamp out the tide of terrorism and extremism in the long run.
If Pakistan fails to control militants on its own, it will provide foreign powers an excuse to intervene.
However, the PPP - seen as a pro-west liberal and secular force - has so far failed to grasp the initiative in this fight, although its leader, Benazir Bhutto, became one of its victims on December 27 in a gun and bomb attack, which bears all the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda-linked or inspired terrorism. This should give the present government the impetus to confront this scourge with a greater determination.
Extremism and terrorism are not challenges faced by the United States and its western allies alone. They pose a far graver challenge for Pakistan, which served as a conduit for waging the US-sponsored Afghan war against the former Soviet Union and its backed communist regime in Kabul during the 1980s. It is now well-documented history that it was American and Saudi Arabian dollars which fuelled the so-called holy war in Afghanistan for more than a decade during the 1980s with Pakistan's help. This dollar-sponsored so-called jihad not only resulted in the mushroom growth of Islamic seminaries all over the country, particularly in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan, but also attracted thousands of Islamic militants from across the world - especially from the Middle East - who learnt the art of terrorism in the ISI-operated training centres that were financed and armed by American and Saudi intelligence agencies. The Pakistani establishment of those days helped not only radical Afghan Islamic groups, but also the Pakistani militants to organise on similar patterns and used them in fuelling jihad in Indian-occupied Kashmir. This led to the establishment of the vast, resource-rich private jihadi empire, which spun out of control from the hands of its sponsors and started following its own extremist and self-styled pan-Islamic agenda.
The surge in sectarian killings during the 1990s, the phenomenal rise in religious extremism and intolerance in the country and the subsequent building of ties of the local militants with international terrorists, are the result of the myopic policies of General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq's era and his remnants. And just like the United States, in an ironic turn of events, Pakistan also faces a backlash from this Frankenstein it helped create with Washington.
By joining hands with Washington in the international war against terrorism, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil, President Musharraf, for the first time in the country's history, confronted these extremists head-on. Not only did Pakistan stop its support to the Afghan Taliban, it also gradually stopped militants from using Pakistani territory against Indian forces in occupied Kashmir, which led to the easing of tensions between the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours.
However, the task of defeating the extremist forces has so far proved easier said than done. The huge, well-financed extremists' empire, having tentacles even within the establishment, has upped the stakes by waging relentless terror and suicide attacks in an attempt to undermine Islamabad's efforts in this war. It is in Pakistan's national interest to defeat these forces, which remain incompatible with the modern world and aim to drag the country to a barbaric medieval period and enforce the outdated tribal system in the name of religion in this 21st century world.
The PPP, being a popular party, remains in a far better position to fight this war effectively and aggressively, both on the ideological and practical fronts, as compared to the previous government. Prime Minister Gillani should avail the opportunity created by the previous military-led government of confronting the extremist pro-Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, who remain a potent threat to Pakistan. For the first time in the country's history, the military leadership and the popularly elected government can have a convergence of views on this vital issue. Will the PPP and its democratic allies act now or let go of this historic opportunity and live to regret it forever? -- ENDS