Pakistan’s Hard Realities

By Amir Zia
July 11, 2012

The religious and other rightwing parties want Pakistan to disregard international will and consensus against the violent non-state actors operating under the influence of al Qaeda


ONE can call it ironic that the government’s decision to reopen the Nato supply routes to Afghanistan is getting flak from both sides of the national divide.
Many of the liberals are calling it the tragedy of delay and rightly asking why it took so long for our brilliant minds in the civil and military establishment to accept the “soft apology” which was there on the platter by Washington since February this year. What Islamabad gained by prolonging the standoff with the United States if the result had to be a timid climb-down on all the key demands. From the US drone attacks on Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding on Pakistani soil to that of the CIA network operating independently of Pakistani authorities, it will be business as usual as far as Washington is concerned. Pakistani authorities remain free to keep the window of discussion open on these issues under the true spirit of democracy.
Pakistan’s attempts to extract more money from the United States by raising the tariff on each Nato container to $5,000 from $250 also resulted in a firm no. Our government graciously dropped this bizarre demand which, in the first place, should not even be linked to US assault on the military check-post at Salala in November last which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. This sensitive issue was mismanaged from day one by the civil and military leaders, who made it more complex by playing to the gallery with their bombastic rhetoric of national honour and sovereignty. Precious time was lost by the government in the long-winded parliamentary debate on the so-called attempts to redefine Pakistan-US ties and tagging the important with unimportant rather than a swift and realistic handling of the issue keeping in view the country’s hard political and economic realities and the international mood.
The religious and other rightwing political parties – the self-proclaimed guardians of the country’s yet unclear and porous ideological frontiers – are furious for all the different reasons. They want Pakistan to disregard international will and consensus against violent non-state actors operating under the banner of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and a host of other shadowy extremist groups and drag it to the dead-end of becoming a rogue and pariah state. Their agenda, as articulated by the Defence of Pakistan (Difa-e-Pakistan) Council, now encompasses the ouster of the US-led Nato forces from the region, ending Pakistan’s cooperation in the UN-mandated war on terrorism, blocking Nato supplies passing through the country to Afghanistan and of course the demand of halting the controversial drone strikes in the country’s militant-infested northern tribal region.
As thousands of supporters of Defence of Pakistan, an umbrella of around 40 religious groups, many of which are banned, displayed their teeth, muscle and emotions in Islamabad at the conclusion of their “long ride” from Lahore, there are clear signs that the national discord over the issue is all set to intensify against the backdrop of growing political instability in the run-up to the general elections, clash of institutions and unbridled monster of terrorism that has consumed more than 36,000 lives since the end of 2001 when Pakistan joined hands with the United States and its allies in the war against Al-Qaeda and its Afghan and local allies.
In this pro- and anti-Nato divide, the all important subject which does not figure prominently on the national narrative is how to rein in the foreign and local extremists who continue to operate here, targeting not just Pakistani civilian and law enforcement agencies, but also using the country as a base to plot and execute terrorist plots against neighbours and other parts of the world.
The international community and the majority of Pakistanis stand justified when they ask the state institutions to establish their writ effectively and ensure that Pakistani soil is not used against other nations as well as Pakistan. The all-important question of why our country has become a fertile ground for suicide bombers, terrorists and extremists and considered a safe haven by similar foreign elements including Arabs, Afghans, Uzbeks, Chechens, and even Indonesians is often ignored as we focus more on symptoms rather than the real causes of our predicament.
The continued self-denial will cost us even more than what we have already suffered in terms of loss of human lives, the country’s image and negative fallout on the battered economy. Monday’s gun attack on an army camp near Gujrat by militants in which seven soldiers and a policeman were killed should serve as the latest stark reminder of the rotten state of affairs in this land of the pure. As the rightwing continues to whip up anti-US emotions, militants would certainly try to intensify attacks on soft and hard targets in an attempt punish the country for its renewed cooperation with Nato.
The absence of a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy, the lack of trust within key state institutions and concerns of Pakistani military establishment regarding the endgame in Afghanistan in which they do not see eye-to-eye with Washington on fundamental issues, will make it more difficult for the authorities to effectively handle the scourge of extremism that has been a major destabilising factor for the country on both its internal and external fronts.
The tragic Salala episode that had plunged the Pakistan-US ties to a new low should be seen more as a symptom rather than the cause which will continue to test the diplomatic skills of leaders of both countries. The source of tension remains, which is graver than the drone attacks. These strikes should also be taken as an outcome of the larger problem.
If the Americans continue to remain wary of Pakistan because of its selective handling of militant groups and lack of political will and capacity in establishing its writ on many parts of its territory, Pakistanis are worried about the enhanced Indian role in Afghanistan and prospects of a hostile government in Kabul. Washington has failed to calm Pakistan’s nerves regarding its exit strategy and give any assurance that Pakistan-friendly elements will get a role in any future setup in Afghanistan. Pakistan has suffered the most due to the protracted Afghan conflict since the invasion by the former Soviet Union there in 1979 and is justified if it wants a friendly government in Kabul, which does not serve as a destabilising factor here.
But Islamabad also needs to unburden itself from many of its Cold War-era baggage in its own enlightened self-interest and curb the violent non-state actors that have agendas clashing its vital, long term goals.
With the trust gap continuing to haunt Pakistan-US relations, our troubles are far from over even after the restoration of Nato supplies, though the decision will help in lowering tensions. A politically embattled government here, which is desperate to complete its five-year term and eyeing the next elections, has limited time and choices at its disposal. The US presidential race has also squeezed options for Washington which means relations between the two countries will remain on a rocky path in the months to come – at least until the hurly burly of elections are over. Even after that it will be a steep climb.

The Sensible Course

By Amir Zia
The News
Wednesday, June 13, 2012

The tense Pakistan-US relations can only be good news for Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban and of course their cheerleaders in the country’s mainstream religious and rightwing parties opposed to Islamabad’s cooperation in the international effort against terrorism. But this bodes ill for Pakistan’s long-term geo-strategic and economic interests.


The tidings from Washington are getting ominous for Pakistan. In yet another sign of worsening ties, the Pentagon announced withdrawal of its negotiators from Pakistan after weeks of talks over the reopening of Nato supply routes into Afghanistan ended in failure. Though the Pentagon tried to give a diplomatic gloss to its decision by saying that the United States remains willing for dialogue over the issue, there are clear indications that the gridlock between the two sides is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.

Earlier, Washington’s frustration with Pakistan was highlighted by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, who in hard-hitting statements made in New Delhi, Kabul and Washington in a span of less than a week, reiterated his government’s position of no letup in drone strikes on what it terms Al- Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding in Pakistan’s northern region. His warning that the United States was “losing patience” with Islamabad over its failure to eliminate safe havens for insurgents reflects the growing chasm and distrust between these two uneasy allies in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In the words of Panetta, the United States is now at war in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata) from where militants allegedly mount cross-border attacks on US forces in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s efforts to underplay these statements – now being echoed at the highest level of the US administration and Congress – and cliché-ridden diplomatic explanations that the country will follow its well-thought-out strategy to eradicate terrorism under its own timeline, falls too short, given the grave challenge it faces on the external and internal fronts. The point is that it’s not business as usual in Pakistan-US relations and the country’s international isolation is growing. Under the current civilian and military leadership, Pakistan has not only lost its initiative – which once it had – in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its inspired local militants, but is increasingly seen as an unwilling partner in the UN-mandated international efforts against terrorism. This lack of drive in combating terrorism stands in stark contrast to former military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s days in which quick decisions were taken on crucial foreign policy issues and there was a sea-change in the way Pakistan dealt with militants.
The tense Pakistan-US relations can only be good news for Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban and of course their cheerleaders in the country’s mainstream religious and rightwing parties opposed to Islamabad’s cooperation in the international effort against terrorism. But this bodes ill for Pakistan’s long-term geo-strategic and economic interests.
In politics, be it national or international, perceptions matters the most. And the hard fact is that today the international perception about Pakistan’s commitment in the war on terrorism remains highly questionable. The country is seen as a safe haven for terrorists from across the globe. In many high-profile terrorist incidents not just in the region, but around the world, investigation threads often lead towards Pakistan.
The Haqqani network, the Al-Qaeda operatives and the Afghan Taliban – from their lowly soldiers to their leaders – all have footprints on our soil and allegedly use it to rest, regroup and plan assaults across the porous border into Afghanistan. The response of Pakistan’s current civil and military leadership to this perception appears to be that of self-denial and their position of tackling the problem at their own sweet pace lacks the urgency which the international community demands from them. No wonder, Pakistani narrative finds few takers in important world capitals. This, indeed, is sad, given the fact that Pakistan paid a far higher price than the US and any of its Nato allies in this war, with more than 36,000 dead that include thousands of security personnel.
The recent killing of Al-Qaeda’s number two, Abu Yahya al-Libi, in a US drone attack in a village of North Waziristan, has come as yet another blow to Pakistan, where terror mastermind Osama bin Laden was also killed by the US Marines in May last year. These high-profile killings of Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives came against the backdrop of continued rejections of charges by top Pakistani officials about the presence of militant leadership in the country. But the killing of al-Libi again exposed these statements and undermined Islamabad’s demand for a halt to US drone attacks, which have been fairly effective in targeting militants despite concerns about civilian deaths in collateral damage.
The surge in the number of drone attacks under US President Barrack Obama’s administration – seen as one of the key stumbling blocks in Pakistan-US relations – has resulted largely because of Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to act against foreign and local militants. From the US point-of-view, the logic is simple: if you can’t act against them, we will.
Given the high-stakes in Afghanistan’s endgame in which Nato allies plan to end their combat operation sometime in 2013 and hand over security to Afghan security forces, Pakistan indeed appears an odd man out as its leadership drags its feet in going for decisive steps to combat the twin ghost of extremism and terrorism that also threaten its own stability and future.
Since Bin Laden’s killing, which embarrassed Pakistan’s military establishment, there has been a rapid deterioration in relations between the two sides as Pakistan curtailed cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The attack of US choppers on the Salala check post in November that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers proved to be the proverbial last straw, following which Islamabad closed the Nato supply routes.
As anti-American sentiment was drummed up in an organised manner through different shades of legal and banned religious groups, as well as rightwing leaders like Imran Khan, the mainstream political parties present in parliament got swayed away under what is being dubbed as “popular pressure,” rather than moving quickly on addressing the fundamental issues marring Pakistan-US relations. The civilian and military leadership failed to give a vision and direction to Pakistan’s foreign and geostrategic policy keeping in view the new realities and challenges. Apparently, they remain stuck with the old game of keeping a few options handy among militants on the assumptions that it will be back to the good old days of 1990s once the United States and Nato troops end combat operations in Afghanistan. But the world has changed and the old games of duplicity in the stated policy and covert action won’t take us anywhere.
The brinkmanship in relations with the United States on account of the Salala post tragedy and connecting it to unrelated issues including revision of Nato cargo tariff upwards is in no way any kind of statesmanship. Instead of trying to resolve the issue on a war footing, the government wasted precious time in emotional debate in parliament and tried to play the popular card rather than leading and moulding public opinion for a sensible and rational solution. When the United States wanted to get over Salala after issuing an apology, we jacked up stakes from where it is now difficult for the civil and military leaders to climb down without losing face.
In the US election year, Obama will be more aggressive in getting results on the Afghan warfront as he wants to be seen as a strong leader. Expecting concessions at this crucial juncture from his administration is too unrealistic. On the other hand, the Pakistani establishment’s strategy, if there is one, appears to wait for the exit of the US and Nato troops and then show its cards. Therefore, to expect a breakthrough in the impasse seems a fry cry in the coming months, which will have its negative repercussions on Pakistan especially its economy. For Islamabad, the sensible course should be to keep itself aligned with the international community, rather than going for an adventurous course. But perhaps common sense and rationality is too much to ask in the Land of the Pure.

The Stalling Game

By Amir Zia
May 2011
Newsline

Faced with increasing pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, will this government swallow the bitter pill of reforms or resort to stalling tactics yet again?

When it comes to Pakistan’s relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one thing is now clear – there is no money for the country under any new or old programme until the government implements its promised reforms in which expanding the tax base and stopping wasteful expenditures remain the top items on the agenda.
This was perhaps the crux of the matter that emerged from Finance Minister Dr Abdul Hafeez Shaikh and his team’s recent trip to Washington where they met with top IMF and the World Bank officials in an attempt to salvage the government’s reputation, tarnished by its inability to keep its promises to the global lending agencies. The toughening of IMF’s stance toward Pakistan was clear even in its programme note issued on April 7, a few days prior to Dr Shaikh and his entourage’s departure for Washington for a series of much-hyped spring meetings.
The IMF, in an unprecedented strongly-worded language, said that the structural reforms “have been retarded or reversed in 2010 and 2011.”
IMF, which approved a standby arrangement for Pakistan in November 2008 and augmented it in August 2009, imposed a technical suspension of its $11.3 billion programme in May 2010 after the disbursement of $7.6 billion due to the government’s inability to implement the reform agenda. Islamabad did manage to get a nine-month extension in the programme as a face-saving measure. However, its efforts to get the IMF programme back on the track have so far proved futile because the global lending agency is not prepared to settle on anything less than practical steps.
IMF’s April 7 programme note says that under its standby arrangement, Pakistan’s economy initially made progress toward stabilisation. “Macroeconomic imbalances shrank and inflation fell below 10% in mid-2009. More recently, however, the budget deficit has increased, reaching 6.3% of the GDP in 2009/10 (July-June), and inflation has been on the rise, recording 13% in March 2011.”
The note further states that since June 2009, the authorities exceeded the budget deficit targets under the programme, among others, due to large additional subsidies for the electricity sector. “The overrun on the fiscal deficit target at end-June 2010 reached 1.7% of GDP.”
According to Finance Ministry sources there appears to be an increasing frustration among top IMF officials towards the government’s lack of willingness and commitment to the reform process.
The value-added tax (VAT) had effectively been torpedoed by political parties and various interest groups. The reformed general sales tax (RGST), which was supposed to be enforced at the start of the current fiscal year, has been delayed by one year.
The untargeted subsidies on energy remain a constant drain on the national exchequer. The subsidy on electricity alone stands at more than 200 billion rupees during the current fiscal, while the haemorrhage from the public sector companies stands around 300 billion rupees. The fuel subsidy during a three-month period of November 1 to end-February also stands at around 15 billion rupees.
This has resulted in the widening of the budget deficit, slashing of annual development programmes, and an increased bank borrowing, which not only had an inflationary impact, but also crowded out the private sector from the credit chain.
The government’s measures to mobilise more than 50 billion rupees in March through three ordinances came as too little and too late. Even on this front, the government scrapped some vital measures under the pressure of vested groups.
Finance Minister Shaikh and his team have been unable to get rid of their lethargic and laid-back attitude, which has become a hallmark of their management style. They not only failed to convince their political bosses of the necessity of reforms, but have made little effort to build a consensus and advocate their case by proactively engaging various trade and business organisations, the media, and the opposition parties.
Sources say that the IMF officials in their Washington meetings have made it clear to Shaikh and his delegation members that the resumption of the stalled programme remains linked to the implementation of reforms – for which the coming budget would provide a litmus test. An IMF team will be here in Pakistan in May to engage Pakistani officials in the budget preparations. It will revisit Pakistan in July to review whether the government has been able to get the promised budgetary measures passed through the parliament – which has so far proved to be the main stumbling block in the reform process.
Tax on agricultural income, enforcement of RGST and stopping wasteful expenditure remain top items on the agenda and the government will have to move on them and convince its allies and the opposition that they remain vital for the economy.
“Getting a new IMF programme was not on the table for discussion,” says a source close to Finance Minister. “We aim to get the stalled programme resumed because it is the matter of the country’s credibility.”
Government officials say that remaining on track with the IMF is extremely important for Pakistan because engagement with, and support from, the global lending agency sends a positive signal to the foreign investors and the international community.
However, Pakistan’s finance team has not been able to win the confidence of IMF officials, who view their promises with increasing scepticism. Some officials in the Pakistan team are known for their anti-IMF stance because of their political beliefs and their participation in the discussions did not prove to be of much help in ironing out the differences with the fund, say government sources.
While IMF-bashing remains the best pastime of most leading Pakistani politicians and political parties, the fund should not be blamed for the country’s economic woes, which stem from the government’s myopic policies and its inability to take the right decision at the right time. This has hit the common man the hardest.
The government should focus on measures to boost growth, increase revenues including taking measures to tax the rich and the affluent and stop wasteful expenditures. That’s what the world, including the IMF, is asking Pakistan to do – and it makes sense.
Shockingly, in a country of more than 170 million people, less than 3.0 million are registered tax payers and out of them only 2.7 million are active tax payers. The country’s tax-to-GDP ratio remains one of the lowest in the world at a slim 10%, only ahead of countries like Afghanistan and lagging behind even regional countries including Sri Lanka and India, which stand at a respectable 15% and 18% respectively.
As Pakistan remains in the vicious cycle of low growth, high-inflation and widening budget deficit for the last three years, the government appears clueless on how to put the country back on the high growth trajectory for which low and stable inflation and low interest rates remain a must.
But for a government, which wasted the first three years of its term and hesitated to take tough decisions on the economic front, would it be prudent to expect that it would be able to bite the bullet and go for the bitter pill of reforms at the fag-end of its term when political pundits are already setting eyes on the next elections.
Few believe that the government will be able to go for any meaningful reforms. But under pressure from the global lending agencies and the world powers, it can’t just sit and wait either. The era of free money and free lunches is now over. How the government balances the demands of popular politics with the demands of the economy remains a moot point. The budget for 2011-2012 will reveal how the government sets its priorities and manages the political dissent of its allies and the opposition. The government’s record in this regard is not exactly encouraging, but it would make sense even for the opposition parties to help push the reforms through now when the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) is in power so that they can reap the benefit of the tough decisions two to three years down the road. Will sanity prevail and will the opposition stop opposing the reforms for their own narrow vested interests?

Washington’s tough talk

By Amir Zia
The News -- Wednesday, May 12, 2010

The US frustration over Pakistan’s inability to curb militant activities on its soil and counter the scourge of extremist mindset has spilled again in public. This time, the tough-talk came from none other than US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who, in an interview with CBS, said that Washington warned Islamabad of "severe consequences" if a successful extremist attack in the United States was traced back to Pakistan. In the interview, Clinton’s praise for Pakistan’s recent role in the war on terrorism comes as an after-thought and a balancing act with an uneasy ally, which appears dragging feet on many issues seen crucial by Washington and its western partners in the fight against Al Qaeda and other militant groups inspired by it.

Although Clinton refrained from explaining what the United States meant by those "severe consequences", the tough overtones of her message to Pakistan’s civil and military leadership came through loud and clear, underlining both the complexity and fragility of relationship between the two countries.

The Obama administration, which so far proved more considerate than its predecessor regarding Islamabad’s difficulties in tackling the problem of terrorism and extremism, slightly deviated from its approach by giving a tough public message. While many Pakistani politicians, analysts and commentators are likely to see Clinton’s statement as yet another opportunity to fan anti-US hysteria in the country and discuss myriad conspiracy theories, there has been hardly any serious soul-searching regarding the fact that why most global and regional acts of terror have their tentacles in Pakistan. Why does Pakistan attract fanatics and extremists of all shades and colours from across the globe? Why does it remain a fertile breeding ground for the local militant and extremist groups?

Faisal Shahzad, belonging to an educated and affluent family, is the latest, but definitely not the last, addition to the long and expanding list of Pakistani extremists -- going international. And even before the US secretary of state appeared on CBS, many Pakistani political pundits started calling this arrest as yet another "American conspiracy" against the Islamic Republic. The fact that this educated gentleman tried to explode a bomb in the heart of New York was conveniently forgotten and so was the information that he was trained to do so in the lawless tribal region of Pakistan.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi seemed to brush aside the attempted terror assault by saying that it was a reaction to drone attacks on Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal region – a fait accompli. His statement seems to provide justification more on behalf of the Taliban’s actions rather than express Pakistan’s determination to tackle the problem. A couple of days later Qureshi seems to calm his agitated nerves by saying that Faisal is not a Pakistani national, but a naturalised American citizen. As if this fact would help end Pakistan’s responsibility. Pakistan’s powerful military establishment, despite being on the forefront in the war on terrorism, in its initial reaction appeared in self-denial regarding Faisal’s suspected links with the Pakistani terror network. Inter-Services Public Relations’ Director General Major-General Athar Abbas said that it was premature to say that Faisal, son of a retired high-ranking air force official, had any connection with extremists operating in Pakistan.

This casual approach and off-the-cuff statements of civil and military officials are not going to help Pakistan ward off the tremendous pressure by the world and regional powers, which are singling it out for being the hub of terrorist and extremist forces. The world justifiably wants Pakistan to establish the writ of state on its territory. That means putting an end to the private militias, self-styled religious militant groups, their ideological mentors, financiers and abettors. Certainly, the task is easier said than done if one keeps in mind the past role of the state and its western allies, who helped create these very monsters they are being forced to fight now.

The Pakistani state failed to establish its writ on vast stretches of its territory, allowing them to stay lawless, ungoverned and backward. The task of establishing the writ became more complex and difficult due to the fact that religious extremism and fanaticism have countless facets and shades both in the mainstream urban centres as well as rural areas. Small and seemingly innocent ideological, political and financial contributions even by lawful and legal institutions and organisations often contribute in promoting radicalism and militancy in society. And the irony remains that the state institutions themselves played a major role in promoting these groups, which hound them now and refuse to unravel.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the civil and military leadership failed to see and tackle the issue in its totality. Pakistan’s approach since the Musharraf era has been fire-fighting and managing those broken arrows that failed to follow dictates of the state under the changed post-9/11 circumstances. The thrust of this approach has been more on fighting the symptoms rather than changing the direction of state policy and taking long-term measures for the eradication of religious extremism in all its forms and manifestations.

Even now, Pakistan seems to act under pressure against extremist individuals and groups, but leaving enough space where they can regroup, breathe, rest, revitalise and attack. Pakistan’s lack of will or inability to act in a decisive manner against the terror network and its support structure is bringing more pressure on Islamabad. The message as stated by US Attorney General Eric Holder following the failed New York terror attack remains loud and clear -- either Islamabad acts against these forces or let the other do this task.

But Washington’s tough public talk makes the Pakistan government’s job more difficult. It gives firepower to the opposition and rightwing groups to confuse and scuttle the real issues of extremism and terrorism in the anti-US rhetoric. Yes, public warnings only strengthen the reactionary and extremist forces. The US should be seen as helping Pakistan in coming out of the vortex of terrorism rather than giving an impression that it is being bullied by the superpower. Just as in the case with India, militants will go to any extent to put strains in the Pakistan-US relations if they could with a terror strike, which remains a possibility.

Knee-jerk reactions and public warnings would certainly be counterproductive. On its part, Pakistan in its own enlightened self-interest should take the ownership of the war against extremism and terrorism, which is hurting the country more than any other nation. Along with surgical military operations, there is a need to counter militants and their allies on ideological and political grounds – a front which so far has been ignored.

Pakistani leaders should also ponder as to what the United States means by "severe consequences". As the tidings are, pressure on Islamabad is all set to increase. Will civil and military leaders be able to use this pressure to the country’s advantage? Pakistan needs a proactive approach rather than a reactionary one when it comes to combating terrorism. And most important, Islamabad has to come out straight regarding its efforts and sacrifices and match its words with action.