By Amir Zia
The News
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
The tense Pakistan-US relations can only be good news for Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban and of course their cheerleaders in the country’s mainstream religious and rightwing parties opposed to Islamabad’s cooperation in the international effort against terrorism. But this bodes ill for Pakistan’s long-term geo-strategic and economic interests.
The tidings from Washington are getting ominous for Pakistan. In yet another sign of worsening ties, the Pentagon announced withdrawal of its negotiators from Pakistan after weeks of talks over the reopening of Nato supply routes into Afghanistan ended in failure. Though the Pentagon tried to give a diplomatic gloss to its decision by saying that the United States remains willing for dialogue over the issue, there are clear indications that the gridlock between the two sides is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
Earlier, Washington’s frustration with Pakistan was highlighted by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, who in hard-hitting statements made in New Delhi, Kabul and Washington in a span of less than a week, reiterated his government’s position of no letup in drone strikes on what it terms Al- Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding in Pakistan’s northern region. His warning that the United States was “losing patience” with Islamabad over its failure to eliminate safe havens for insurgents reflects the growing chasm and distrust between these two uneasy allies in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In the words of Panetta, the United States is now at war in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata) from where militants allegedly mount cross-border attacks on US forces in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s efforts to underplay these statements – now being echoed at the highest level of the US administration and Congress – and cliché-ridden diplomatic explanations that the country will follow its well-thought-out strategy to eradicate terrorism under its own timeline, falls too short, given the grave challenge it faces on the external and internal fronts. The point is that it’s not business as usual in Pakistan-US relations and the country’s international isolation is growing. Under the current civilian and military leadership, Pakistan has not only lost its initiative – which once it had – in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its inspired local militants, but is increasingly seen as an unwilling partner in the UN-mandated international efforts against terrorism. This lack of drive in combating terrorism stands in stark contrast to former military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s days in which quick decisions were taken on crucial foreign policy issues and there was a sea-change in the way Pakistan dealt with militants.
The tense Pakistan-US relations can only be good news for Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban and of course their cheerleaders in the country’s mainstream religious and rightwing parties opposed to Islamabad’s cooperation in the international effort against terrorism. But this bodes ill for Pakistan’s long-term geo-strategic and economic interests.
In politics, be it national or international, perceptions matters the most. And the hard fact is that today the international perception about Pakistan’s commitment in the war on terrorism remains highly questionable. The country is seen as a safe haven for terrorists from across the globe. In many high-profile terrorist incidents not just in the region, but around the world, investigation threads often lead towards Pakistan.
The Haqqani network, the Al-Qaeda operatives and the Afghan Taliban – from their lowly soldiers to their leaders – all have footprints on our soil and allegedly use it to rest, regroup and plan assaults across the porous border into Afghanistan. The response of Pakistan’s current civil and military leadership to this perception appears to be that of self-denial and their position of tackling the problem at their own sweet pace lacks the urgency which the international community demands from them. No wonder, Pakistani narrative finds few takers in important world capitals. This, indeed, is sad, given the fact that Pakistan paid a far higher price than the US and any of its Nato allies in this war, with more than 36,000 dead that include thousands of security personnel.
The recent killing of Al-Qaeda’s number two, Abu Yahya al-Libi, in a US drone attack in a village of North Waziristan, has come as yet another blow to Pakistan, where terror mastermind Osama bin Laden was also killed by the US Marines in May last year. These high-profile killings of Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives came against the backdrop of continued rejections of charges by top Pakistani officials about the presence of militant leadership in the country. But the killing of al-Libi again exposed these statements and undermined Islamabad’s demand for a halt to US drone attacks, which have been fairly effective in targeting militants despite concerns about civilian deaths in collateral damage.
The surge in the number of drone attacks under US President Barrack Obama’s administration – seen as one of the key stumbling blocks in Pakistan-US relations – has resulted largely because of Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to act against foreign and local militants. From the US point-of-view, the logic is simple: if you can’t act against them, we will.
Given the high-stakes in Afghanistan’s endgame in which Nato allies plan to end their combat operation sometime in 2013 and hand over security to Afghan security forces, Pakistan indeed appears an odd man out as its leadership drags its feet in going for decisive steps to combat the twin ghost of extremism and terrorism that also threaten its own stability and future.
Since Bin Laden’s killing, which embarrassed Pakistan’s military establishment, there has been a rapid deterioration in relations between the two sides as Pakistan curtailed cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The attack of US choppers on the Salala check post in November that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers proved to be the proverbial last straw, following which Islamabad closed the Nato supply routes.
As anti-American sentiment was drummed up in an organised manner through different shades of legal and banned religious groups, as well as rightwing leaders like Imran Khan, the mainstream political parties present in parliament got swayed away under what is being dubbed as “popular pressure,” rather than moving quickly on addressing the fundamental issues marring Pakistan-US relations. The civilian and military leadership failed to give a vision and direction to Pakistan’s foreign and geostrategic policy keeping in view the new realities and challenges. Apparently, they remain stuck with the old game of keeping a few options handy among militants on the assumptions that it will be back to the good old days of 1990s once the United States and Nato troops end combat operations in Afghanistan. But the world has changed and the old games of duplicity in the stated policy and covert action won’t take us anywhere.
The brinkmanship in relations with the United States on account of the Salala post tragedy and connecting it to unrelated issues including revision of Nato cargo tariff upwards is in no way any kind of statesmanship. Instead of trying to resolve the issue on a war footing, the government wasted precious time in emotional debate in parliament and tried to play the popular card rather than leading and moulding public opinion for a sensible and rational solution. When the United States wanted to get over Salala after issuing an apology, we jacked up stakes from where it is now difficult for the civil and military leaders to climb down without losing face.
In the US election year, Obama will be more aggressive in getting results on the Afghan warfront as he wants to be seen as a strong leader. Expecting concessions at this crucial juncture from his administration is too unrealistic. On the other hand, the Pakistani establishment’s strategy, if there is one, appears to wait for the exit of the US and Nato troops and then show its cards. Therefore, to expect a breakthrough in the impasse seems a fry cry in the coming months, which will have its negative repercussions on Pakistan especially its economy. For Islamabad, the sensible course should be to keep itself aligned with the international community, rather than going for an adventurous course. But perhaps common sense and rationality is too much to ask in the Land of the Pure.
The News
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
The tense Pakistan-US relations can only be good news for Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban and of course their cheerleaders in the country’s mainstream religious and rightwing parties opposed to Islamabad’s cooperation in the international effort against terrorism. But this bodes ill for Pakistan’s long-term geo-strategic and economic interests.
The tidings from Washington are getting ominous for Pakistan. In yet another sign of worsening ties, the Pentagon announced withdrawal of its negotiators from Pakistan after weeks of talks over the reopening of Nato supply routes into Afghanistan ended in failure. Though the Pentagon tried to give a diplomatic gloss to its decision by saying that the United States remains willing for dialogue over the issue, there are clear indications that the gridlock between the two sides is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
Earlier, Washington’s frustration with Pakistan was highlighted by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, who in hard-hitting statements made in New Delhi, Kabul and Washington in a span of less than a week, reiterated his government’s position of no letup in drone strikes on what it terms Al- Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding in Pakistan’s northern region. His warning that the United States was “losing patience” with Islamabad over its failure to eliminate safe havens for insurgents reflects the growing chasm and distrust between these two uneasy allies in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In the words of Panetta, the United States is now at war in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata) from where militants allegedly mount cross-border attacks on US forces in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s efforts to underplay these statements – now being echoed at the highest level of the US administration and Congress – and cliché-ridden diplomatic explanations that the country will follow its well-thought-out strategy to eradicate terrorism under its own timeline, falls too short, given the grave challenge it faces on the external and internal fronts. The point is that it’s not business as usual in Pakistan-US relations and the country’s international isolation is growing. Under the current civilian and military leadership, Pakistan has not only lost its initiative – which once it had – in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its inspired local militants, but is increasingly seen as an unwilling partner in the UN-mandated international efforts against terrorism. This lack of drive in combating terrorism stands in stark contrast to former military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s days in which quick decisions were taken on crucial foreign policy issues and there was a sea-change in the way Pakistan dealt with militants.
The tense Pakistan-US relations can only be good news for Al-Qaeda, the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban and of course their cheerleaders in the country’s mainstream religious and rightwing parties opposed to Islamabad’s cooperation in the international effort against terrorism. But this bodes ill for Pakistan’s long-term geo-strategic and economic interests.
In politics, be it national or international, perceptions matters the most. And the hard fact is that today the international perception about Pakistan’s commitment in the war on terrorism remains highly questionable. The country is seen as a safe haven for terrorists from across the globe. In many high-profile terrorist incidents not just in the region, but around the world, investigation threads often lead towards Pakistan.
The Haqqani network, the Al-Qaeda operatives and the Afghan Taliban – from their lowly soldiers to their leaders – all have footprints on our soil and allegedly use it to rest, regroup and plan assaults across the porous border into Afghanistan. The response of Pakistan’s current civil and military leadership to this perception appears to be that of self-denial and their position of tackling the problem at their own sweet pace lacks the urgency which the international community demands from them. No wonder, Pakistani narrative finds few takers in important world capitals. This, indeed, is sad, given the fact that Pakistan paid a far higher price than the US and any of its Nato allies in this war, with more than 36,000 dead that include thousands of security personnel.
The recent killing of Al-Qaeda’s number two, Abu Yahya al-Libi, in a US drone attack in a village of North Waziristan, has come as yet another blow to Pakistan, where terror mastermind Osama bin Laden was also killed by the US Marines in May last year. These high-profile killings of Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives came against the backdrop of continued rejections of charges by top Pakistani officials about the presence of militant leadership in the country. But the killing of al-Libi again exposed these statements and undermined Islamabad’s demand for a halt to US drone attacks, which have been fairly effective in targeting militants despite concerns about civilian deaths in collateral damage.
The surge in the number of drone attacks under US President Barrack Obama’s administration – seen as one of the key stumbling blocks in Pakistan-US relations – has resulted largely because of Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to act against foreign and local militants. From the US point-of-view, the logic is simple: if you can’t act against them, we will.
Given the high-stakes in Afghanistan’s endgame in which Nato allies plan to end their combat operation sometime in 2013 and hand over security to Afghan security forces, Pakistan indeed appears an odd man out as its leadership drags its feet in going for decisive steps to combat the twin ghost of extremism and terrorism that also threaten its own stability and future.
Since Bin Laden’s killing, which embarrassed Pakistan’s military establishment, there has been a rapid deterioration in relations between the two sides as Pakistan curtailed cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The attack of US choppers on the Salala check post in November that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers proved to be the proverbial last straw, following which Islamabad closed the Nato supply routes.
As anti-American sentiment was drummed up in an organised manner through different shades of legal and banned religious groups, as well as rightwing leaders like Imran Khan, the mainstream political parties present in parliament got swayed away under what is being dubbed as “popular pressure,” rather than moving quickly on addressing the fundamental issues marring Pakistan-US relations. The civilian and military leadership failed to give a vision and direction to Pakistan’s foreign and geostrategic policy keeping in view the new realities and challenges. Apparently, they remain stuck with the old game of keeping a few options handy among militants on the assumptions that it will be back to the good old days of 1990s once the United States and Nato troops end combat operations in Afghanistan. But the world has changed and the old games of duplicity in the stated policy and covert action won’t take us anywhere.
The brinkmanship in relations with the United States on account of the Salala post tragedy and connecting it to unrelated issues including revision of Nato cargo tariff upwards is in no way any kind of statesmanship. Instead of trying to resolve the issue on a war footing, the government wasted precious time in emotional debate in parliament and tried to play the popular card rather than leading and moulding public opinion for a sensible and rational solution. When the United States wanted to get over Salala after issuing an apology, we jacked up stakes from where it is now difficult for the civil and military leaders to climb down without losing face.
In the US election year, Obama will be more aggressive in getting results on the Afghan warfront as he wants to be seen as a strong leader. Expecting concessions at this crucial juncture from his administration is too unrealistic. On the other hand, the Pakistani establishment’s strategy, if there is one, appears to wait for the exit of the US and Nato troops and then show its cards. Therefore, to expect a breakthrough in the impasse seems a fry cry in the coming months, which will have its negative repercussions on Pakistan especially its economy. For Islamabad, the sensible course should be to keep itself aligned with the international community, rather than going for an adventurous course. But perhaps common sense and rationality is too much to ask in the Land of the Pure.
No comments:
Post a Comment