By Amir Zia
April 7, 2014
The News
Satisfying the Jamaat-e-Islami’s cadre and expanding its clout, especially in electoral politics, will be a tough call for its new chief at a time when Islamic hard-liners are coming up with advanced slogans and resorting to do or die actions
In the more than 70-year-long history of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the first-ever refusal of a majority of its members to reselect their sitting chief for the party’s top slot is no ordinary event. This major deviation from the party’s long-set convention highlights the rethinking and ideological tussle about the strategy within its ranks, which remains a dominating question these days for many Islamic groups not just in Pakistan but the world over.
Syed Munawar Hasan, 72, the Jamaat’s outgoing ameer, had long symbolised its old inflexible, non-compromising ideological face. Leaders like him, indeed, remain a fast dwindling breed in the mainstream political and religious parties in this day and age of politics of expediency and pragmatism.
Sirajul Haq, 52, is Munawar Hasan’s much younger successor and is seen as a populist, practical and flexible politician. His ‘unique selling point’, according to Jamaat insiders, remains his vast experience of working in the corridors of power as a senior provincial minister and ability to get along with diverse set of political allies. He reportedly edged passed Hasan in the selection process by a narrow margin to emerge as the Jamaat-e-Islami’s long-term bet for the future.
The Jamaat is likely to redefine its politics under the new chief, who apparently is closer to the late Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s brand of popular politics than Munawar Hasan’s puritan and often confrontationist style.
Ironically, while Munawar Hasan’s political approach failed to expand the Jamaat-e-Islami’s clout in the electoral politics, Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s efforts to do so also came to naught despite diluting the party brand in the form of the Pakistan Islamic Front in the early 1990s and through politics of alliances in the later years.
However, both the radical and populist schools of thought remained committed to working within the democratic system rather than resorting to force or violence for the implementation of Shariah as advocated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan commander Omar Khalid Khurasani in his message to Sirajul Haq.
Which of these options suits the Jamaat more remains a fundamental question not just for its leadership, but perhaps all the Islamic groups striving to seize power in the world’s lone nuclear-armed nation or any other Muslim country.
One may love or hate Munawar Hasan for his blunt, provocative and controversial statements, but he is being seen as representing that idealist mindset which strived for a radical change in the society by remaining within the system.
For many Jamaat supporters and rivals alike, calls for an ‘Islamic revolution’ and yet struggling within the ambit of the constitution remain the biggest dichotomy of this party’s politics and an inherent flaw in its ideological narrative. The Jamaat-e-Islami’s radicals, including Munawar Hasan, appear deeply torn between their desire to work for their ultimate goal of Islamic revolution and their commitment to stay within the ambit of the system.
This delicate ideological balancing was possible during the cold-war era when the local Islamic forces, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, were aligned with Pakistan’s civil and military establishment and the US-led alliance comprising western powers and the conservative Muslim countries against the ‘evil Soviet Empire’ and the common threat of communism. But after the end of the cold war, many Islamic non-state actors, including masterminds of Al-Qaeda, turned their guns toward their western allies of yesteryears, leaving the mainstream Islamic parties in a lurch.
The protracted unresolved conflicts, including those of Palestine and Kashmir, and the apparent western hegemony and the alleged exploitation of resources in the Muslim lands fuelled the anger of Islamists in all parts of the world. These radicals also declared war against those Muslim rulers and institutions seen as ‘collaborators’ and ‘friends’ of Washington and its allied western countries.
In this post cold-war scenario, organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami faced an unprecedented challenge emitting from the hard-line non-state actors, who upped the ante of both ideological narrative and action though militancy – branded as ‘jihad’ or holy war.
This has resulted in the squeezing of space for the old-style, conventional Islamic parties, which offered high-sounding lip-service to the Islamic causes, but worked within the framework of the law.
Even when these conventional religious forces dabbled in militancy, it was with the blessings and support of their establishment as is the case with the Jamaat-e-Islami – among the first groups to provide gun-fodder from Pakistan in the US-sponsored Afghan resistance against the Soviet forces during the 1980s. However, this flirting with militancy was strictly regulated.
On the domestic front, the Jamaat despite being the main proxy in both Afghanistan and occupied Kashmir conflicts, by and large showed a policy of restraint when it came to advancing its goals within the country through the use of muscle power.
The Jamaat’s much touted organised street power and stick and gun-wielding youngsters belonging to the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT), who ruled most major campuses across Pakistan during 1980s and 1990s, today appear as ‘innocent moderates’ if compared with the new generation of Islamic militants involved in terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, that target civilians and security personnel across Pakistan and responsible for more than 50,000 killings.
This radicalisation blunted the influence and importance of the conventional religio-political parties and created confusion within their ranks. No wonder many hard-liners and young members of the Jamaat and its student wing directly joined hands with Al-Qaeda or formed terror cells of their own. A number of Al-Qaeda operative were given refuge by Jamaat members in their houses. This Al-Qaeda inspired dissent penetrated not just the Jamaat but other Islamist groups as well.
From being the main bulwark of the Islamic movement only a few years ago, the Jamaat-e-Islami saw its role and influence diminishing, especially after the former military-led government ended its support to the Afghan Taliban and joined the US-led war against terrorism in the post-9/11 days.
For ideological Jamaat leaders like Munawar Hasan this about-turn in the establishment’s policy was a shocker. There was a sense of betrayal that the Jamaat and its likes were used and then abandoned. He expressed his anger by refusing to condemn acts of terrorism in Pakistan, dubbing terrorist kingpins as martyrs and questioning the sacrifices of Pakistani soldiers killed in the line of duty. His strongly worded statements popularised him among hothead Islamists, but went against the grain of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s politics – one apparent reason for his downfall.
Unlike some other Islamic groups including the Jamaat-ud Dawah, which openly declared terrorism carried out in Pakistan against the tenets of Islam, the Jamaat was seen as an apologist for the actions of the local Taliban and pursued a highly unpopular line.
Munawar Hasan’s decision to boycott the May 2013 elections in Karachi and his rigid and non-comprising style of politics also alienated this aging Jamaat ideologue. Perhaps sensing the mood, he first declined to run in his party’s latest process of selection for the ameer, but he was asked by the Shura to remain a candidate.
The rise of moderate and populist Sirajul Haq to the top slot is likely to help the Jamaat-e-Islami repair its ties with the military establishment in the mid-term. However, a bitter fact remains that many of the strengths of the Jamaat’s new leader are seen as weaknesses by radicals.
He will face pressure from both the sides of the Islamist divide – those who want to work within the system and those wanting to take it on. Going by the party’s recent selection verdict, Sirajul Haq is likely to distance the party from extremists and violent Islamist forces.
But satisfying the Jamaat’s cadre and expanding its clout, especially in electoral politics, will definitely be a tough call for the new ameer at a time when Islamic hard-liners are coming up with advanced slogans and resorting to do or die actions.
How the Jamaat-e-Islami will perform the high-wire act between these competing trends within the Islamic movement is perhaps a $1.5 billion question. For now the Jamaat appears to be on a slippery slope and seems to be struggling for direction.
April 7, 2014
The News
Satisfying the Jamaat-e-Islami’s cadre and expanding its clout, especially in electoral politics, will be a tough call for its new chief at a time when Islamic hard-liners are coming up with advanced slogans and resorting to do or die actions
In the more than 70-year-long history of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the first-ever refusal of a majority of its members to reselect their sitting chief for the party’s top slot is no ordinary event. This major deviation from the party’s long-set convention highlights the rethinking and ideological tussle about the strategy within its ranks, which remains a dominating question these days for many Islamic groups not just in Pakistan but the world over.
Syed Munawar Hasan, 72, the Jamaat’s outgoing ameer, had long symbolised its old inflexible, non-compromising ideological face. Leaders like him, indeed, remain a fast dwindling breed in the mainstream political and religious parties in this day and age of politics of expediency and pragmatism.
Sirajul Haq, 52, is Munawar Hasan’s much younger successor and is seen as a populist, practical and flexible politician. His ‘unique selling point’, according to Jamaat insiders, remains his vast experience of working in the corridors of power as a senior provincial minister and ability to get along with diverse set of political allies. He reportedly edged passed Hasan in the selection process by a narrow margin to emerge as the Jamaat-e-Islami’s long-term bet for the future.
The Jamaat is likely to redefine its politics under the new chief, who apparently is closer to the late Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s brand of popular politics than Munawar Hasan’s puritan and often confrontationist style.
Ironically, while Munawar Hasan’s political approach failed to expand the Jamaat-e-Islami’s clout in the electoral politics, Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s efforts to do so also came to naught despite diluting the party brand in the form of the Pakistan Islamic Front in the early 1990s and through politics of alliances in the later years.
However, both the radical and populist schools of thought remained committed to working within the democratic system rather than resorting to force or violence for the implementation of Shariah as advocated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan commander Omar Khalid Khurasani in his message to Sirajul Haq.
Which of these options suits the Jamaat more remains a fundamental question not just for its leadership, but perhaps all the Islamic groups striving to seize power in the world’s lone nuclear-armed nation or any other Muslim country.
One may love or hate Munawar Hasan for his blunt, provocative and controversial statements, but he is being seen as representing that idealist mindset which strived for a radical change in the society by remaining within the system.
For many Jamaat supporters and rivals alike, calls for an ‘Islamic revolution’ and yet struggling within the ambit of the constitution remain the biggest dichotomy of this party’s politics and an inherent flaw in its ideological narrative. The Jamaat-e-Islami’s radicals, including Munawar Hasan, appear deeply torn between their desire to work for their ultimate goal of Islamic revolution and their commitment to stay within the ambit of the system.
This delicate ideological balancing was possible during the cold-war era when the local Islamic forces, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, were aligned with Pakistan’s civil and military establishment and the US-led alliance comprising western powers and the conservative Muslim countries against the ‘evil Soviet Empire’ and the common threat of communism. But after the end of the cold war, many Islamic non-state actors, including masterminds of Al-Qaeda, turned their guns toward their western allies of yesteryears, leaving the mainstream Islamic parties in a lurch.
The protracted unresolved conflicts, including those of Palestine and Kashmir, and the apparent western hegemony and the alleged exploitation of resources in the Muslim lands fuelled the anger of Islamists in all parts of the world. These radicals also declared war against those Muslim rulers and institutions seen as ‘collaborators’ and ‘friends’ of Washington and its allied western countries.
In this post cold-war scenario, organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami faced an unprecedented challenge emitting from the hard-line non-state actors, who upped the ante of both ideological narrative and action though militancy – branded as ‘jihad’ or holy war.
This has resulted in the squeezing of space for the old-style, conventional Islamic parties, which offered high-sounding lip-service to the Islamic causes, but worked within the framework of the law.
Even when these conventional religious forces dabbled in militancy, it was with the blessings and support of their establishment as is the case with the Jamaat-e-Islami – among the first groups to provide gun-fodder from Pakistan in the US-sponsored Afghan resistance against the Soviet forces during the 1980s. However, this flirting with militancy was strictly regulated.
On the domestic front, the Jamaat despite being the main proxy in both Afghanistan and occupied Kashmir conflicts, by and large showed a policy of restraint when it came to advancing its goals within the country through the use of muscle power.
The Jamaat’s much touted organised street power and stick and gun-wielding youngsters belonging to the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT), who ruled most major campuses across Pakistan during 1980s and 1990s, today appear as ‘innocent moderates’ if compared with the new generation of Islamic militants involved in terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, that target civilians and security personnel across Pakistan and responsible for more than 50,000 killings.
This radicalisation blunted the influence and importance of the conventional religio-political parties and created confusion within their ranks. No wonder many hard-liners and young members of the Jamaat and its student wing directly joined hands with Al-Qaeda or formed terror cells of their own. A number of Al-Qaeda operative were given refuge by Jamaat members in their houses. This Al-Qaeda inspired dissent penetrated not just the Jamaat but other Islamist groups as well.
From being the main bulwark of the Islamic movement only a few years ago, the Jamaat-e-Islami saw its role and influence diminishing, especially after the former military-led government ended its support to the Afghan Taliban and joined the US-led war against terrorism in the post-9/11 days.
For ideological Jamaat leaders like Munawar Hasan this about-turn in the establishment’s policy was a shocker. There was a sense of betrayal that the Jamaat and its likes were used and then abandoned. He expressed his anger by refusing to condemn acts of terrorism in Pakistan, dubbing terrorist kingpins as martyrs and questioning the sacrifices of Pakistani soldiers killed in the line of duty. His strongly worded statements popularised him among hothead Islamists, but went against the grain of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s politics – one apparent reason for his downfall.
Unlike some other Islamic groups including the Jamaat-ud Dawah, which openly declared terrorism carried out in Pakistan against the tenets of Islam, the Jamaat was seen as an apologist for the actions of the local Taliban and pursued a highly unpopular line.
Munawar Hasan’s decision to boycott the May 2013 elections in Karachi and his rigid and non-comprising style of politics also alienated this aging Jamaat ideologue. Perhaps sensing the mood, he first declined to run in his party’s latest process of selection for the ameer, but he was asked by the Shura to remain a candidate.
The rise of moderate and populist Sirajul Haq to the top slot is likely to help the Jamaat-e-Islami repair its ties with the military establishment in the mid-term. However, a bitter fact remains that many of the strengths of the Jamaat’s new leader are seen as weaknesses by radicals.
He will face pressure from both the sides of the Islamist divide – those who want to work within the system and those wanting to take it on. Going by the party’s recent selection verdict, Sirajul Haq is likely to distance the party from extremists and violent Islamist forces.
But satisfying the Jamaat’s cadre and expanding its clout, especially in electoral politics, will definitely be a tough call for the new ameer at a time when Islamic hard-liners are coming up with advanced slogans and resorting to do or die actions.
How the Jamaat-e-Islami will perform the high-wire act between these competing trends within the Islamic movement is perhaps a $1.5 billion question. For now the Jamaat appears to be on a slippery slope and seems to be struggling for direction.
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