By Amir Zia
January 27, 2014
The News
The powerful military establishment that appears more focused and serious on taking on the challenge of terrorism remains constrained because of weak and divided civilian partners.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has finally indicated it will use force against select bands of the local Taliban militants after months of indecisiveness and inaction. The mantra of peace talks has not been abandoned, but going by reports of the January 23 meeting between top civil and military leaders, it seems that ‘surgical strikes’ against these al-Qaeda linked militants are now on the cards following the recent surge in terrorist attacks across Pakistan.
The government has also amended the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance, allowing security agencies to keep suspects of terrorism and “enemies” of the state under detention for an indefinite period. The Sharif government has also hinted at lifting the moratorium on the death penalty – placed by the former PPP government and being seen by devout Muslims as against the tenets of Islam and the country’s constitution.
Are these the usual fire-fighting measures taken whenever there is a spike in killings and violence, or does the civil-military leadership really want to address the root cause of the problem and pursue a holistic strategy to counter terrorism and reestablish the writ of the state and supremacy of the law? Perhaps it is too early to gauge the government’s mid- to long-term resolve and intentions on this crucial issue, but the cautious approach of the top leadership underlines the fact that one should not accept any swift, broad-based and decisive action against these non-state actors, who are determined to bring down the state of Pakistan.
The Sharif government has reluctantly inched towards the ‘fight and talk’ mood from the ‘peace talks’ frame of mind only after militants carried out a spate of high-profile attacks on security personnel, media workers, polio vaccinators, and ordinary citizens. In doing this, the militants not just upped the ante of violence, but for the first time threatened to target national and international media organisations and leading journalists in an organised manner. For this, the local Taliban militants again circulated a controversial edict, from which some of its leaders distanced themselves only a few months back. The list of targeted media persons and organisations, however, has been revised and expanded.
This has created an unprecedented atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in those segments of the society and urban centres which had considered themselves by and large immune from the terrorist threat.
The elusive militants enjoy an upper hand and initiative in this conflict as they have successfully managed to dominate the national narrative and terrorise dissenting voices against the backdrop of a weak and defensive response from the state institutions.
However, given the highly polarised and ideologically divided state of Pakistan, even the recent symbolic steps taken by the government of making amendments in the law and its vague intentions of carrying out action against militants are all set to intensify the emotional debate, sharpen the friction and trigger bitter criticism both from the right-wing and religious-minded segment of the society as well as the westernised liberal urban elite and human rights organisations.
While the twin ghost of religious extremism and Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism poses the gravest internal challenge to Pakistan’s existence, the main political players and stakeholders have miserably failed to reach a consensus on how to tackle the situation.
There are influential political and religious groups with pockets within the civil and military establishment, which sincerely believe that the war on terror is not Pakistan’s war despite the fact that more than 50,000 people have been killed by the militants since early 2002. Ideologically, these groups and individuals remain sympathetic to militants and share their worldview, though they may not necessarily agree with the tactics of terrorism and killings of fellow Muslims. These forces are socially conservative and politically anti-west.
Even the ruling PML-N mainly banks on the conservative and religiously-minded vote bank. Many PML-N stalwarts do not want to take on the sectarian extremists and the Al-Qaeda linked militants groups and tend to believe that the tide of extremism and terrorism would fizzle out on its own. They want to keep violence and terrorism in check by the combined application of select use of force and a policy of appeasement.
The country’s secular political parties, non-government organisations and the liberal element advocate stern action against extremists and militants, but many of them remain highly sceptical about the role and intentions of the country’s armed forces in dealing with this challenge. They also are deeply divided over the tactics and modalities of any operation against militants and abhor the resumption of the death sentence and other tough measures, which they see as undermining human rights and transforming the country into a ‘security state’.
In the overall scheme of things, the secularists and liberals appear to be fast losing ground to various shades of fundamentalist and right-wing political forces that have a greater hold on society. (However, the religious forces too are politically and ideologically fragmented.)
The powerful military establishment that appears more focused and serious on taking on the challenge of terrorism remains constrained because of weak and divided civilian partners. The planned drawback of the US/Nato troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s perceived desire to maintain proxies in the land-locked state to counter the Indian influence there also hamper an all-out effort against the loosely intertwined militant groups.
The biggest collective failure of the civil and military leaders is that they have been too slow and lacklustre in their response to this challenge.
One expected a better performance from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the start of his third stint in power, but he dragged his feet on all the key issues. Instead of taking a lead and giving direction to the nation in confronting extremism and terrorism, he tried to hide behind the cover of All-Parties Conferences, which failed to come up with a rational analysis to this challenge or suggest a practical strategy to bring peace and normalcy in the country. No wonder, the APC-suggested recipe of peace talks remained a non-starter.
However, an effective response does not mean the use of military option as the one and only preferred choice. It also entails a wide set of initiatives in which finding a common ground between various political forces, Islamic schools of thought and stakeholders on a minimum set of points is foremost.
The support and backing of leading ulema and clerics – especially those belonging to the Deobandi school of thought – is vital for peace as many militants adhere to this puritan version of Islam. At the same time, the government needs to reform the education system, particularly the ungoverned seminaries, which are seen as the breeding ground of militancy. and introduce rehabilitation programmes for militants. This cannot be done without increasing investment in the social and education sectors.
The state and its institutions must show zero tolerance toward all armed groups affiliated with the mainstream political and religious parties, and outlawed groups. The legal political parties can play a role in building this consensus if the ruling party itself shows determination and starts playing by the book.
The military establishment also needs to rethink and redefine its strategy and goals according to the changed global and regional paradigm. The Cold War-era strategy won’t work now. There has been a realisation within the army on this issue since the days of former president Pervez Musharraf when he aligned the country in the US-led war on terrorism in early 2002, abandoned support to the Afghan Taliban and stopped insurgents from going into Indian-held Kashmir.
It is now time to go another step forward and address the international concerns regarding Pakistan by enforcing the writ of the state and ensuring that the territory it is not being used to foment violence and terrorism in the region or around the world.
The lesson of history is that the state threatens its existence when it fails to resolve its internal contradictions.
January 27, 2014
The News
The powerful military establishment that appears more focused and serious on taking on the challenge of terrorism remains constrained because of weak and divided civilian partners.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government has finally indicated it will use force against select bands of the local Taliban militants after months of indecisiveness and inaction. The mantra of peace talks has not been abandoned, but going by reports of the January 23 meeting between top civil and military leaders, it seems that ‘surgical strikes’ against these al-Qaeda linked militants are now on the cards following the recent surge in terrorist attacks across Pakistan.
The government has also amended the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance, allowing security agencies to keep suspects of terrorism and “enemies” of the state under detention for an indefinite period. The Sharif government has also hinted at lifting the moratorium on the death penalty – placed by the former PPP government and being seen by devout Muslims as against the tenets of Islam and the country’s constitution.
Are these the usual fire-fighting measures taken whenever there is a spike in killings and violence, or does the civil-military leadership really want to address the root cause of the problem and pursue a holistic strategy to counter terrorism and reestablish the writ of the state and supremacy of the law? Perhaps it is too early to gauge the government’s mid- to long-term resolve and intentions on this crucial issue, but the cautious approach of the top leadership underlines the fact that one should not accept any swift, broad-based and decisive action against these non-state actors, who are determined to bring down the state of Pakistan.
The Sharif government has reluctantly inched towards the ‘fight and talk’ mood from the ‘peace talks’ frame of mind only after militants carried out a spate of high-profile attacks on security personnel, media workers, polio vaccinators, and ordinary citizens. In doing this, the militants not just upped the ante of violence, but for the first time threatened to target national and international media organisations and leading journalists in an organised manner. For this, the local Taliban militants again circulated a controversial edict, from which some of its leaders distanced themselves only a few months back. The list of targeted media persons and organisations, however, has been revised and expanded.
This has created an unprecedented atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in those segments of the society and urban centres which had considered themselves by and large immune from the terrorist threat.
The elusive militants enjoy an upper hand and initiative in this conflict as they have successfully managed to dominate the national narrative and terrorise dissenting voices against the backdrop of a weak and defensive response from the state institutions.
However, given the highly polarised and ideologically divided state of Pakistan, even the recent symbolic steps taken by the government of making amendments in the law and its vague intentions of carrying out action against militants are all set to intensify the emotional debate, sharpen the friction and trigger bitter criticism both from the right-wing and religious-minded segment of the society as well as the westernised liberal urban elite and human rights organisations.
While the twin ghost of religious extremism and Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism poses the gravest internal challenge to Pakistan’s existence, the main political players and stakeholders have miserably failed to reach a consensus on how to tackle the situation.
There are influential political and religious groups with pockets within the civil and military establishment, which sincerely believe that the war on terror is not Pakistan’s war despite the fact that more than 50,000 people have been killed by the militants since early 2002. Ideologically, these groups and individuals remain sympathetic to militants and share their worldview, though they may not necessarily agree with the tactics of terrorism and killings of fellow Muslims. These forces are socially conservative and politically anti-west.
Even the ruling PML-N mainly banks on the conservative and religiously-minded vote bank. Many PML-N stalwarts do not want to take on the sectarian extremists and the Al-Qaeda linked militants groups and tend to believe that the tide of extremism and terrorism would fizzle out on its own. They want to keep violence and terrorism in check by the combined application of select use of force and a policy of appeasement.
The country’s secular political parties, non-government organisations and the liberal element advocate stern action against extremists and militants, but many of them remain highly sceptical about the role and intentions of the country’s armed forces in dealing with this challenge. They also are deeply divided over the tactics and modalities of any operation against militants and abhor the resumption of the death sentence and other tough measures, which they see as undermining human rights and transforming the country into a ‘security state’.
In the overall scheme of things, the secularists and liberals appear to be fast losing ground to various shades of fundamentalist and right-wing political forces that have a greater hold on society. (However, the religious forces too are politically and ideologically fragmented.)
The powerful military establishment that appears more focused and serious on taking on the challenge of terrorism remains constrained because of weak and divided civilian partners. The planned drawback of the US/Nato troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s perceived desire to maintain proxies in the land-locked state to counter the Indian influence there also hamper an all-out effort against the loosely intertwined militant groups.
The biggest collective failure of the civil and military leaders is that they have been too slow and lacklustre in their response to this challenge.
One expected a better performance from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the start of his third stint in power, but he dragged his feet on all the key issues. Instead of taking a lead and giving direction to the nation in confronting extremism and terrorism, he tried to hide behind the cover of All-Parties Conferences, which failed to come up with a rational analysis to this challenge or suggest a practical strategy to bring peace and normalcy in the country. No wonder, the APC-suggested recipe of peace talks remained a non-starter.
However, an effective response does not mean the use of military option as the one and only preferred choice. It also entails a wide set of initiatives in which finding a common ground between various political forces, Islamic schools of thought and stakeholders on a minimum set of points is foremost.
The support and backing of leading ulema and clerics – especially those belonging to the Deobandi school of thought – is vital for peace as many militants adhere to this puritan version of Islam. At the same time, the government needs to reform the education system, particularly the ungoverned seminaries, which are seen as the breeding ground of militancy. and introduce rehabilitation programmes for militants. This cannot be done without increasing investment in the social and education sectors.
The state and its institutions must show zero tolerance toward all armed groups affiliated with the mainstream political and religious parties, and outlawed groups. The legal political parties can play a role in building this consensus if the ruling party itself shows determination and starts playing by the book.
The military establishment also needs to rethink and redefine its strategy and goals according to the changed global and regional paradigm. The Cold War-era strategy won’t work now. There has been a realisation within the army on this issue since the days of former president Pervez Musharraf when he aligned the country in the US-led war on terrorism in early 2002, abandoned support to the Afghan Taliban and stopped insurgents from going into Indian-held Kashmir.
It is now time to go another step forward and address the international concerns regarding Pakistan by enforcing the writ of the state and ensuring that the territory it is not being used to foment violence and terrorism in the region or around the world.
The lesson of history is that the state threatens its existence when it fails to resolve its internal contradictions.
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