By Amir Zia
From where do the Pakistani Taliban and other extremist groups get billions of rupees to bankroll their huge terror network, which has tentacles from the Khyber Pass to Karachi and from Chaman to Lahore? After all, billions of rupees are needed every year not only for weapons and ammunition, but also to pay the monthly salaries of thousands of fighters in the mountains and full-time operators in the major cities, including their food, shelter, clothes and even stipends to their families – if a militant dies in the line of terrorism.
Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, alone, reportedly left more than Rs 3 billion worth assets in cash and kind, which also become a source of dispute among some of his followers. And we are talking about only one key commander. The highly decentralised networks of militant groups have more than one legal and illegal source for generating funds.
According to security officials, local and foreign Islamic charities, donations collected by Islamic seminaries and mosques affiliated or sympathetic to one militant group or the other remain the key source of income of these groups. Although the previous military-led government managed to remove the donation boxes kept in shops and main markets across the length and breadth of the country, the clandestine funding continues in the name of building mosques or helping the poor seminary students.
From the collection of hides of sacrificial animals during Eid-ul-Azha to the Islamic donations of zakat and fitra, the radical groups manage to divert a major chunk from all religious donations for themselves. Then there are those philanthropist Muslims – especially among the traders and business circles – who dole out huge amounts in cash and kind to such groups or individuals. Additionally, there are some leading politicians in Pakistan who have donated or purchased property for hard-line clerics in major cities. One of the beneficiaries of such largesse by a well known politician affiliated with the previous military-led government is none other than the family running Islamabad’s Lal Masjid.
There is no way to monitor or tap the flow of money coming through these seemingly innocent channels, which ends up in the coffers of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda sympathisers and other shadowy militant groups.
The Pakistani Taliban militants and their sympathisers also raise billions through smuggling narcotics, extortion and the illegal taxes they impose in areas they control. In the Swat region, before the army weeded out the terrorist network earlier this year, the Taliban earned up to Rs 260 million a year through the sale of narcotics.
But as the going got tough for these extremists in recent months, they went for a string of bank robberies and kidnappings to raise funds, declaring these acts as justified, say police and security analysts.
Under their controversial version of Islam, the Taliban authorised the looting of banks saying that their mode of business is against the teachings of Islam as it is based on “usury.” However, moderate Islamists say there is a difference between the usury prohibited under Islam and interest-based modern banking. However, Qari Hussain, the Taliban mastermind of suicide bombings in South Waziristan, issued the controversial edict of looting banks, saying that it was an “indirect form” of holy war, report security officials.
In the last year or so, the police have busted at least four major networks of the Taliban and arrested their sympathisers who were involved in several bank robberies and kidnappings in the commercial hub of Karachi.
Raja Omar Khattab, a senior superintendent of police, maintains that there are two types of operators engaged in fund-raising through criminal means. “One is directly linked to the Taliban while the other hails from the tribal regions. Several of them have been killed and arrested during the past few months,” says Khattab, who himself was wounded in a bomb attack masterminded by Taliban militants in Karachi on August 24, 2008, to avenge his successful operations against their companions.
Sharfuddin Memon, chief of the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), says the Taliban have also masterminded some key kidnappings. “They target people who work with the US-led coalition in any way or those who are religious minorities, even Muslims belonging to a different sect,” he says.
Satish Anand, a noted Pakistani filmmaker, was kidnapped for ransom in October 2008 and was freed more than six months later after the payment of an undisclosed ransom in Islamabad.
Memon says that Kashmiri militant leader Ilyas Kashmiri masterminded Anand’s kidnapping along with two former army majors who have been arrested. Ilyas Kashmiri, who is affiliated with Harakatul Jihad-e-Islami fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir, has been reported killed in a US drone attack in September 2009.
But not all the victims are as lucky as Anand. Shaukat Afridi, who owned trucks carrying supplies for NATO troops in Afghanistan, was kidnapped in Karachi last year and was killed by his abductors when they were surrounded by the police. Three of the militants were also killed in the shootout in the low-income locality of Baldia Town that occurred in September 2008.
Memon says the police carried out the raid on a tip that terrorists had stored weapons in a small house and were not aware that Afridi was also being held there.
Kidnappers also operate in other cities, including Lahore and Peshawar. Security officials say that several victims win their freedom after paying millions of rupees ransom and they remain silent for the fear of their lives.
Police officials say there have been several cases this year in which private security guards belonging to the tribal region were involved in robberies. Ikram Sehgal, a senior security analyst and owner of a private security company, says only guards of two or three lesser-known companies were involved in such crimes.
“These crimes were committed at the behest of the Taliban,” says Sehgal. In a huge city like Karachi, Taliban operators easily find safe houses and logistical support. “Many innocent people provide them shelter not knowing whether they are criminals or terrorists,” he adds.
According to the police, Islamic seminaries also provide safe hiding places for the Taliban who are on the run from the conflict area and those who want to operate in major cities to raise funds.
“This does not mean that all Islamic seminaries are involved in this or deliberately provide shelter to them … they are being misused,” says Khattab.
After the busting of four Taliban networks in Karachi, there has been a decline in bank robberies and kidnappings in recent months as the militants need time to regroup and reorganise.
Another apparent reason for them keeping a low profile in Karachi are the business and commercial stakes of the Pashtuns in this city. Taliban activity has the potential of sparking ethnic tensions – which leading Pashtun interest groups do not want. But the Taliban involvement in crimes to wage their unholy war remains a harsh reality. It should open the eyes of those religious parties who still think that the Taliban are friends of Islam.
Ends
Monday, November 16, 2009
Sunday, November 8, 2009
‘Jihad Print Media’ and its Impact
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) conducted a national seminar on Understanding the ‘Jihad Print Media’ in Pakistan and its impact on October 20, 2009 in Islamabad. The seminar brought together a large number of media representatives, scholars and academics to discuss and comment on PIPS’ recently produced report on the subject.
Dr. Tariq Rehman, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad chaired the seminar while Mr. Zafarullah Khan, Executive Director Centre for Civic Education, Islamabad was the key speaker and discussant. Other speakers included Mr. Taufeeq Asif Advocate, President Rawalpindi Bar Association, Mr. Afzal Khan, South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA), Mr. Amir Zia, Director News at Samaa TV, Islamabad, and Mr. Javed Siddique, Resident Editor Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Islamabad.
Director PIPS Mr. Muhammad Amir Rana said in his welcome address that the seminar was part of the PIPS series of discussion meant for creating awareness and building up consensus on the analysis of radicalization in Pakistani society and media. The purpose of this seminar, he noted, was to discuss jihad print media, its characteristics and impact on Pakistan society and mainstream media.
Mr. Safdar Sial, a researcher at PIPS, presented an abridged version of the PIPS report on jihad print media taking into account the following 4 sections:
Genesis and Evolution of Jihad Publishing
a. Use of Militant Literature in the Soviet-Afghan War (1980-88)
b. Period of Growth and Modernization (1989-2000)
c. Impact of the War on Terror on Jihad Print Media in Pakistan (2001-2009)
Messengers of Militancy: An Introduction to Jihad Publications
a. Profiles
i. Jihad publications
ii. Madrasa publications
iii. Sectarian publications
iv. Vernacular mainstream media groups/ individuals which support’ jihad narrative’
b. A Parallel Propaganda Campaign: Leaflets and Shabnamas (Night Letters)
c. Circulation, Distribution and Outreach
Content Analysis of Jihad Print Media
a . Space Devoted to Issues: An Analysis on Categories
b. Advertising
c. Quality and Authenticity of Reporting/Approaches
d. Disparagement and Glorification: An Opinion Analysis
e. Treatment: Diction, Style and Tone
Impact on Society and Mainstream Media
Keynote Address by Mr. Zafarullah Khan
In Pakistan religious media or the media that used to examine the issues from religious perspective is an old tradition. You can find too many magazines and newspapers that used to interpret society, its development from the perspective of religion. Even the mainstream religious political parties also came up with some publications ranging from weeklies, monthlies and dailies to promote their viewpoints.
‘Jihad media’, as has rightly been pinpointed in this research report by PIPS, emerged particularly during the Afghan-Soviet war. But before that I would like to share with you one report on publicity media prepared by the Council of Islamic Ideology, right from 1962 uptil 1993. It contains many recommendations such as how to include Islamic ethos into media discourses. There are prescriptions for print media on how to check obscenity, establish a film censor board, and promote Islamic view or Islamic way of life in Pakistan. But I was amazed the tone and tenor of recommendations significantly changed when there was Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. For instance I would like to quote one recommendation which emerged in a meeting in 1978 which suggested that we should include Kalima-e-Tayyeba and inscribe Allah-o-Akbar on Pakistani flag as these symbols could be source of inspiration for majority of the people in Pakistan instigating in them desires of martyrdom and jihad. Quite surprisingly flag of Taliban bears these symbols.
Besides these recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology, there was a book published by Idara-e-Moarraf-e-Islami, a publication house run by the Jamat-e-Islami. The title of the book is Islami Sahafat (Islamic journalism) and it is written by Syed Ubaidul Islam who served in the Radio Pakistan for many years. This book said that we would have to create a new paradigm for journalism to mould Pakistani society according to Islamic ethos.
Academic discourse has also remained supportive to this kind of media narrative. Some of the leading scholars of journalism in Lahore and Karachi have been asserting that if we want to reform Pakistani society we need Islamic journalism whose sole source of inspiration should be “Amr bil Ma’roof wa Nahi Anil Munkir”, a methodology which was later on internalized by almost all jihadi publications. Some academics have even argued that it is false that media’s sole responsibility is to provide you accurate and up-to-date information rather its responsibility is to interpret developments from Islamic perspective and try to promote through its discourses Islamic way of life.
I started to collect jihadi publications before 9/11 and found out that they were trying to come up with a very different perspective on our society. They had special pamphlets like “jamhoreat Islami kaise?”, “TV aur azab-e-qabar”, things like that how TV watchers will be treated on the day of judgment, and democracy is an un-Islamic notion. I was amazed to see that although the message is packaged in a very medieval tone and tenor whereas they are using the modern media, and very interestingly all these gadgets of modernity are described as biddah (new things/innovations in Islam which are considered evil) and jahelah (ignorance).
During ‘Afghan Jihad’ Afghan media center was being run by security apparatuses of the world and they used to come up with this jihadi worldview such as in Nebraska project to Islamize and jihadize text books etc. From 1989 till 1999 one finds some shift from Afghan theatre to Kashmir theatre and many more Kashmir specific publications also emerged.
After 9/11 some important shift was witnessed in jihad or alternative media. Daily Islam of al-Rashid Trust, which is now considered one of the mainstream newspapers, wrote in one of its first editorials after 9/11 that the Western forces were going to destroy Islamic caliphate of Afghanistan. It further said that the mainstream media was not enough and that it was playing in the hands of infidels so there was need to launch such publications which served their (jihadis) purpose; and daily Islam was one of them besides many other publications of Al-Rashid Trust. They were not only producing media publications but also some documented books like “how Kaa’ba is being attacked” and “how lion of mountains Osama bin Laden has challenged the rest of the world”. There were at least 8 media outlets that emerged and they were very much closed to Al-Qaeda, like Ummat Studio, Labbaik media production, Jundullah media, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan media and many more.
When Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged in Pakistan they launched some publications but most of their messages were disseminated through the night letters and pamphlets, and at the same time they quite successfully used the existing mainstream media. Again their major targets were children, youth, women and students. Pakistani Taliban has even appointed their spokespersons who are available to talk about their issues. They also use to send mobile sms. If you look at recent code of conduct issued by Mullah Omer, he talked about not keeping of some pictures of young boys in cell phones. That was special advice to ‘mujahedeen’. Swat Taliban came up with threats to the journalists such as ‘don’t make fun of Nizam-e-Adl regulation,’ ‘don’t describe us terrorists; we are mujahedeen’ and things like that.
Circulation of jihad publications is huge. When I used to collect these publications, they ate all money from my pocket. Off course they are large in numbers. What is their sociology? Obviously they want to promote their world view. Then there is another thing; funding. These publications are not only used as tools to promote what they are doing but also sources of raising funds. You will find advertisements of charities.
Interestingly during recent times you will find code of conduct which our modern media occasionally failed to evolve. Surprisingly our media professionals are confused that what to report and how to report. There were even efforts that what kind of code of conduct should be for these jihadi publications. When the Lal Masjid administration came up with a blueprint of Islamization of Pakistan, it contained one specific chapter on mainstream media saying if mainstream media didn’t internalize jihad morality than ‘we’ will have to not only ban these channels but come up with our own channels to disseminate our point of view.
Now what is the future of these publications? Pakistani government banned many of these publications after becoming part of war on terror. But there is amazing tendency among these publications to bounce back with the similar layout that is very standardized. You can immediately recognize if Ghazwah has been banned Jarrar is there, which belongs to the same house of publication. May be it is the weakness of our law enforcement.
I wouldn’t say that these jihad publications despite their huge circulation may have some impact. I keep monitoring and don’t see that was a big story or any perspective given by these publications taken up by the mainstream press; very rare indeed. However you can find the commonalities in terms of opinion. The people writing columns for mainstream media sometimes resemble with contributors to jihad media publications. Sometimes it looks like the same [mainstream press] people are writing with pseudo names in those jihadi publications. To be honest the vocabulary, the argument, the construction of the argument especially in Zarb-e-Momin and couple of Urdu newspapers, has startling similarities. I tried to decipher 10 to 12 columns, which have amazing resemblance but I don’t have any empirical evidence may be it is just a simple case of plagiarism.
And why jihadis created their own media? The only answer is maybe they were not satisfied with the stories of 500 hundred words or space of few columns. Now they have abundance of their own products. Who consumes them? I would like to share here that I was very much excited when I was conducting a research related to Lashkar-e-Taiba. I had a chance to attend a workshop on peace journalism held with students of Srinagar University and media school in Jammu. I asked them if they ever had seen Majalla Al-Da’waa. They replied “What is that?” They had never seen those publications which were dedicated to Kashmir Jihad. Who are the consumers of those publications? Pakistani society? It poses a question of whole economy for whom they are producing. May be they want to keep their worldview well entrenched in Pakistani society. The fact is that despite so many bans and legal frameworks this monster refuses to die.
Toufeeq Asif
These kinds of events and discussions are important to understand how we can curb extremism and strategic tools of extremists like media. This way we may get success to tell an alternative narrative to the people and children whom extremists use in name of religion and paradise. We may be able to tell people what is real Islam and what is true jihad. At the same time we may influence the people by debate who join extremists and/or are extremists about right and wrong notions. We should not push them to a blind alley rather keep doors open so that they don’t indulge in bad activities. They should not feel us biased. If we become unbiased and impartial then I am optimistic the situation will be different. Freedom of expression can provide an opportunity to them to express their anger or feelings. And media is also one tool for this purpose but spread of hate speech and violence should not be tolerated.
Amir Zia
I haven’t seen any work before which analyzes the literature and publication produced by the militant organizations. So in a way this work is phenomenal and ground breaking. But I have couple of observations. First if we start discussing its title i.e. Jihadi print media in Pakistan. My question is that should the mainstream journalists, researchers and academic people be calling them jihadi? I mean that we all know the term jihad itself is being held scared by most of the Muslims throughout the world. It is one of the basic tenants of Islam. So if these militants say themselves jihadis should we also use the same terms? I don’t think so. We can use a neutral term; militant organizations. They are armed groups. We should not be calling them jihadis. At the most we call them terrorist groups. Indeed when we use word jihadi we legitimize their many things. It confuses the whole discourse.
My second submission is the term ‘Islamic journalism’. Islamic journalism is no term. A journalist is a journalist. Journalism means being objective, fair and neutral. So what terms should we use for it? This is a question. So I would say that for this kind of publications by any political group or any armed group we can use the term propaganda literature. Even the Nazis used to do it. The fascists and communists also used to do it and now so-called Islamic forces are doing it. But we should not be calling them Islamic or Jihadi things. It is propaganda literature. It is very effective because the way it changes the minds of innocent people through its half-baked truth, faulty information and discourses it should be looked into seriously.
My third point is the real face of state in promoting this kind of media can not be ignored. There was a time when state had played a very important role in promoting these militant organizations and not just the state but international players have played the role including US, Saudi Arabia, Iran and all other big countries. They used them and abused them. Now luckily after 9/11 our state institutions are gradually changing the course of activities not because of they are now enlightened thinkers but they are under so mush pressure of the world powers.
The last thing is the question of freedom of expression in press, which is also important. I remember when daily Islam was banned couple of years ago the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists and Karachi Union of Journalists came out in favor of freedom of speech and employees of these publications joined hand with the mainstream media. So I would say that yes the whole argument was on principle that we believe in freedom of press. But I think propaganda and journalism should be separated. The state and government has every right to ban any literature, writing, and hate material, which may incite violenceand terrorism.
Afzal Khan
My whole career in journalism had been devoted for the causes of freedom of expression and freedom of press. I stand for these freedoms but there are some limits to them and there also come some responsibilities; social, political and cultural etc. Everyone should have right to raise one’s viewpoint but when one uses media as tool and instrument of propaganda to incite and mislead people, and distort facts crossing the limits then you can see the outcome.
This is very important topic the organization, the PIPS, has chosen for discussion. I also pay thanks to Mr. Zafarullah for his enlightening keynote on the issue. The concept of jihad has seen much transformation in Pakistan. For example Maulana Maudoodi, founder of Jamat-e-Islami, had very moderate view about jihad. He did not even accept fighting in Kashmir as jihad. But the present leadership of the Jamat-e-Islami is agreed that fighting in Kashmir and even Afghanistan is jihad. The Kashmir movement which started in 1989 was neither a jihadi nor a religious movement rather it was secular in nature. It remained so for some years and then it was transformed into jihadi movement.
The jihadi organizations and their literature particularly mushroomed during Zia period or the Soviet-Afghan war. But one can trace the roots of this jihadi literature even before the Afghan war and during the communist era in Afghanistan. Americans took up this ‘cause’ and American Centre at that time was in Rawalpindi. Later under state patronage the mainstream media was also encouraged to highlight jihad in Afghanistan. There were many publications also. This trend of publishing such literature has continued over past many years till to-date.
Javed Siddque
First the few words about the concept of jihad. There is a great controversy going on in the Islamic world that what jihad really means. Jihad is an Islamic term and it originates from Holy Quran but there are differences of perception about jihad. For instance Gen. Musharaf once said when he was President of Pakistan that most of the scholars agreed that jihad can be waged only by the state. In an Islamic state the army can wage jihad against the enemies. No other organization in an Islamic state can wage the jihad.
If we look at the publications which were owned by various Islamic parties in Pakistan and before establishment of Pakistan including JUI, JUP and Jamat-e-Islami we don’t find the concept of jihad being promoted in those publications in those times. These publications promoted Islam, Islamic values and injunctions but they never mentioned the concept of jihad. They never promoted jihad with the intensity, it is been promoted now.
I think all speakers have mentioned the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan back in 70s. The United States’ interest to flush Soviets out of Afghanistan did breed the jihadi organizations and jihad was used to damage the Soviets. The jihad groups were taken on board and their fighters were infiltrated into Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces. That was one reason in this part of the world, the jihadi organizations took root in our soil and also patronized by the state. ISI, CIA and the government, they were all together in this effort. Subsequently these elements, when the Soviets left the Afghanistan, were used in Kashmir to promote jihad and fight against the Indian army which is occupying Kashmir.
I think that 9/11 also played a very important role in reinforcing these jihadi organizations but they existed even before that. Jihad publications have supported Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other jihad groups in Pakistan. The jihadis have even sought support from mainstream media using different tactics. Almost every newspaper covers the activities of Taliban, whatever is happening in FATA and even in Afghanistan. But I think they are not satisfied with the way the mainstream media is covering their jihad which they are waging against NATO and US forces and also now the Pakistan army. They want publications and huge number of publications to promote not only the concept of Islam but also sectarian concepts which they adhere to. So I think as long as issue of Kashmir, Palestine and presence of NATO/ US troops remain these jihadi organizations will continue to flourish and I think it is difficult to curtail the number of these jihadi publications. They will have a cause as long as these forces are there. These jihadi groups have a cause to promote and talk about jihad and to insight common Muslims to fight this war which they call the holy war.
Concluding Remarks by Dr. Tariq Rehman
Basically the questions which are asked generally show that we are still not clear as to what the enemy is and who the enemy is? Certain things have been discussed here and I think the historical aspect was necessary in order to point out how come we have the ‘forces’ in the country which are hitting us. So it is traced out that there is in fact a worldview [of the militants] and worldview is domination over the world through a means that whatever means may be used i.e. force or otherwise etc. This view precedes 9/11 which is there for a long time and it is promoted by international hooliganism, by trade powers but also by the fact that in the Muslim world most people who are ruling the Muslim world are exploitative elites. Because of their exploitation they have not actually allowed their people to think, they have not allowed media to picking up the facts even in Saudi Arabia. They have not allowed the liberties which normally prevent grievances from becoming extremism. Also the elites of Pakistan have used Islam thinking they could dominate and suppress ethnicities. Therefore a lot of selfishness of our ruling elites has to be counted when we say that grievances and poverty provide foot soldiers to militant groups and translate into idiom of Islam.
Along with that we must admit certain basic facts and those are that these forces, for whatever historical reasons, are using the extreme force. And that whichever area has gone into their control including Swat and Buner etc. we have seen they used discriminate force against women and children, who were taken away on the suicide missions etc. Their sources of gathering money like kidnapping for ransom are not allowed from Islamic and legal points of view. Those things people don’t know about. They talk in terms of black and white but they do not know that there is a lot of way and there is a lot of unknown into it.
They [militants] are very powerful forces. It is not that we cannot fight them in one way but it is also correct that we cannot do so without understanding the enemy. And to understand them reports like this by the PIPS have to be launched and I’m very happy that so many people spoke about it and they have looked at it in different ways. I myself wrote an article on what I called the Munazara literature in my book which was published by Oxford University in 2004. I have looked at the literatures at higher level and which circulates in madrasa also. They also call it rud (refutation) literature wherein people from different sects refute each other. That means [to them] it is not possible to train people about maslak (religious sect) without actually refuting other doctrine and creating bias. However maslak has been taught for hundred of years and yet this kind of violence against Shia and vice versa was not there before.
The excellent point was made by Amir Zia that should we also call it jihad. This is a point for you to ponder. May be some people can reply. But there is a ground for rethinking terminology we use because language is an important point as it affects the minds. There is a worldview, emotions and attitude which grow with the language. So it is important that which language is used.
Dr. Tariq Rehman, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad chaired the seminar while Mr. Zafarullah Khan, Executive Director Centre for Civic Education, Islamabad was the key speaker and discussant. Other speakers included Mr. Taufeeq Asif Advocate, President Rawalpindi Bar Association, Mr. Afzal Khan, South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA), Mr. Amir Zia, Director News at Samaa TV, Islamabad, and Mr. Javed Siddique, Resident Editor Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Islamabad.
Director PIPS Mr. Muhammad Amir Rana said in his welcome address that the seminar was part of the PIPS series of discussion meant for creating awareness and building up consensus on the analysis of radicalization in Pakistani society and media. The purpose of this seminar, he noted, was to discuss jihad print media, its characteristics and impact on Pakistan society and mainstream media.
Mr. Safdar Sial, a researcher at PIPS, presented an abridged version of the PIPS report on jihad print media taking into account the following 4 sections:
Genesis and Evolution of Jihad Publishing
a. Use of Militant Literature in the Soviet-Afghan War (1980-88)
b. Period of Growth and Modernization (1989-2000)
c. Impact of the War on Terror on Jihad Print Media in Pakistan (2001-2009)
Messengers of Militancy: An Introduction to Jihad Publications
a. Profiles
i. Jihad publications
ii. Madrasa publications
iii. Sectarian publications
iv. Vernacular mainstream media groups/ individuals which support’ jihad narrative’
b. A Parallel Propaganda Campaign: Leaflets and Shabnamas (Night Letters)
c. Circulation, Distribution and Outreach
Content Analysis of Jihad Print Media
a . Space Devoted to Issues: An Analysis on Categories
b. Advertising
c. Quality and Authenticity of Reporting/Approaches
d. Disparagement and Glorification: An Opinion Analysis
e. Treatment: Diction, Style and Tone
Impact on Society and Mainstream Media
Keynote Address by Mr. Zafarullah Khan
In Pakistan religious media or the media that used to examine the issues from religious perspective is an old tradition. You can find too many magazines and newspapers that used to interpret society, its development from the perspective of religion. Even the mainstream religious political parties also came up with some publications ranging from weeklies, monthlies and dailies to promote their viewpoints.
‘Jihad media’, as has rightly been pinpointed in this research report by PIPS, emerged particularly during the Afghan-Soviet war. But before that I would like to share with you one report on publicity media prepared by the Council of Islamic Ideology, right from 1962 uptil 1993. It contains many recommendations such as how to include Islamic ethos into media discourses. There are prescriptions for print media on how to check obscenity, establish a film censor board, and promote Islamic view or Islamic way of life in Pakistan. But I was amazed the tone and tenor of recommendations significantly changed when there was Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. For instance I would like to quote one recommendation which emerged in a meeting in 1978 which suggested that we should include Kalima-e-Tayyeba and inscribe Allah-o-Akbar on Pakistani flag as these symbols could be source of inspiration for majority of the people in Pakistan instigating in them desires of martyrdom and jihad. Quite surprisingly flag of Taliban bears these symbols.
Besides these recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology, there was a book published by Idara-e-Moarraf-e-Islami, a publication house run by the Jamat-e-Islami. The title of the book is Islami Sahafat (Islamic journalism) and it is written by Syed Ubaidul Islam who served in the Radio Pakistan for many years. This book said that we would have to create a new paradigm for journalism to mould Pakistani society according to Islamic ethos.
Academic discourse has also remained supportive to this kind of media narrative. Some of the leading scholars of journalism in Lahore and Karachi have been asserting that if we want to reform Pakistani society we need Islamic journalism whose sole source of inspiration should be “Amr bil Ma’roof wa Nahi Anil Munkir”, a methodology which was later on internalized by almost all jihadi publications. Some academics have even argued that it is false that media’s sole responsibility is to provide you accurate and up-to-date information rather its responsibility is to interpret developments from Islamic perspective and try to promote through its discourses Islamic way of life.
I started to collect jihadi publications before 9/11 and found out that they were trying to come up with a very different perspective on our society. They had special pamphlets like “jamhoreat Islami kaise?”, “TV aur azab-e-qabar”, things like that how TV watchers will be treated on the day of judgment, and democracy is an un-Islamic notion. I was amazed to see that although the message is packaged in a very medieval tone and tenor whereas they are using the modern media, and very interestingly all these gadgets of modernity are described as biddah (new things/innovations in Islam which are considered evil) and jahelah (ignorance).
During ‘Afghan Jihad’ Afghan media center was being run by security apparatuses of the world and they used to come up with this jihadi worldview such as in Nebraska project to Islamize and jihadize text books etc. From 1989 till 1999 one finds some shift from Afghan theatre to Kashmir theatre and many more Kashmir specific publications also emerged.
After 9/11 some important shift was witnessed in jihad or alternative media. Daily Islam of al-Rashid Trust, which is now considered one of the mainstream newspapers, wrote in one of its first editorials after 9/11 that the Western forces were going to destroy Islamic caliphate of Afghanistan. It further said that the mainstream media was not enough and that it was playing in the hands of infidels so there was need to launch such publications which served their (jihadis) purpose; and daily Islam was one of them besides many other publications of Al-Rashid Trust. They were not only producing media publications but also some documented books like “how Kaa’ba is being attacked” and “how lion of mountains Osama bin Laden has challenged the rest of the world”. There were at least 8 media outlets that emerged and they were very much closed to Al-Qaeda, like Ummat Studio, Labbaik media production, Jundullah media, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan media and many more.
When Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged in Pakistan they launched some publications but most of their messages were disseminated through the night letters and pamphlets, and at the same time they quite successfully used the existing mainstream media. Again their major targets were children, youth, women and students. Pakistani Taliban has even appointed their spokespersons who are available to talk about their issues. They also use to send mobile sms. If you look at recent code of conduct issued by Mullah Omer, he talked about not keeping of some pictures of young boys in cell phones. That was special advice to ‘mujahedeen’. Swat Taliban came up with threats to the journalists such as ‘don’t make fun of Nizam-e-Adl regulation,’ ‘don’t describe us terrorists; we are mujahedeen’ and things like that.
Circulation of jihad publications is huge. When I used to collect these publications, they ate all money from my pocket. Off course they are large in numbers. What is their sociology? Obviously they want to promote their world view. Then there is another thing; funding. These publications are not only used as tools to promote what they are doing but also sources of raising funds. You will find advertisements of charities.
Interestingly during recent times you will find code of conduct which our modern media occasionally failed to evolve. Surprisingly our media professionals are confused that what to report and how to report. There were even efforts that what kind of code of conduct should be for these jihadi publications. When the Lal Masjid administration came up with a blueprint of Islamization of Pakistan, it contained one specific chapter on mainstream media saying if mainstream media didn’t internalize jihad morality than ‘we’ will have to not only ban these channels but come up with our own channels to disseminate our point of view.
Now what is the future of these publications? Pakistani government banned many of these publications after becoming part of war on terror. But there is amazing tendency among these publications to bounce back with the similar layout that is very standardized. You can immediately recognize if Ghazwah has been banned Jarrar is there, which belongs to the same house of publication. May be it is the weakness of our law enforcement.
I wouldn’t say that these jihad publications despite their huge circulation may have some impact. I keep monitoring and don’t see that was a big story or any perspective given by these publications taken up by the mainstream press; very rare indeed. However you can find the commonalities in terms of opinion. The people writing columns for mainstream media sometimes resemble with contributors to jihad media publications. Sometimes it looks like the same [mainstream press] people are writing with pseudo names in those jihadi publications. To be honest the vocabulary, the argument, the construction of the argument especially in Zarb-e-Momin and couple of Urdu newspapers, has startling similarities. I tried to decipher 10 to 12 columns, which have amazing resemblance but I don’t have any empirical evidence may be it is just a simple case of plagiarism.
And why jihadis created their own media? The only answer is maybe they were not satisfied with the stories of 500 hundred words or space of few columns. Now they have abundance of their own products. Who consumes them? I would like to share here that I was very much excited when I was conducting a research related to Lashkar-e-Taiba. I had a chance to attend a workshop on peace journalism held with students of Srinagar University and media school in Jammu. I asked them if they ever had seen Majalla Al-Da’waa. They replied “What is that?” They had never seen those publications which were dedicated to Kashmir Jihad. Who are the consumers of those publications? Pakistani society? It poses a question of whole economy for whom they are producing. May be they want to keep their worldview well entrenched in Pakistani society. The fact is that despite so many bans and legal frameworks this monster refuses to die.
Toufeeq Asif
These kinds of events and discussions are important to understand how we can curb extremism and strategic tools of extremists like media. This way we may get success to tell an alternative narrative to the people and children whom extremists use in name of religion and paradise. We may be able to tell people what is real Islam and what is true jihad. At the same time we may influence the people by debate who join extremists and/or are extremists about right and wrong notions. We should not push them to a blind alley rather keep doors open so that they don’t indulge in bad activities. They should not feel us biased. If we become unbiased and impartial then I am optimistic the situation will be different. Freedom of expression can provide an opportunity to them to express their anger or feelings. And media is also one tool for this purpose but spread of hate speech and violence should not be tolerated.
Amir Zia
I haven’t seen any work before which analyzes the literature and publication produced by the militant organizations. So in a way this work is phenomenal and ground breaking. But I have couple of observations. First if we start discussing its title i.e. Jihadi print media in Pakistan. My question is that should the mainstream journalists, researchers and academic people be calling them jihadi? I mean that we all know the term jihad itself is being held scared by most of the Muslims throughout the world. It is one of the basic tenants of Islam. So if these militants say themselves jihadis should we also use the same terms? I don’t think so. We can use a neutral term; militant organizations. They are armed groups. We should not be calling them jihadis. At the most we call them terrorist groups. Indeed when we use word jihadi we legitimize their many things. It confuses the whole discourse.
My second submission is the term ‘Islamic journalism’. Islamic journalism is no term. A journalist is a journalist. Journalism means being objective, fair and neutral. So what terms should we use for it? This is a question. So I would say that for this kind of publications by any political group or any armed group we can use the term propaganda literature. Even the Nazis used to do it. The fascists and communists also used to do it and now so-called Islamic forces are doing it. But we should not be calling them Islamic or Jihadi things. It is propaganda literature. It is very effective because the way it changes the minds of innocent people through its half-baked truth, faulty information and discourses it should be looked into seriously.
My third point is the real face of state in promoting this kind of media can not be ignored. There was a time when state had played a very important role in promoting these militant organizations and not just the state but international players have played the role including US, Saudi Arabia, Iran and all other big countries. They used them and abused them. Now luckily after 9/11 our state institutions are gradually changing the course of activities not because of they are now enlightened thinkers but they are under so mush pressure of the world powers.
The last thing is the question of freedom of expression in press, which is also important. I remember when daily Islam was banned couple of years ago the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists and Karachi Union of Journalists came out in favor of freedom of speech and employees of these publications joined hand with the mainstream media. So I would say that yes the whole argument was on principle that we believe in freedom of press. But I think propaganda and journalism should be separated. The state and government has every right to ban any literature, writing, and hate material, which may incite violenceand terrorism.
Afzal Khan
My whole career in journalism had been devoted for the causes of freedom of expression and freedom of press. I stand for these freedoms but there are some limits to them and there also come some responsibilities; social, political and cultural etc. Everyone should have right to raise one’s viewpoint but when one uses media as tool and instrument of propaganda to incite and mislead people, and distort facts crossing the limits then you can see the outcome.
This is very important topic the organization, the PIPS, has chosen for discussion. I also pay thanks to Mr. Zafarullah for his enlightening keynote on the issue. The concept of jihad has seen much transformation in Pakistan. For example Maulana Maudoodi, founder of Jamat-e-Islami, had very moderate view about jihad. He did not even accept fighting in Kashmir as jihad. But the present leadership of the Jamat-e-Islami is agreed that fighting in Kashmir and even Afghanistan is jihad. The Kashmir movement which started in 1989 was neither a jihadi nor a religious movement rather it was secular in nature. It remained so for some years and then it was transformed into jihadi movement.
The jihadi organizations and their literature particularly mushroomed during Zia period or the Soviet-Afghan war. But one can trace the roots of this jihadi literature even before the Afghan war and during the communist era in Afghanistan. Americans took up this ‘cause’ and American Centre at that time was in Rawalpindi. Later under state patronage the mainstream media was also encouraged to highlight jihad in Afghanistan. There were many publications also. This trend of publishing such literature has continued over past many years till to-date.
Javed Siddque
First the few words about the concept of jihad. There is a great controversy going on in the Islamic world that what jihad really means. Jihad is an Islamic term and it originates from Holy Quran but there are differences of perception about jihad. For instance Gen. Musharaf once said when he was President of Pakistan that most of the scholars agreed that jihad can be waged only by the state. In an Islamic state the army can wage jihad against the enemies. No other organization in an Islamic state can wage the jihad.
If we look at the publications which were owned by various Islamic parties in Pakistan and before establishment of Pakistan including JUI, JUP and Jamat-e-Islami we don’t find the concept of jihad being promoted in those publications in those times. These publications promoted Islam, Islamic values and injunctions but they never mentioned the concept of jihad. They never promoted jihad with the intensity, it is been promoted now.
I think all speakers have mentioned the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan back in 70s. The United States’ interest to flush Soviets out of Afghanistan did breed the jihadi organizations and jihad was used to damage the Soviets. The jihad groups were taken on board and their fighters were infiltrated into Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces. That was one reason in this part of the world, the jihadi organizations took root in our soil and also patronized by the state. ISI, CIA and the government, they were all together in this effort. Subsequently these elements, when the Soviets left the Afghanistan, were used in Kashmir to promote jihad and fight against the Indian army which is occupying Kashmir.
I think that 9/11 also played a very important role in reinforcing these jihadi organizations but they existed even before that. Jihad publications have supported Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other jihad groups in Pakistan. The jihadis have even sought support from mainstream media using different tactics. Almost every newspaper covers the activities of Taliban, whatever is happening in FATA and even in Afghanistan. But I think they are not satisfied with the way the mainstream media is covering their jihad which they are waging against NATO and US forces and also now the Pakistan army. They want publications and huge number of publications to promote not only the concept of Islam but also sectarian concepts which they adhere to. So I think as long as issue of Kashmir, Palestine and presence of NATO/ US troops remain these jihadi organizations will continue to flourish and I think it is difficult to curtail the number of these jihadi publications. They will have a cause as long as these forces are there. These jihadi groups have a cause to promote and talk about jihad and to insight common Muslims to fight this war which they call the holy war.
Concluding Remarks by Dr. Tariq Rehman
Basically the questions which are asked generally show that we are still not clear as to what the enemy is and who the enemy is? Certain things have been discussed here and I think the historical aspect was necessary in order to point out how come we have the ‘forces’ in the country which are hitting us. So it is traced out that there is in fact a worldview [of the militants] and worldview is domination over the world through a means that whatever means may be used i.e. force or otherwise etc. This view precedes 9/11 which is there for a long time and it is promoted by international hooliganism, by trade powers but also by the fact that in the Muslim world most people who are ruling the Muslim world are exploitative elites. Because of their exploitation they have not actually allowed their people to think, they have not allowed media to picking up the facts even in Saudi Arabia. They have not allowed the liberties which normally prevent grievances from becoming extremism. Also the elites of Pakistan have used Islam thinking they could dominate and suppress ethnicities. Therefore a lot of selfishness of our ruling elites has to be counted when we say that grievances and poverty provide foot soldiers to militant groups and translate into idiom of Islam.
Along with that we must admit certain basic facts and those are that these forces, for whatever historical reasons, are using the extreme force. And that whichever area has gone into their control including Swat and Buner etc. we have seen they used discriminate force against women and children, who were taken away on the suicide missions etc. Their sources of gathering money like kidnapping for ransom are not allowed from Islamic and legal points of view. Those things people don’t know about. They talk in terms of black and white but they do not know that there is a lot of way and there is a lot of unknown into it.
They [militants] are very powerful forces. It is not that we cannot fight them in one way but it is also correct that we cannot do so without understanding the enemy. And to understand them reports like this by the PIPS have to be launched and I’m very happy that so many people spoke about it and they have looked at it in different ways. I myself wrote an article on what I called the Munazara literature in my book which was published by Oxford University in 2004. I have looked at the literatures at higher level and which circulates in madrasa also. They also call it rud (refutation) literature wherein people from different sects refute each other. That means [to them] it is not possible to train people about maslak (religious sect) without actually refuting other doctrine and creating bias. However maslak has been taught for hundred of years and yet this kind of violence against Shia and vice versa was not there before.
The excellent point was made by Amir Zia that should we also call it jihad. This is a point for you to ponder. May be some people can reply. But there is a ground for rethinking terminology we use because language is an important point as it affects the minds. There is a worldview, emotions and attitude which grow with the language. So it is important that which language is used.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
Pakistani Cities Under Siege
More than 300 people killed in October as number of terror attacks rise
By Amir Zia
Targeted killings, bomb explosions and suicide attacks – some of the major Pakistani cities are literally under siege. As Taliban and al-Qaeda linked terrorists select and hit targets mainly in the federal capital Islamabad, garrison city of Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar, never before in Pakistan’s history, such an organized, extensive and sustained reign of terror had been unleashed.
The successful military operation in Swat this May and killing of the Taliban kingpin Baitullah Mehsood in a U.S. drone attack on 5th August had brought a relative decline in terror attacks in the country. But the extremists returned with a vengeance in October following fiery new chief of Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsood, consolidated grip on the terror network.
In more than dozen major attacks in October, more than 300 people were killed and around 500 wounded. This is a sharp rise compared with the months of August and September in which around 50 and 80 people were killed respectively.
In October, the extremist not just went for what security officials term as soft civilian targets, but also staged the stunning attack on Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in which a brigadier and a colonel were also killed. The ferocious GHQ attack underlined not just the determination and boldness of the terrorists, but also their willingness to raise the bar of conflict by throwing the gauntlet at Pakistan’s most mighty institution.
From the suicide attacks at the offices of U.N. food agency in Islamabad and Saddar Bazzar of Peshawar to the brazen storming of FIA and Manawa Police Centers in Lahore – terrorists ensured that the entire nation remain in the grip of fear and uncertainty. The atrocious twin suicide bombings at the Islamic University Islamabad only heightened the sense of dread as educational institutions were shuttered across Pakistan.
If one key aim of terrorists was to create maximum fear and draw media attention, the Taliban, their al Qaeda allies and supporters certainly remained successful. Their second achievement is that the conflict remains far from over. The longer the conflict prolongs the better for the terror network. By not allowing the state to win, they are making their mark.
However, the upping of ante by the Taliban and their allies finally resulted in the launch of the much-delayed military operation in their power centre of South Waziristan. Barring Jamaat-e-Islami and its likes, all the major political parties and public opinion backs the South Waziristan operation -- achieving a rare consensus on a thorny issue in a highly politically polarized country.
But consensus in no way means that the battle is half won. Top security officials say it will be a protracted and a bloody conflict. For a country, where historically and traditionally, the state never established its writ on vast chunks of territory called the tribal areas and for decades supported and promoted Islamic extremists, controlling this monster undoubtedly will prove an uphill battle.
In the tribal areas, lawlessness and militancy has become a way of life – part of the system. From Islamic seminaries to the tribal code of conduct – all supplement extremists, who have economic stakes in the conflict and the business of terrorism. The links of local extremists with foreign militants, hiding in their area, as well as with various shades and brands of terror groups and cells spread across the country, make them a mammoth and a complex fiend whose strength and uniqueness is in the fact that each part remains connected yet operational on its own. Eliminating one leader or tier of leadership brings the second in command. Even without the central authority, the active and sleeping terror cells across Pakistan can stage attacks on their own. All terror groups – whether Pushtun or Punjabi dominated -- share more or less similar flawed interpretation of Islam, murky political goals and highly distorted worldview.
The concepts of modernity, democracy, constitution, women rights, tolerance or mutual co-existence remain not just alien, but these forces are hostile to them. The lethal ideology, which is infused into minds by hard-line Islamic seminaries and terror groups from a young age, justifies and approves elimination of those who disagree with their worldview. And those, who got killed in these efforts, are promised the rosy gardens of heaven not just for themselves, but also for their families.
The simmering hate toward the proclaimed “enemies of Islam” and the promise of paradise are the two motivating factors for which many youngsters –as young as 13 to those in mid 20s -- get recruited in the death squads, which carryout suicide attacks. Thousands of veterans and young guns of Afghan and Kashmir battle fronts and tens of thousands studying at the Islamic seminaries provide a huge pool of human resource to terror masterminds from which they pick the best of the best.
The presence of such a huge terror network and the single-minded zeal of its members undoubtedly is a nightmarish situation for any army. Pakistan’s army and rest of its security apparatus -- ideologically and practically trained to fight on the eastern front -- faces the twin challenge of a grueling guerilla war as well as of terrorist attacks.
The terrorists just not aim to win publicity for their cause but trying to replace the state writ in many parts of the country as well as force their values in cities. Their immediate target is -- freedom to use Pakistani territory for regional and international terrorism and the long term goal to change the very structure of Pakistani state. Both these objectives are highly detrimental for the state and its people.
As the security forces press hard to weed out tentacles of terrorism in the tribal areas, the militants are trying to ward-off the pressure by targeting major cities. As security officials say that terrorists and guerrilla fighters always get the advantage of selecting the time and the target. They can wait and hide when the security forces look for them and strike where least expected.
The task becomes more difficult when it comes to stopping the suicide bombers. Nothing but their death stops them. And in even then, they have the capability to inflict damage. A senior security official admitted that terrorists have a huge support base and network in almost every city and major town. “When you have a social and financial support network … it becomes easy to operate. Only accurate intelligence can deter them from implementing their plans,” he said.
While terrorists have strong basis in the tribal belt of NWFP, they also have pockets in Punjab -- specially the poverty-hot southern parts of the province -- Sindh and Balochistan.
In recent terror attacks, the extremists effectively changed tactics. In GHQ assault they donned military uniform. They did a thorough homework before attacking the place under the command of their ring-leader, who himself was a low-ranking defector of army’s medical corps.
Going for the soft targets including 20th October’s unprecedented attack on an educational institution – Islamic University in Islamabad and 28th October’s car bomb attack in Peoples' Mandi Peshawar -- underlines the desperation of militants. They can go to any length and commit any atrocity to create waves and avenge the military operation at the tribal areas. Security officials do not even rule out the possibility of militants taking students hostage or kidnapping school or college bus --- especially belonging to the secular and liberal institutions of any major city.
The challenge before the government is not just to tackle the militant threat using force. The bigger challenge is to defeat them ideologically and to dry those pools from where they get recruits. For this, not just the government should go ahead with the long awaited Madarssa reforms, but also open main stream free-of-cost educational institutions for the children belonging to the poor families who mostly end up in Islamic seminaries.
The political parties will also have to come forward openly and forcefully to confront the extremist ideology. Ironically, while the military is now seems geared toward confronting this menace in its own enlightened self-interest, the political leadership are found wanting. Only political leadership can provide a long term and effective solution to the problem of extremism and terrorism by not just taking a candid political stand against them, but educating and organizing the people against them. Their failure to do this, will keep Pakistan on the boil and its soil a hotbed of extremist and terrorist forces.
ENDS
By Amir Zia
Targeted killings, bomb explosions and suicide attacks – some of the major Pakistani cities are literally under siege. As Taliban and al-Qaeda linked terrorists select and hit targets mainly in the federal capital Islamabad, garrison city of Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar, never before in Pakistan’s history, such an organized, extensive and sustained reign of terror had been unleashed.
The successful military operation in Swat this May and killing of the Taliban kingpin Baitullah Mehsood in a U.S. drone attack on 5th August had brought a relative decline in terror attacks in the country. But the extremists returned with a vengeance in October following fiery new chief of Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsood, consolidated grip on the terror network.
In more than dozen major attacks in October, more than 300 people were killed and around 500 wounded. This is a sharp rise compared with the months of August and September in which around 50 and 80 people were killed respectively.
In October, the extremist not just went for what security officials term as soft civilian targets, but also staged the stunning attack on Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in which a brigadier and a colonel were also killed. The ferocious GHQ attack underlined not just the determination and boldness of the terrorists, but also their willingness to raise the bar of conflict by throwing the gauntlet at Pakistan’s most mighty institution.
From the suicide attacks at the offices of U.N. food agency in Islamabad and Saddar Bazzar of Peshawar to the brazen storming of FIA and Manawa Police Centers in Lahore – terrorists ensured that the entire nation remain in the grip of fear and uncertainty. The atrocious twin suicide bombings at the Islamic University Islamabad only heightened the sense of dread as educational institutions were shuttered across Pakistan.
If one key aim of terrorists was to create maximum fear and draw media attention, the Taliban, their al Qaeda allies and supporters certainly remained successful. Their second achievement is that the conflict remains far from over. The longer the conflict prolongs the better for the terror network. By not allowing the state to win, they are making their mark.
However, the upping of ante by the Taliban and their allies finally resulted in the launch of the much-delayed military operation in their power centre of South Waziristan. Barring Jamaat-e-Islami and its likes, all the major political parties and public opinion backs the South Waziristan operation -- achieving a rare consensus on a thorny issue in a highly politically polarized country.
But consensus in no way means that the battle is half won. Top security officials say it will be a protracted and a bloody conflict. For a country, where historically and traditionally, the state never established its writ on vast chunks of territory called the tribal areas and for decades supported and promoted Islamic extremists, controlling this monster undoubtedly will prove an uphill battle.
In the tribal areas, lawlessness and militancy has become a way of life – part of the system. From Islamic seminaries to the tribal code of conduct – all supplement extremists, who have economic stakes in the conflict and the business of terrorism. The links of local extremists with foreign militants, hiding in their area, as well as with various shades and brands of terror groups and cells spread across the country, make them a mammoth and a complex fiend whose strength and uniqueness is in the fact that each part remains connected yet operational on its own. Eliminating one leader or tier of leadership brings the second in command. Even without the central authority, the active and sleeping terror cells across Pakistan can stage attacks on their own. All terror groups – whether Pushtun or Punjabi dominated -- share more or less similar flawed interpretation of Islam, murky political goals and highly distorted worldview.
The concepts of modernity, democracy, constitution, women rights, tolerance or mutual co-existence remain not just alien, but these forces are hostile to them. The lethal ideology, which is infused into minds by hard-line Islamic seminaries and terror groups from a young age, justifies and approves elimination of those who disagree with their worldview. And those, who got killed in these efforts, are promised the rosy gardens of heaven not just for themselves, but also for their families.
The simmering hate toward the proclaimed “enemies of Islam” and the promise of paradise are the two motivating factors for which many youngsters –as young as 13 to those in mid 20s -- get recruited in the death squads, which carryout suicide attacks. Thousands of veterans and young guns of Afghan and Kashmir battle fronts and tens of thousands studying at the Islamic seminaries provide a huge pool of human resource to terror masterminds from which they pick the best of the best.
The presence of such a huge terror network and the single-minded zeal of its members undoubtedly is a nightmarish situation for any army. Pakistan’s army and rest of its security apparatus -- ideologically and practically trained to fight on the eastern front -- faces the twin challenge of a grueling guerilla war as well as of terrorist attacks.
The terrorists just not aim to win publicity for their cause but trying to replace the state writ in many parts of the country as well as force their values in cities. Their immediate target is -- freedom to use Pakistani territory for regional and international terrorism and the long term goal to change the very structure of Pakistani state. Both these objectives are highly detrimental for the state and its people.
As the security forces press hard to weed out tentacles of terrorism in the tribal areas, the militants are trying to ward-off the pressure by targeting major cities. As security officials say that terrorists and guerrilla fighters always get the advantage of selecting the time and the target. They can wait and hide when the security forces look for them and strike where least expected.
The task becomes more difficult when it comes to stopping the suicide bombers. Nothing but their death stops them. And in even then, they have the capability to inflict damage. A senior security official admitted that terrorists have a huge support base and network in almost every city and major town. “When you have a social and financial support network … it becomes easy to operate. Only accurate intelligence can deter them from implementing their plans,” he said.
While terrorists have strong basis in the tribal belt of NWFP, they also have pockets in Punjab -- specially the poverty-hot southern parts of the province -- Sindh and Balochistan.
In recent terror attacks, the extremists effectively changed tactics. In GHQ assault they donned military uniform. They did a thorough homework before attacking the place under the command of their ring-leader, who himself was a low-ranking defector of army’s medical corps.
Going for the soft targets including 20th October’s unprecedented attack on an educational institution – Islamic University in Islamabad and 28th October’s car bomb attack in Peoples' Mandi Peshawar -- underlines the desperation of militants. They can go to any length and commit any atrocity to create waves and avenge the military operation at the tribal areas. Security officials do not even rule out the possibility of militants taking students hostage or kidnapping school or college bus --- especially belonging to the secular and liberal institutions of any major city.
The challenge before the government is not just to tackle the militant threat using force. The bigger challenge is to defeat them ideologically and to dry those pools from where they get recruits. For this, not just the government should go ahead with the long awaited Madarssa reforms, but also open main stream free-of-cost educational institutions for the children belonging to the poor families who mostly end up in Islamic seminaries.
The political parties will also have to come forward openly and forcefully to confront the extremist ideology. Ironically, while the military is now seems geared toward confronting this menace in its own enlightened self-interest, the political leadership are found wanting. Only political leadership can provide a long term and effective solution to the problem of extremism and terrorism by not just taking a candid political stand against them, but educating and organizing the people against them. Their failure to do this, will keep Pakistan on the boil and its soil a hotbed of extremist and terrorist forces.
ENDS
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Interview: Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri
“The entire world is open to us, why should we confine ourselves to this country”
By Amir Zia
Newsline - September 2009
Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri is seen as the kingpin of the radical Baloch nationalist movement, which explicitly demands an independent Balochistan. Although the veteran Baloch leader appears to be living a quiet life in Karachi’s posh Defence Housing Authority for the past several years, his admirers as well as rivals view him as one of the key players of the separatist movement, operating from behind-the-scenes. The shadowy militant Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) – which is waging a low-intensity insurgency in the rugged mountains of Balochistan, as well as targeting government installations, officials and security forces in the cities – is dominated by his Marri tribesmen.
An enigma to many of his contemporaries, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri was a key leader of the 1973-77 Baloch insurgency that saw an estimated 50,000 Baloch fighters taking up arms against the Pakistan Army. Thousands of people were killed in the insurgency, including hundreds of security personnel. The Marri tribe spearheaded the movement, which was supported by a handful of Pakistani leftists as well as by the now-defunct Soviet bloc. KB, as he was popularly known at the time, was languishing in prison during that entire period, along with several key leaders of the banned National Awami Party including Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo and Ataullah Mengal under the Hyderabad conspiracy case. Once freed by the former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, KB flew to Europe for a brief stop over and then went into self-imposed exile in Afghanistan, along with his tribesmen.
He returned to Pakistan in 1991, only after the Soviet-backed Kabul regime was close to collapse. He was briefly arrested on charges of being involved in Justice Nawaz Marri’s murder, but was released in 2002, following which he moved to Karachi. Ill-health and old age have ostensibly removed him from the political scene, but he is still idolised by many Baloch nationalists.
His arrest during Musharraf’s tenure fuelled anger among many of his tribesmen, who, once again, went on a confrontationist path. These included his son Balach, who was killed in 2007 in a controversial military operation.
Unlike conventional tribal and feudal politicians, who are fond of lengthy political arguments and discussions, KB remains a man of few words. He speaks in a soft voice, but his one-liners are often filled with sarcasm, bitter wit and irony.. He knows the art of answering a question with a question. From his calm body language and the gentle tone of his voice, he appears to be a gentle person, but appearances are often deceptive. Old age, exile, arrest and personal losses have in no way mellowed him. He is still as uncompromising and unbending as he was in the 1970s. He continues to chase his dream of an independent Balochistan, which has eluded him all his life and still remains a mirage.
Q: For a fairly long time, you have not been visible on the political scene. What’s the reason?
A: Sir, there are [different] tactics. Do you think there is only one way?
Q: Your tactics have changed?
A: That’s possible … I don’t admit that I have disassociated myself [from politics]. Maybe there is a change in tactics.
Q: In the ’70s, the country’s leftist forces were supporting the Baloch nationalists. The Soviet bloc was there. Today, it does not have any such support.
A: The Soviet bloc never gave us any armies. It only gave us books.. Whether the Soviet bloc is there [or not] … injustice is still there.
Q: But moral support counts. People drew inspiration from the former Soviet Union.
A: I don’t know to what extent the Soviets supported [the nationalists]. Ideology does work, but guns and weapons play a more important role. The Soviets did not give us any guns, bombs or weapons.
Q: The ’70s movement is viewed as the high point of the Baloch nationalist movement.
A: I think the present times are the high point of this movement compared to that period.
Q: Why did the key Baloch leaders of the ’70s fail to evolve a common strategy once they were freed from prison? Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo formed his own Pakistan National Party. Attaullah Mengal went into self-exile in London, while you, too, after a brief stop over in Europe, went to Afghanistan.
A: Maybe there was a change in thinking, which led to a change in practice. [Some] chose the wrong path or we picked one [which was wrong]. Some were diverted, afraid, or bought over … I don’t want to talk about who did what.
I first went to Europe for a brief period and then to Afghanistan. My tribesmen also went to Afghanistan.. We have this pattern – a convention. My grandfather also went to Afghanistan to seek the help of the Muslim king against the British.
Q: The Afghan governments of those times have a history of supporting Pakistan’s nationalists.
A: Yes, they did; Dawood Khan supported us.
Q: Critics say that the movement of that time was tribal in nature and was not a nationalist movement. There was no united front of the Baloch.
A: This is a phase of our history. Tribalism is part of our society … It was tribal as well as for the Baloch identity.
Q: Don’t you think that the lack of a central leadership and divisions within the nationalist movement are weakening it?
A: This has happened everywhere in the world. The better option would have been to have a single party. If it is not there, an alliance will do. I will not say it is correct, but unfortunately, they [the nationalists] are divided. Being divided is not an ailment that cannot be cured. Even the Soviet revolution was not brought about by the power of Bolsheviks alone. Bolsheviks led the revolution by giving a correct thought, correct analysis and a correct diagnosis of the ailment. Then, the people helped.
Q: If you compare the ’70s movement to that of 2009, are the Baloch nationalists as divided as they were back then?
A: I think they are more united now. Even young kids, whose elders used to do nothing and had no concern other than bread, are talking about a free Balochistan. They will be tomorrow’s soldiers – at least, one or two out of 10.
Q: If you were asked to define your politics ideologically, how would you define Khair Bakhsh Marri – as a nationalist or a Marxist?
A: I am afraid to say this openly. [But] I believe that justice should be done in Balochistan in proportion to the bloodshed and the price being paid there.
Q: There was a time when you were seen as a Marxist tribal leader. Has there been a change?
A: There has been a change. I don’t know whether it’s [a sign of] maturity or immaturity. I don’t want to upset the American government.
Q: Can a movement be organised on progressive ideals in a tribal society?
A: It can be done but with hard work.
Q: So far, it has been observed that the Marri tribe has been in the lead in the armed movement.
A: I can’t say that my tribe remains in the lead. Yes, it is satisfying that we are part of the movement. But Nauroz Khan and others started this movement much earlier when the Marris had no role in it.
Q: What is your main grievance against Pakistan?
A: Our freedom has been snatched.
Q: Is this your personal view or that of the majority?
A: At the [time of] creation of Pakistan, we were asked whether we wanted to join India or Pakistan. And we said we wanted independence. As a state, we never had any connection with Pakistan. Our language, culture, history, geography were never the same.
Q: Is there a chance of any compromise? In all political movements, there is room for talks.
A: You must have observed, and I also think, that sometimes I am impolite or say things that are considered uncivil, but which I think are absolutely civil. We cannot live with the Punjabis. There is no room for compromise in my book. We have to get rid of them.
Q: Don’t you think 62 years after independence, all the provinces are now politically and economically integrated and staying united seems to make sense?
A: [It seems so] because we are not free … [But economically] we do not have to depend on others. We have sea, land, vast resources. It is others who depend on the Baloch; the Baloch don’t have to depend on others.
Q: The entire country is open to you.
A: Sir, the entire world is open to us, why should we confine ourselves to this country.
Q: If we talk about the past, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s democratic …
A: Bengal was denied [of its rights], you call that democratic? Aren’t you doing an injustice? They [the Bengalis] had a majority in votes, in numbers. And despite that, you call it democratic? Why do you misguide people?
Q: Those tragic events are a part of history. But Bhutto’s constitution was supported by all, including Baloch nationalists.
A: I wish we were more mature, especially after what happened with Bangladesh. Maybe we were so scared, so frightened that we thought it was sufficient. But a simple man like me didn’t sign that constitution ... I thought that this constitution does not [provide any] salvation. You could call it my obedience or timidity, but as I didn’t like it, I thought [I should] express [my displeasure].
Q: The Baloch launched an armed resistance against Bhutto’s elected government. But when a dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, was in power, the nationalists remained silent. Why?
A: That was the low ebb of our freedom movement. All movements pass through such phases.
Q: When your movement was at its peak in the ’70s, the Baloch were not in it alone. There were other leftist elements who remained part of the movement. There was a London group … then why do you talk in such a disparaging manner about one ethnic group?
A: (Laughing) There were only four, five people in the London group. But they could not remain with us. [Maybe] because of our mistakes or because their timeline for adventurism was over.
Q: What was the role of the London group?
A: I don’t know exactly because I had never been to the mountains [to fight]. But I have heard that they used to fight, write and explode bombs. One lost an eye, another got his hand slashed.
Q: Don’t you think the solution to the Baloch problem lies in democracy?
A: No, not with this rival. Not with the Punjabis.
Q: In politics, the doors of negotiations are never closed.
A: Negotiations remained open for 60 years, but we could not find a way. For us, the doors are closed.
Q: It is said that a lot of money was spent on Balochistan’s development and progress during Pervez Musharraf’s tenure.
A: Brother, when someone is asking for freedom, you offer them an increase in salary – even that is a lie. They are offering us some leftover meat on the bones … We are talking of freedom.
Q: The demand for freedom appears to come from only two, three tribal chiefs. It does not seem to be a popular movement in Balochistan.
A: All this army, these killings, exiles, arrests, torture … don’t you think they are a deterrence [in building a popular movement]? There are so many obstacles.
Q: There are allegations that a few tribal chiefs are opposed to development.
A: Which few sardars – Marri, Bugti and Mengal? I would have joined the Muslim League if this sardari was a paradise for me. [I would have] got motors, planes, a share in oil, become the chief minister – made money. Even in this age, I go to Afghanistan [in exile], go to jail – all the time I’m afraid [as to] when the policemen will break the door, drag us away, arrest or shoot us. What do you think I am – a normal human being or a lunatic out of an asylum?
Q: People say tribal chiefs will lose their grip on their people when education and development come to their areas.
A: If there is freedom, the Baloch will decide about the fate of the sardars. At your place, are there political parties in the western sense, who do issue-oriented politics? There are Chaudhrys, Khans, Nawabs, Pirs! Do you have issue-based politics? There are baradaris – is there any politics based on ideology or is it just opportunism?
Q: Is the present government sincere in resolving the Balochistan problem?
A: Yes, it is sincere in resolving the issue by defeating us. It is sincere in defeating us, breaking us, bending us, forcing us to flee and surrender. For this, they have to tell big lies, tempt people with money, [launch] operations … This shows how sincere they are.
Q: President Asif Ali Zardari promises to resolve the Balochistan issue. Do you see any ray of hope?
A: What is Zardari’s status? He is a puppet..
Q: Other nationalists welcomed it.
A: Whom do you call nationalists? Except for BNF or BNM, who are the other nationalists working openly?
Q: There is the National Party.
A: You call the National Party nationalist! In the eyes of the Baloch, it is not.
Q: You don’t see any democratic solution to this problem?
A: [We] tried, but were let down. Democracy does not exist here.
Q: What is the way to reach a settlement?
A: There is only one way to reach a settlement: you get out of our house. After that we will see what our relations will be. But I am sure you are not going to leave – by you, I mean the Punjabis and Mohajirs.
Q: Your son Chengaiz used to be a PML-N member. Your other sons were also part of the system.
A: Not all of them.
Q: Chengaiz was in PML-N. Gazen remained member of the provincial assembly, a minister …
A: Today it is not the same Gazen. You won’t be able to give references of any other sons of mine.
Q: Out of your four sons, who is to be the successor of your politics and ideology?
A: My heirs are not just my legitimate sons, but all those Baloch who respect us, listen to us and [are willing to] sacrifice.
Q: Do you think the tragic killing of one of your sons, Balach, could have been prevented?
A: Balach was following a path where death followed him at every step. The regret is that it came too early. He could have done more work. There used to be study circles, but Balach never attended them. He was a youngster who enjoyed life. When he returned from London, he was a changed man. I never thought he would be successful, but he succeeded.
Q: Worldwide, all such movements have a face. But the Baloch armed movement is without one. There is a shadowy BLA and the Republican Army, but they have no known leadership. Don’t you think this is a weakness?
A: There are no names? I think they are working under two banners.
Q: Do you endorse the tactics of these militant groups?
A: In today’s street language, I agree with them 110%.
Q: Pakistan has recently blamed India for fomenting violence in Balochistan. What do you think?
A: Right now, the most disturbing thing for us is [Pakistani] helicopters and planes. We are not getting those [from India]. What help is it [India] giving us? Providing us bullets, Kalashnikovs? They are available in the market here.
Q: You have spent a lifetime in politics. In the final analysis what have you gained and lost?
A: I can’t say what I lost or gained. But the Baloch are moving forward. Consciousness is increasing among them. Their numbers are rising. Out of 100, 25 will also raise arms.
Q: If you were asked to do a critical evaluation of your own politics and movement …
A: Self-criticism? I am not going to do it.
Q: There must be something for public consumption?
A: Being human, there are weaknesses. But why should I tell others about them – so that they [enemies] can further stab me with a dagger? If I reveal this before you, the government will also listen in. I will not commit the sin of sharing my weaknesses.
Q: How do you spend your time in Karachi these days?
A: It’s unfortunate, [but] the Marris bring their small and big disputes for settlement. Presently, I don’t have the strength to do much reading but occasionally I do spend time reading.
Q: One of your passions is cockfighting. I could hear roosters even during this interview.
A: Yes, this is my childhood passion. It existed even when I was a young man and stayed with me throughout my jail days. People think it is a bad thing; I think so too, but it is no secret that I keep roosters. [Though] I fail to understand [why I do it]. (In a lighter tone) Sometimes I think I need the help of a psychiatrist. Now I only keep roosters that are fit to fight but earlier on, as a child, I used to pick even the normal ones.
I believe it is a sin … the way they fight, get injured and die … but I still keep them, though I have stopped going to the ground [to watch the fights] for a long time now. n
Saturday, August 15, 2009
EXCLUSIVE - Child Suicide Bombers
Upadated on: 14 Aug 09 10:50 PM
KARACHI: Who are child suicide bombers in Pakistan and how are they recruited? SAMAA News Director & Current Affairs Amir Zia discussed the phenomenon with expert Zahid Hussain on his show ‘Qaum kay Samnay’ on Aug 6, 2009. Produced below are some excerpts from the transcript:
AMIR ZIA: Zahid saheb, do tell us what kind of people and organizations are involved in this horrifying work?
ZAHID HUSSAIN: Look, the biggest responsibility that is shouldered is shouldered by the so-called ‘aalims’ or ulema or clerics who have given the fatwa that suicide bombings are allowed in Islam. There is a large number of such clerics who have moved to Waziristan. These men say that fighting and suicide bombings against the Pakistan Army is allowed – the army is not taking part in the ‘real’ jihad which according to them is the one that should be fought. These people are the biggest culprits.
And after them the people I hold most responsible are the men who are using these children, who run the camps, who were not just in Swat, but the biggest camp was in South Waziristan, which is being supported by Baitullah Mehsud. And they say that the biggest trainer is Qari Hussain who has lived in Karachi for a long time even though he is a member of the Mehsud tribe. And he had, in a way, established this camp. And people would say that he could convince a child to become a suicide bomber in ten minutes flat.
AMIR: Zahid saheb, you’ve traveled a lot to these areas, what is it that you think these people do to manipulate the minds of these innocent children? What is it that they say to them? What reasons do they give?
ZAHID: First of all they bring them up [tarbiat] into their way of life. And when you see it, for a normal child, if he takes a gun in his hands, there is a feeling of excitement. They come and I think they brainwash them. And the most basic thing they say to the children is that when you do this, you will be rendering a service to Islam. And after that they tell them that if you do this, you will go straight to heaven. I spoke to a lot of people who were in training or who were ready to go for suicide bombings and were caught, and what becomes clear from them is that they are completely brainwashed. And they think that if they did this suicide bombing, they would in fact be doing it in the name of religion. They are told, and this strange thing surfaced in the people who were trained… I met them from three different areas and they had been in different environments but they all said the same one thing, in the wrong exegesis of the Quran, and they were told that all these people are Murt’did and jihad is permitted against the Murt’dim. And then the majority of them, you’ll see that there are two types:
There are those who are really poor and go to the madrassas and their minds are constantly bombarded with…
AMIR: We’ll talk about the socio-economic factors later, but first tell me about their religious centres, what are they like? What are the training camps like where they are brainwashed?
ZAHID: There are two types of training. There is the mental training which in a way you will get at the madrassas in the form of education. The child’s brain is prepped in these places. Then there are a few actual camps in Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas where they are actually physically trained. There is a big network and lots of people are involved. First they used to say that the camps were just in the NWFP, but from the events that recently surfaced, it became absolutely clear that they are in the Punjab as well. That a lot of the suicide bombings that had children who came from here.
And the scale is so large that it was these people who were behind a majority of the suicide bombings after 2007.
Then it came to the fore that a lot of them had been bought and sold. They didn’t even know what they were going to be told to do. There is a well known incident from Mianwalli, Chakwal, there was a suicide bombing at an MNA’s office. Later on they found out that there was an exchange of money and some problem. And the man who had ordered the attack had gone to South Waziristan and brought a child who had been trained as a suicide bomber. And the child had been told that you go and do this against the people who aren’t proper Muslims.
And another major portion of these people are suicide bombers who have been unsuccessful in life…
AMIR: The children who are made suicide bombers, could you talk about their socio-economic outlook? You said they were mostly poor.
ZAHID: They are from the poorest of the poor families.
AMIR: So what about the parents? Do they agree?
ZAHID: Not at all, very few give permission. I’ll give you an example of the four or five children I saw in Swat. Their families were poor, but not that poor. So one child’s father ran a shop, one was a sweeper, one worked in a shop. So what was their outlook? That was during the time of the peace deal when the Taliban had a completely free hand. And a massive number of children was recruited during that period. One child used to study in a school. One used to study in a madrassas. And they were lured in a way, told that they would be given training but they would not be told what for, that ultimately they would be a suicide bomber.
AMIR: Did they find that the children had been the subject of any other abuse?
ZAHID: I think that, and some people have said, that before these incidents the children are drugged. There are two things; they are mentally prepared, ideologically and the second is that at the same time they are being drugged before the attack.
In Taxila, about 2.5 years ago, there was a bombing, there were two people, about 60 to 70 people were killed… there was a third person who was in the mosque at the time. He had panicked and ran. And when they asked him later on, he said, we were told that there are American and foreign people here who work here and are the enemies of Muslims. So this thing is spread.
If you look at the profile, there are the school dropouts. They don’t manage to do anything else in life. They then bring these minds around to suicide bombings.
AMIR: How long does such training take? How long does it take to change their personalities?
ZAHID: It’s not like that, the training can last for months as well. It’s not that they are just given training for suicide bombings. They are first given ‘fikri’ or Quranic teaching. They are given this fundamental training first. I spoke to a boy who had been caught from a South Waziristan camp and he said that different people had come to the Punjab. There were some young men and some children, who were trained there. And when I asked him what they talked about amongst themselves, he said that they didn’t ask each other’s names or talk about anything except these academic/religious matters. We did not ask about where the other person was from, what was their background. And all the people who were at that camp were not known by their real names. They were all known by other names.
So in a way a sense of secrecy is created. And there are different reasons for this and different motivations. Some of them are interested in the training. Others have had some tragedy. There was one child who worked in a clothing shop in Islamabad and his father was a government servant and his brothers and sisters went to school. One of his brothers had joined the Lashkar-e Tayba and fought in Kashmir. He had stopped going to school after seventh grade. And when I asked him why, he said he didn’t feel like studying. And when you looked at him, you could see that he was of average intelligence but didn’t have any purpose in life. He didn’t think he was capable of doing anything in life. And the Lal Masjid… when that happened, I thought about it.
And they are even told that if your parents are involved, then you should kill them as well. So that kind of mind, uneducated, innocent, and if you brainwash it, then you have a human killer.
AMIR: Tell us how these children are taken in their neighbourhoods, among their peers. Are they feared, respected, ignored?
ZAHID: Look, these people become completely isolated. They have run away. They become completely separated from their homes and households. I don’t think that they are left with any links or bonds to their family, neighbourhood or society.
And then, before someone is taken off to commit the attack, one or two days before they take him to a mosque and he meets their big leaders. And they say, come, why don’t you lead the prayers. So they tell a 13 or 14 year old kid to lead the congregation, imamat, because he is about to ascend to a great status [a martyr]. Then they keep them there for two days and he keeps praying during this time. They keep congratulating him. So his mind is already prepared that he’s about to achieve some great feat. It’s not the kind of motivation like you see in Palestine. Those are different conditions.
AMIR: What do the locals do when all of this is going on?
ZAHID: I think that the locals have an intense hatred for this kind of thing. They are not proud of it. Who are they killing? They are killing their own people, fellow Muslims, people from their own country. So I don’t think they are supported. And perhaps they have no idea how much they will be hated. And people don’t know where they have come from. If someone comes from the tribal areas and is taken to Islamabad or Karachi for an attack, how do you identify that person?
AMIR: Thank you for your time Zahid saheb. Nazireen, suicide bombings by children is our topic today. In the next part of the programme we will have you meet Zia Awan, a human rights activist who had worked a lot for child rehabilitation. Back after the break.
ENDS
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Vulnerable & Helpless On The Street
By Amir Zia
The News: December 20, 2006
We see them daily on almost every major road, every busy traffic junction — begging, washing cars, selling flowers, roaming idly, being chased and harassed by policemen and bullied by petty criminals and thugs.
Some of them are barely six or seven-year-old. They earn, eat, sleep, and live on the streets. The traffic choked roads are their playgrounds and footpaths their homes. The world gives them lessons about life, relationships and the society in the hardest possible way.
Those of us, who pity them, toss a few rupees on their extended palms, but most just ignore them. Many seem oblivious to their very existence, others appear afraid to see them eye-to-eye. Perhaps the guilt of living in such a callous society sometimes becomes burdensome even for the most thick-skinned among us.
However, the public apathy or occasional burst of sympathy, hardly make any difference for these wretched souls. They cling to their miserable life — if it is one — on day-to-day basis.
Yes, the plight and suffering of the street children of Pakistan is hardly news now. These little tragic stories float around us unnoticed in every major city — be it Karachi, Lahore, or Rawalpindi-Islamabad. A vast majority, or perhaps the collective will of the society, has accepted them just as another fact. The debate whether is it pleasant or unpleasant one does not seem to matter at all.
Therefore it should not come as a surprise if one is told by some of the stalwarts of rights groups that there is no reliable data available even on the approximate number of these children who live on the streets. The number of this floating-population is increasing as fresh homeless children keep trickling down to their ranks. In Karachi alone, the number of street children is estimated somewhere between 15,000 and 25,000. They could be less or more — but mere statistics, fudged or accurate, conservative or exaggerated won’t bring any smiles on their faces or more tears in their eyes. For these are children not just numbers.
And let’s be clear that these street children do not include the ones involved in manual labour with the consent of their parents. The children who are into labour under the supervision of parents are certainly better off. At least they are more protected. But those who live on the streets are among the lowest of the low and the most vulnerable. They have nowhere to turn to for protection, emotional support and comradeship except the members of their own band in which often a bully — who himself could be a victim of physical and sexual abuse — treats the young or weaker ones as once he was treated as a child.
A vast majority of the children who end up on the roads are driven away from their homes because of domestic violence, corporal punishment, abuse, and poverty. They are usually members of divided or single-parent families. In some cases, simply bad company, the desire of unrestricted freedom, and the pull of the hustle and bustle of cities, prompt them to leave homes in rural areas and low-income localities of our cities, especially belonging to southern Punjab and parts of North West Frontier Province.
Some limited surveys and interviews conducted by various non-government organisations show that an alarming 80 to 90 per cent of the street children are victims of sodomy, sexual and physical abuse not just by elders but older children within their own gangs.
A majority of them are drug addicts. The most popular and affordable of the durg is a type of glue — used mostly in home repair and maintenance — which these children inhale by putting it on a piece of cloth. One can see young boys sniffing this glue openly on the streets and pavements that according to one user, "tingles nose and make one slightly drowsy." The use of other drugs including hashish, and even heroin are also rampant among many of these streets children.
Organised gangs of criminals — peddling drugs or operating begging rackets — take these children under their wings and use them in criminal activities. Many children also resort on their own to begging and petty crimes, raising enough money to buy themselves food and favourite drug.
There are a few small NGOs working for the rehabilitation of these children, but their network is much small given the enormity of the task. Some NGOs operate a few small day-care centres, but they are closed during the night when these children are most vulnerable.
As far as the authorities are concerned, the less said about them the better. The issue does not seem to exist on their radar. There seems to be no awareness about this festering problem in the official quarters. There is no government initiative to protect and rehabilitate these children, who grow up on the streets, amid extreme forms of abuse, harassment, and violence.
Establishing state-run shelters where these children can have food, clothing and education, does not require mega-bucks, foreign currency, or a vote of two-third majority in parliament. It needs a little sensitivity, consideration, and above all channelling of efforts to help these miserable souls, who are not asking for the moon, but only a right to live and lead normal lives.
We, as a society, need to take this responsibility and attempt to pull these children out of the deep pit of crime, ignorance, and exploitation. If we allow them to live as they are, tomorrow they would be justified in returning and inflicting the same violence on others that our society has perpetuated on them.
Yes, these children can live and die on the roads, turn out to be petty thieves, hardened criminals, or even terrorists. After all what options do they have? What options the society has given them? What have they to lose?
Let’s all help these children to get back their precious childhood. It should not be denied to them. But are we willing? Let’s try to find this answer in our hearts — perhaps we can find some light. We need it badly.
The writer is a senior Karachi-based journalist. Email: amir.zia@gmail.com
The News: December 20, 2006
We see them daily on almost every major road, every busy traffic junction — begging, washing cars, selling flowers, roaming idly, being chased and harassed by policemen and bullied by petty criminals and thugs.
Some of them are barely six or seven-year-old. They earn, eat, sleep, and live on the streets. The traffic choked roads are their playgrounds and footpaths their homes. The world gives them lessons about life, relationships and the society in the hardest possible way.
Those of us, who pity them, toss a few rupees on their extended palms, but most just ignore them. Many seem oblivious to their very existence, others appear afraid to see them eye-to-eye. Perhaps the guilt of living in such a callous society sometimes becomes burdensome even for the most thick-skinned among us.
However, the public apathy or occasional burst of sympathy, hardly make any difference for these wretched souls. They cling to their miserable life — if it is one — on day-to-day basis.
Yes, the plight and suffering of the street children of Pakistan is hardly news now. These little tragic stories float around us unnoticed in every major city — be it Karachi, Lahore, or Rawalpindi-Islamabad. A vast majority, or perhaps the collective will of the society, has accepted them just as another fact. The debate whether is it pleasant or unpleasant one does not seem to matter at all.
Therefore it should not come as a surprise if one is told by some of the stalwarts of rights groups that there is no reliable data available even on the approximate number of these children who live on the streets. The number of this floating-population is increasing as fresh homeless children keep trickling down to their ranks. In Karachi alone, the number of street children is estimated somewhere between 15,000 and 25,000. They could be less or more — but mere statistics, fudged or accurate, conservative or exaggerated won’t bring any smiles on their faces or more tears in their eyes. For these are children not just numbers.
And let’s be clear that these street children do not include the ones involved in manual labour with the consent of their parents. The children who are into labour under the supervision of parents are certainly better off. At least they are more protected. But those who live on the streets are among the lowest of the low and the most vulnerable. They have nowhere to turn to for protection, emotional support and comradeship except the members of their own band in which often a bully — who himself could be a victim of physical and sexual abuse — treats the young or weaker ones as once he was treated as a child.
A vast majority of the children who end up on the roads are driven away from their homes because of domestic violence, corporal punishment, abuse, and poverty. They are usually members of divided or single-parent families. In some cases, simply bad company, the desire of unrestricted freedom, and the pull of the hustle and bustle of cities, prompt them to leave homes in rural areas and low-income localities of our cities, especially belonging to southern Punjab and parts of North West Frontier Province.
Some limited surveys and interviews conducted by various non-government organisations show that an alarming 80 to 90 per cent of the street children are victims of sodomy, sexual and physical abuse not just by elders but older children within their own gangs.
A majority of them are drug addicts. The most popular and affordable of the durg is a type of glue — used mostly in home repair and maintenance — which these children inhale by putting it on a piece of cloth. One can see young boys sniffing this glue openly on the streets and pavements that according to one user, "tingles nose and make one slightly drowsy." The use of other drugs including hashish, and even heroin are also rampant among many of these streets children.
Organised gangs of criminals — peddling drugs or operating begging rackets — take these children under their wings and use them in criminal activities. Many children also resort on their own to begging and petty crimes, raising enough money to buy themselves food and favourite drug.
There are a few small NGOs working for the rehabilitation of these children, but their network is much small given the enormity of the task. Some NGOs operate a few small day-care centres, but they are closed during the night when these children are most vulnerable.
As far as the authorities are concerned, the less said about them the better. The issue does not seem to exist on their radar. There seems to be no awareness about this festering problem in the official quarters. There is no government initiative to protect and rehabilitate these children, who grow up on the streets, amid extreme forms of abuse, harassment, and violence.
Establishing state-run shelters where these children can have food, clothing and education, does not require mega-bucks, foreign currency, or a vote of two-third majority in parliament. It needs a little sensitivity, consideration, and above all channelling of efforts to help these miserable souls, who are not asking for the moon, but only a right to live and lead normal lives.
We, as a society, need to take this responsibility and attempt to pull these children out of the deep pit of crime, ignorance, and exploitation. If we allow them to live as they are, tomorrow they would be justified in returning and inflicting the same violence on others that our society has perpetuated on them.
Yes, these children can live and die on the roads, turn out to be petty thieves, hardened criminals, or even terrorists. After all what options do they have? What options the society has given them? What have they to lose?
Let’s all help these children to get back their precious childhood. It should not be denied to them. But are we willing? Let’s try to find this answer in our hearts — perhaps we can find some light. We need it badly.
The writer is a senior Karachi-based journalist. Email: amir.zia@gmail.com
Friday, June 12, 2009
Book Review: The Other Faiz
A collection of prose writings reveals another side of the legendary poet.
By Amir Zia
Newsline - Feb. 2006
The poet in Faiz Ahmed Faiz outshines and eclipses all the other aspects of his personality: Faiz, the journalist, the teacher, the trade unionist, the left-wing intellectual. However, a glimpse of other dimensions of Faiz leads one to a greater appreciation and understanding of his poetic genius, and his character as a whole.
Culture and Identity - Selected English Writings of Faiz, a recent book published by the Oxford University Press, offers readers a chance to peer into the mind of this great genius of our times through some of his little known and forgotten writings and essays. These works remain as important and relevant to our age as they were when Faiz wrote them. They reveal a part of his personality as well as his views on issues of culture, art, literature, society and politics. An encounter with Faiz's prose can be as fulfilling, and intellectually and emotionally stimulating, as one with his poetry.
Sheema Majeed - a renowned literary researcher of Pakistan - has done a commendable job as the editor of this book by compiling the poet's writings from a range of varied and scattered sources.
The book, which also includes Faiz's only published English-language poem, 'The Unicorn and The Dancing Girl', is certainly not just a gift for Faiz fans, but a great reference for scholars and researchers as well. His lucid style and simplicity of expression hook the reader to his observations on varied topics.
The autobiographical section of the book, which opens with 'Faiz by Faiz,' is a treat to read. It is a slightly edited version of an extempore talk delivered by Faiz to the Asia Study Group in Islamabad just eight months before he died in March 1984.
Here Faiz reveals how he helped the British organise Communist Party-like cells in each unit of the Indian army to bolster war efforts among Indian soldiers against the Japanese and German forces during World War II.
He was awarded the Order of the British Empire for this feat, rising within a short span of three years to the rank of colonel - the highest position an Indian could attain at that time. He ran the propaganda machinery of the entire Indian army on all its fronts until the war ended.
Another interesting account in this section is about the much publicised Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in which Faiz was arrested along with several military officials and had to spend four years in prison.
"Nothing had happened, you see, nothing was going to be done," said Faiz. In what Faiz called "a very stupid way," he along with two civilian friends went to attend a meeting of 14 to 16 army officers at the invitation of General Akbar Khan to plan a coup. The participants did discuss ways to overthrow the government, but towards the end of the meeting realised that it was impractical and "not on." So the decision was that nothing had to be done, but this "thought-crime," as George Orwell would have termed it, resulted in one of the most famous cases in our history.
Faiz's stint in prison, however, proved productive for his poetry. He came out with two books which turned him into an "even greater celebrity than before."
This section also contains Faiz's account of his father, who rose from the ranks of a landless peasant to serve an Afghan monarch, as his chief secretary and minister, went on to Cambridge University for education and became a barrister before settling for good in his hometown, Sialkot.
"I was born in the house of a gentleman who was a 19th century adventurer, who had a far more colourful life than I have had," Faiz said while giving his family background.
Faiz's eight articles on culture raise many issues and questions, which not only remain relevant to this day, but highlight those anomalies and contradictions that grip Pakistan even now.
He attempted to identify and understand the essence of the culture of peoples living in Pakistan, the impact of imperialism on their lives and the burden imposed on them by primitive tribal and feudal societies.
"Before independence, the only radical change which occurred in our economic and social structure was under the impact of British Imperialism," he wrote in an article - 'The Quest for Identity in Culture' - published in Viewpoint in February 1976.
In his articles on culture, Faiz focused on raising questions rather than providing answers. He pointed out various interpretations on issues such as language and tradition, rather than drawing a definite conclusion. He attempted to understand the basic cultural problems of third world countries by applying the Marxist yardstick for understanding history.
"Very broadly speaking, these problems are primarily the problems of arrested growth; they originate primarily from long years of imperialist-colonialist domination and the remnants of a backward, outmoded social structure," he wrote in the article titled 'Cultural Problems in Underdeveloped Countries.'
He, however, does not shy away from accepting the massive social change the imperialist powers brought into their colonies, nor does he hesitate to point out the flaws and inherent weaknesses of feudal and tribal societies.
"The culture of these ancient feudal societies, in spite of much technical and intellectual excellence, was restricted to a small privileged class and rarely intermingled with the parallel unsophisticated folk culture of the general masses. Primitive tribal culture, in spite of its childlike beauty, had little intellectual content."
The readers get a flavour of Faiz's concept of beauty - both external and internal - and its elusiveness and tangibility in the brief section on art in which there is also an article on "The World of Sadequain."
In the section on literature, containing 16 articles, he provides a bird's eye view of the literary heritage of Pakistan - from the Arab and Persian influences to the contemporary age - and discusses the work and art of our literary giants including Ameer Khusrau, Mirza Asadullah Khan Ghalib and Sir Allama Mohammed Iqbal.
In the three separate articles on Iqbal, Faiz discusses his poetic technique - on which, according to him, "very little analysis has been done"- as well as the four key distinct phases of poetry starting from his youthful days to the final phase of philosophical humanism. Faiz describes Iqbal's final phase as "most mature and most valuable," saying that his approach and exposition of themes was abstract and philosophical which frequently gave rise to contradictory expositions by his followers and admirers.
"To understand Iqbal correctly… it is necessary to keep in mind that his work reflected all the inner intellectual contradictions, all the conflicting impulses, all the confused dreams and aspirations of the middle strata of Indo-Pakistan Muslims during the first three or four decades of this century and it is precisely because of this that his work is popular among progressives and reactionaries alike and make for his title as the national poet of Pakistan."
Faiz's interpretation of Iqbal stands in contrast to the official and widely accepted line in which our philosopher- poet is being read and understood in Pakistan.
The three articles on social issues include a short and very moving piece on Sir Ganga Ram - one of the greatest philanthropists Lahore has produced to date. 'No Holiday From Virtue' was published in the Civil and Military Gazette in March 1961 and tells of how Faiz found Ram's samadhi in an utterly depleted, filthy and neglected state. Yet, it was home to many of the homeless and wretched of the world.
"The needs of the living, I thought to myself, must have precedence over reverence for the dead, even though it comes to this," wrote Faiz as he found a woman's cauldron bubbling over the place where the dead man's ashes lay buried. "They have sheltered here, homeless, nameless, disinherited, dehumanised, because no one else would give them shelter, except this dead philanthropist."
The final section on politics contains nine pieces by Faiz, including a compact, crisp and commanding article titled 'Disgrace.' As with some other pieces, the editor of the book does not mention the source and date of publication of this article. This remains one of the most irritating flaw of this otherwise fine collection.
"We have learnt with horror and surprise that a political detainee, who has recently undergone a serious eye operation, is receiving medical attention in the Mayo Hospital handcuffed to his bed. The detainee in question is Mirza Mohammed Ibrahim, the labour leader," wrote Faiz, questioning the authorities.
"We hold that any police or executive functionary who considers that he is serving Pakistan by aping Hitler's Belsen Guards, anyone who thinks that he is securing the interests of the State by indulging in unnecessary brutalities, is no friend of Pakistan."
The advise proferred by Faiz decades ago remains pertinent and potent even now - and will be in the days to come. This collection of writings is an important one and a must-have for all Faiz lovers - from all the former and serving comrades, to those in a state of political hibernation and, above all, those who simply adore him for his poetry, its romance and its immortal message.. ENDS
Monday, June 8, 2009
Viewpoint: This War is Our War
The new government needs to realise that Pakistan has more to lose than even the US if it does not conduct the war on terror effectively.
By Amir ZiaNewsline -July 2008
There is no dearth of Pakistani politicians and analysts who brand Islamabad's fight against religious extremism and militancy purely an "American war." Notwithstanding the numerous UN resolutions, which have made it mandatory on all its member states to cooperate in the global war on terror or risk sanctions, a vast number of ordinary Pakistanis have been made to believe that the country could have avoided all the suicide bombings and terror attacks in its major cities and violence in the restive tribal areas, if the former military-led government had not committed itself to the US-led war against terrorism.
Even one of the key partners in the new ruling coalition - the PML-N - has been trying to whip up popular sentiment against the besieged President Pervez Musharraf by playing this right-wing card. In fact, its chief whip - former premier Nawaz Sharif - has been demanding that Musharraf be held accountable for last year's operation against the militants in Islamabad's Lal Masjid, accusing him of killing 'innocent' people. In an attempt to win the support of the traditional religious lobby and Islamic radicals, and channelise their anger towards Musharraf, Sharif seems to have deliberately overlooked the fact that the armed militants of Lal Masjid were resorting to criminal and terrorist acts - including kidnapping and harassment of foreign and local nationals, in their zeal to enforce a myopic version of Islam. No state can tolerate such unlawful acts, especially an open revolt against the government's writ in the federal capital. Acting out of political expediency, the members of the ruling coalition, including the PPP, announced compensation for the Lal Masjid militants, but this has only served to embolden the extremist elements.
No wonder the lobby opposed to the fight against extremists has become louder and bolder since the installation of the PPP-led government in Islamabad in March 2008. The deaths of thousands of Pakistanis in recent years, and the damage to the very fabric of our society, are being conveniently ignored or forgotten amidst the clichéd anti-US rhetoric of the religious and right-wing forces.
As the country remains in the grip of political instability and uncertainty because of the lawyers' campaign for the restoration of the controversial deposed chief justice, and the mounting pressure on President Musharraf to resign, there has been a marked confusion in the government's anti-terror war policy, which appears to lack initiative, drive and resolve. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani's government - under pressure from its allies and right-wing forces - seems to be sending mixed signals, both within the country and abroad, regarding its commitment on how to conduct this war against the backdrop of a rapid deterioration in the law and order situation in parts of the NWFP. Emboldened militants have increased violent attacks not just in the tribal region, but also in nearby settled areas of the NWFP.
The Taliban extremists are executing people, burning schools, hitting at government installations and the security forces, and targeting women. The dark shadow of their activities is no longer confined to the remote mountainous region; it is fast spreading its tentacles in the populated areas as well. How can one hold talks with these forces who refuse to pay heed to reason? Should the government allow the creation of states within the state, in turn, allowing a rapid Talibanisation in parts of the NWFP?
The international community was becoming increasingly wary of Pakistan's intentions and its capacity to reign in militants, as the government is desperately trying to bank on the faltering talks in an attempt to restore peace in the volatile tribal region.
In the past, the pro-Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants used peace talks to re-group, re-organise and re-entrench themselves in the lawless mountainous tribal belt. This led to not just increased violence against US-led forces in Afghanistan, but also undermined whatever little writ the state had in its tribal belt.
The same mistake of appeasing the militants should not be repeated. The government should act to establish its writ and not give any ground to militants to make parts of the country a safe haven for international terrorists and use its territory for unleashing terrorism across the globe. This country of 160 million people should not be allowed to drift into complete anarchy and chaos.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's statement that his country had the right to send troops across the border to chase militants taking shelter in Pakistan, perhaps reflects the sentiment of his powerful NATO allies, who remain concerned about Islamabad's efforts to sign peace accords with militants. Karzai's statement remains in line with the UN Security Council resolutions - 1373 (passed in 2001) and 1566 (passed in 2004) - which make it mandatory for all its member states to deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support and commit terrorist acts. These resolutions also direct the member states to prohibit their nationals and entities from making funds, financial assets, economic resources, or any other related services available to those who commission or participate in the terrorist acts.
This has put the Gillani government in a quandary at a time when it is struggling to maintain balance between international expectations and obligations on the one hand, and growing pressure from the religious and right-wing forces, including some of its own allies, to change the course of the war against terror, on the other.
On June 25, the government announced that it was handing over powers to the army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, to take action against militants in the NWFP. The PPP-led government has to take ownership of this fight against extremists and terrorists, rather than give an impression that it has been dragged into an unwanted and unnecessary conflict. The Gillani government should fight this war boldly on the ideological front and help build public opinion in its favour, providing security forces the necessary cushion to weed out terrorism from Pakistani soil. The much-neglected Islamic seminary reforms also need to be pushed on a war-footing to stamp out the tide of terrorism and extremism in the long run.
If Pakistan fails to control militants on its own, it will provide foreign powers an excuse to intervene.
However, the PPP - seen as a pro-west liberal and secular force - has so far failed to grasp the initiative in this fight, although its leader, Benazir Bhutto, became one of its victims on December 27 in a gun and bomb attack, which bears all the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda-linked or inspired terrorism. This should give the present government the impetus to confront this scourge with a greater determination.
Extremism and terrorism are not challenges faced by the United States and its western allies alone. They pose a far graver challenge for Pakistan, which served as a conduit for waging the US-sponsored Afghan war against the former Soviet Union and its backed communist regime in Kabul during the 1980s. It is now well-documented history that it was American and Saudi Arabian dollars which fuelled the so-called holy war in Afghanistan for more than a decade during the 1980s with Pakistan's help. This dollar-sponsored so-called jihad not only resulted in the mushroom growth of Islamic seminaries all over the country, particularly in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan, but also attracted thousands of Islamic militants from across the world - especially from the Middle East - who learnt the art of terrorism in the ISI-operated training centres that were financed and armed by American and Saudi intelligence agencies. The Pakistani establishment of those days helped not only radical Afghan Islamic groups, but also the Pakistani militants to organise on similar patterns and used them in fuelling jihad in Indian-occupied Kashmir. This led to the establishment of the vast, resource-rich private jihadi empire, which spun out of control from the hands of its sponsors and started following its own extremist and self-styled pan-Islamic agenda.
The surge in sectarian killings during the 1990s, the phenomenal rise in religious extremism and intolerance in the country and the subsequent building of ties of the local militants with international terrorists, are the result of the myopic policies of General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq's era and his remnants. And just like the United States, in an ironic turn of events, Pakistan also faces a backlash from this Frankenstein it helped create with Washington.
By joining hands with Washington in the international war against terrorism, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil, President Musharraf, for the first time in the country's history, confronted these extremists head-on. Not only did Pakistan stop its support to the Afghan Taliban, it also gradually stopped militants from using Pakistani territory against Indian forces in occupied Kashmir, which led to the easing of tensions between the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours.
However, the task of defeating the extremist forces has so far proved easier said than done. The huge, well-financed extremists' empire, having tentacles even within the establishment, has upped the stakes by waging relentless terror and suicide attacks in an attempt to undermine Islamabad's efforts in this war. It is in Pakistan's national interest to defeat these forces, which remain incompatible with the modern world and aim to drag the country to a barbaric medieval period and enforce the outdated tribal system in the name of religion in this 21st century world.
The PPP, being a popular party, remains in a far better position to fight this war effectively and aggressively, both on the ideological and practical fronts, as compared to the previous government. Prime Minister Gillani should avail the opportunity created by the previous military-led government of confronting the extremist pro-Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, who remain a potent threat to Pakistan. For the first time in the country's history, the military leadership and the popularly elected government can have a convergence of views on this vital issue. Will the PPP and its democratic allies act now or let go of this historic opportunity and live to regret it forever? -- ENDS
Sunday, June 7, 2009
Recipe for Disaster
Is the National Assembly already beginning to regret its near unanimous approval of the Nizam-e-Adl as the Taliban extend their writ in parts of Malakand?
By Amir Zia
Newsline - May 2009
Pakistani security forces swung into action against the Taliban militants in parts of Malakand division, less than two weeks after the National Assembly gave a near unanimous seal of approval to the controversial Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, which was supposed to usher in an era of peace in this scenic region.
The boom of guns in lower Dir and Buner has, for all practical purposes, shattered whatever remote chance this contentious regulation had of ending the bloody conflict in Swat and its neighbouring areas.
“We want this agreement to work,” says a close aide of President Asif Ali Zardari. “Sufi Mohammad has been assigned the task of bringing peace in the area. This is a home-grown solution and we want to give it a chance.”
But, ironically, even as these words were being uttered in Islamabad on the eve of April 27, security forces were already on their way to weed out those Taliban militants who had seized Buner – a rugged town of Malakand division – located barely 60 miles from the federal capital, Islamabad.
The militants marched into Buner after the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was signed, seizing government buildings and announcing plans of establishing their own writ in the region. They also went on an offensive in Dir – confirming apprehensions that the policy of appeasement and concessions had only served to embolden the militant elements.
As alarm bells rang from Karachi to Peshawar about the growing threat of the Taliban, the government continued to give mixed signals and vehemently defended the deal. But despite all its optimism, that Sufi Mohammad and his men would deliver peace in the region, the security forces launched the much-awaited operation in Dir and Buner on April 26 and 27, respectively, in which dozens of militants were killed in less than 48 hours of sporadic fighting.
Although the government and Sufi Mohammad are still trying to save the agreement, political analysts say that the authorities are back to square one.
This entire episode – from the signing of the controversial deal to the resumption of fighting – underlines the haphazard and confused government approach in dealing with the Taliban challenge.
After weeks of dragging his feet on the issue, on April 13 President Zardari finally signed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation that established a parallel system of justice in the entire Malakand division.
Under this system, the Qazi courts do not recognise the common law of the country and there is a distinct gender bias in the name of religion.
The supporters of the Nizam-e-Adl argue that it administers quick justice, but its critics maintain that it creates a state within a state, and proposes draconian laws – ranging from death by stoning to flogging – in the name of Islam.
Zia Ahmed Awan, an eminent human rights activist and lawyer, suggests that rather than establishing a separate system which fans insecurities of not just minorities, but women as well, the common law needs to be made more efficient. “There should be no compromise on this issue,” he says.
Religious scholars also stand divided on the issue, because Shariah is interpreted differently by every sect.
Former law minister Iqbal Haider declares the Regulation unconstitutional. “Under the constitution, only the Islamic Ideology Council can recommend Islamic laws to the parliament. Individuals or small bands and organisations cannot do so,” says Haider. “If this is allowed, we will have a separate set of laws and a different version of the Shariah in every neighbourhood. This will lead to absolute chaos and anarchy.”
Critics of the Regulation also argue that it undermines the writ of the state, and encourages individuals and armed groups to dictate terms to the government through the barrel of the gun. The Regulation rang alarm bells not just in the civil society, but also within the international community, which sees this as the government’s capitulation to the Taliban. “I am increasingly, both concerned and frustrated at the progression of the danger [in Pakistan],” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Mike Mullen told the US media. Additionally, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a congressional panel that the situation in Pakistan posed a “mortal threat” to world security. She accused Pakistan of abdicating to the Taliban by allowing them to control parts of the country such as Swat.
Washington has become increasingly critical of what it views as Islamabad’s “soft approach” towards the militants. The change in tone, under the new Democratic set-up in Washington, should be of some concern to the Pakistani leadership which seems unable to convince its domestic detractors and foreign friends about its strategy to combat terrorism.
Analysts say that the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation has, in fact, emboldened the militants. They have not only refused to surrender weapons, they have now fanned out to the nearby areas of Swat, vowing to spread their narrow version of Islam.
Sufi Mohammad, who led the banned Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM) shocked the world when he said that there was no room for democracy in Islam, and that running for the elections and becoming members of Parliament were against the tenets of Islam. His views should not come as a surprise. Sufi Mohammad has been campaigning for the imposition of his brand of Islam in Malakand since the early 1990s. His militant TNSM has a history of violence and of defying the writ of the state. He was also responsible for leading 10,000 Pakistani youth into Afghanistan in 2002 to fight against the US-led forces. Hundreds of these men were killed or incarcerated and Sufi himself ran for his life and returned to Pakistan, only to be imprisoned by the former military government. The same man has now been given the important task of restoring peace and coaxing his son-in-law, Maulvi Fazlullah and his men to lay down their arms. For many, it is a sure recipe for disaster.
There were many worried faces in Islamabad as reports of the Taliban gaining ground made headlines in the media. The government’s inaction in the initial weeks caused widespread nervousness, and residents of Islamabad started to debate whether or not they should leave the capital. Later, the tough statement of the army chief General Ashfaq Kayani against the Taliban helped calm frayed nerves.
The PPP-led government, however, defended the agreement tooth-and-nail, brushing aside concerns regarding the country’s slide into chaos because of its “wheelings and dealings” with the militants.
The secular ANP has consistently been making the plea that the people of Swat are all for the Nizam-e-Adl system. If that were indeed the case how do they explain the fact that in the 2008 elections, all the national and provincial assembly seats of Malakand division were won by secular and liberal parties – the PPP, the ANP and the PML-Q.
The collective wisdom of our lawmakers in the National Assembly failed the nation as they approved a resolution supporting the Nizam-e-Adl within a couple of hours. The only voice of dissent came from the MQM, which vehemently opposed it. However, the MQM paved the way for the near unanimous passage of this resolution as its members boycotted the session rather than voting against it.
The National Assembly’s endorsement of the Nizam-e-Adl came as a shocker for many Pakistanis, who had pinned their hopes that lawmakers would ensure that it would not be allowed to sail through parliament. The vision of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was betrayed by the National Assembly.
The herd mentality of the women parliamentarians, who should’ve been most concerned about the passage of this Regulation, but who chose to give it their approval, was appalling.
The double-speak and expediency of the mainstream political parties is ample proof of the fact that the national leadership does not have a strategy to combat terrorism. They lack both the will and the vision to deal with this challenge. It is a tried-and-tested truth that a policy of appeasement does not work with terrorists. They only use it to reorganise, re-group and raise the stakes. Had this not been the case, the past seven such deals, signed by consecutive governments since 2004, would not have been scrapped so unceremoniously.
The high hopes that a democratically elected and popular government would be in a far better position to fight extremism and terrorism are now turning into despair because the PPP-led government has so far failed to provide direction and leadership.
The credentials of this government have further eroded here as well as abroad. Washington and its allies have started voicing their concerns openly, and Pakistan is now being touted as the world’s most dangerous place.
This frightening image is taking its toll on every field – from economy and investment to sports. Pakistan is fast becoming a pariah state and every Pakistani who has a stake in this system is worried about his and the country’s future.
Although top government officials are trying to convey the impression that everything is under control, the ground reality appears to be totally different. President Zardari may be good at wheeling and dealing with politicians and rivals alike, but the same tactic will not necessarily work with terrorists.
Pakistan is paying a heavy price for the government’s inaction and unwillingness to take the bull by the horns. Whatever the ANP and PPP stalwarts might say to justify the Nizam-e-Adl, it has hit dead-end, even before its implementation. But the damage is done.
Is the government ready to learn from this experience and end the confusion in dealing with the Taliban and its allies? -- ENDS
By Amir Zia
Newsline - May 2009
Pakistani security forces swung into action against the Taliban militants in parts of Malakand division, less than two weeks after the National Assembly gave a near unanimous seal of approval to the controversial Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, which was supposed to usher in an era of peace in this scenic region.
The boom of guns in lower Dir and Buner has, for all practical purposes, shattered whatever remote chance this contentious regulation had of ending the bloody conflict in Swat and its neighbouring areas.
“We want this agreement to work,” says a close aide of President Asif Ali Zardari. “Sufi Mohammad has been assigned the task of bringing peace in the area. This is a home-grown solution and we want to give it a chance.”
But, ironically, even as these words were being uttered in Islamabad on the eve of April 27, security forces were already on their way to weed out those Taliban militants who had seized Buner – a rugged town of Malakand division – located barely 60 miles from the federal capital, Islamabad.
The militants marched into Buner after the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was signed, seizing government buildings and announcing plans of establishing their own writ in the region. They also went on an offensive in Dir – confirming apprehensions that the policy of appeasement and concessions had only served to embolden the militant elements.
As alarm bells rang from Karachi to Peshawar about the growing threat of the Taliban, the government continued to give mixed signals and vehemently defended the deal. But despite all its optimism, that Sufi Mohammad and his men would deliver peace in the region, the security forces launched the much-awaited operation in Dir and Buner on April 26 and 27, respectively, in which dozens of militants were killed in less than 48 hours of sporadic fighting.
Although the government and Sufi Mohammad are still trying to save the agreement, political analysts say that the authorities are back to square one.
This entire episode – from the signing of the controversial deal to the resumption of fighting – underlines the haphazard and confused government approach in dealing with the Taliban challenge.
After weeks of dragging his feet on the issue, on April 13 President Zardari finally signed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation that established a parallel system of justice in the entire Malakand division.
Under this system, the Qazi courts do not recognise the common law of the country and there is a distinct gender bias in the name of religion.
The supporters of the Nizam-e-Adl argue that it administers quick justice, but its critics maintain that it creates a state within a state, and proposes draconian laws – ranging from death by stoning to flogging – in the name of Islam.
Zia Ahmed Awan, an eminent human rights activist and lawyer, suggests that rather than establishing a separate system which fans insecurities of not just minorities, but women as well, the common law needs to be made more efficient. “There should be no compromise on this issue,” he says.
Religious scholars also stand divided on the issue, because Shariah is interpreted differently by every sect.
Former law minister Iqbal Haider declares the Regulation unconstitutional. “Under the constitution, only the Islamic Ideology Council can recommend Islamic laws to the parliament. Individuals or small bands and organisations cannot do so,” says Haider. “If this is allowed, we will have a separate set of laws and a different version of the Shariah in every neighbourhood. This will lead to absolute chaos and anarchy.”
Critics of the Regulation also argue that it undermines the writ of the state, and encourages individuals and armed groups to dictate terms to the government through the barrel of the gun. The Regulation rang alarm bells not just in the civil society, but also within the international community, which sees this as the government’s capitulation to the Taliban. “I am increasingly, both concerned and frustrated at the progression of the danger [in Pakistan],” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Mike Mullen told the US media. Additionally, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a congressional panel that the situation in Pakistan posed a “mortal threat” to world security. She accused Pakistan of abdicating to the Taliban by allowing them to control parts of the country such as Swat.
Washington has become increasingly critical of what it views as Islamabad’s “soft approach” towards the militants. The change in tone, under the new Democratic set-up in Washington, should be of some concern to the Pakistani leadership which seems unable to convince its domestic detractors and foreign friends about its strategy to combat terrorism.
Analysts say that the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation has, in fact, emboldened the militants. They have not only refused to surrender weapons, they have now fanned out to the nearby areas of Swat, vowing to spread their narrow version of Islam.
Sufi Mohammad, who led the banned Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM) shocked the world when he said that there was no room for democracy in Islam, and that running for the elections and becoming members of Parliament were against the tenets of Islam. His views should not come as a surprise. Sufi Mohammad has been campaigning for the imposition of his brand of Islam in Malakand since the early 1990s. His militant TNSM has a history of violence and of defying the writ of the state. He was also responsible for leading 10,000 Pakistani youth into Afghanistan in 2002 to fight against the US-led forces. Hundreds of these men were killed or incarcerated and Sufi himself ran for his life and returned to Pakistan, only to be imprisoned by the former military government. The same man has now been given the important task of restoring peace and coaxing his son-in-law, Maulvi Fazlullah and his men to lay down their arms. For many, it is a sure recipe for disaster.
There were many worried faces in Islamabad as reports of the Taliban gaining ground made headlines in the media. The government’s inaction in the initial weeks caused widespread nervousness, and residents of Islamabad started to debate whether or not they should leave the capital. Later, the tough statement of the army chief General Ashfaq Kayani against the Taliban helped calm frayed nerves.
The PPP-led government, however, defended the agreement tooth-and-nail, brushing aside concerns regarding the country’s slide into chaos because of its “wheelings and dealings” with the militants.
The secular ANP has consistently been making the plea that the people of Swat are all for the Nizam-e-Adl system. If that were indeed the case how do they explain the fact that in the 2008 elections, all the national and provincial assembly seats of Malakand division were won by secular and liberal parties – the PPP, the ANP and the PML-Q.
The collective wisdom of our lawmakers in the National Assembly failed the nation as they approved a resolution supporting the Nizam-e-Adl within a couple of hours. The only voice of dissent came from the MQM, which vehemently opposed it. However, the MQM paved the way for the near unanimous passage of this resolution as its members boycotted the session rather than voting against it.
The National Assembly’s endorsement of the Nizam-e-Adl came as a shocker for many Pakistanis, who had pinned their hopes that lawmakers would ensure that it would not be allowed to sail through parliament. The vision of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was betrayed by the National Assembly.
The herd mentality of the women parliamentarians, who should’ve been most concerned about the passage of this Regulation, but who chose to give it their approval, was appalling.
The double-speak and expediency of the mainstream political parties is ample proof of the fact that the national leadership does not have a strategy to combat terrorism. They lack both the will and the vision to deal with this challenge. It is a tried-and-tested truth that a policy of appeasement does not work with terrorists. They only use it to reorganise, re-group and raise the stakes. Had this not been the case, the past seven such deals, signed by consecutive governments since 2004, would not have been scrapped so unceremoniously.
The high hopes that a democratically elected and popular government would be in a far better position to fight extremism and terrorism are now turning into despair because the PPP-led government has so far failed to provide direction and leadership.
The credentials of this government have further eroded here as well as abroad. Washington and its allies have started voicing their concerns openly, and Pakistan is now being touted as the world’s most dangerous place.
This frightening image is taking its toll on every field – from economy and investment to sports. Pakistan is fast becoming a pariah state and every Pakistani who has a stake in this system is worried about his and the country’s future.
Although top government officials are trying to convey the impression that everything is under control, the ground reality appears to be totally different. President Zardari may be good at wheeling and dealing with politicians and rivals alike, but the same tactic will not necessarily work with terrorists.
Pakistan is paying a heavy price for the government’s inaction and unwillingness to take the bull by the horns. Whatever the ANP and PPP stalwarts might say to justify the Nizam-e-Adl, it has hit dead-end, even before its implementation. But the damage is done.
Is the government ready to learn from this experience and end the confusion in dealing with the Taliban and its allies? -- ENDS
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