MQM’s Tough Choices

By Amir Zia

June 30, 2013

The News On Sunday

Ideally speaking, an alliance between the forces representing rural and urban Sindh makes sense. But when politics is driven more by narrow self- or party-interest, right choices are seldom made.

For the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), it is the proverbial situation of being caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. If this urban-based party tags itself again with the Pakistan Peoples’ Party- (PPP) led government at the Sindh provincial level, its popular politics is doomed. And if it doesn’t, the party leadership and its rank-and-file should get ready to brace for rougher times ahead against the backdrop of unsympathetic security institutions and equally militant and brutal political rivals, who crave to strengthen or expand their turfs in the country’s financial and industrial capital of Karachi.

The MQM’s dilemma is evident the way its leadership has been navigating the minefield of Pakistani politics since the May 11, 2013 general elections. On one hand, it is trying to flirt with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) at the centre, albeit an apparent cold shoulder from the new rulers. On the other, it is maintaining an ambiguous stance about the future relations with the PPP, which is keen to take the MQM leaders on another ‘joy-ride,’ that brought overwhelming criticism and hardly any accolades in their last stint together.

Amidst all this, the party’s supreme leader Altaf Hussain is keeping his supporters and followers on tenterhooks by bringing massive organisational changes and all the hard-talk against political adversaries, bad eggs within the MQM and some ominous predictions about Pakistan’s future.

Yes, the MQM’s politics is not for a faint-hearted person. The dynamics of its internal organisational politics are complex, yet simply clear in which straying away from ‘party-line’ or any lack of faith on its self-exiled founder has a high price. On the external level, the party is still seen with deep suspicion and as an unwanted intruder in the country’s corridors of power. Despite efforts and initiatives of awarding party tickets to non-Urdu-speaking candidates from its strongholds, the MQM continues to suffer from this ‘image problem’ and is largely seen as an ethnic-based party, accused by rivals of introducing the politics of bodies stuffed in gunny sacks, torture and extortion in Karachi.

The MQM, on its part, blames the establishment and the traditional political forces of launching successive operations against it, which killed thousands of its committed workers, supporters and leaders in more than two decades.

“Even now the MQM remains the target of an unannounced operation,” said Nasir Jamal, a deputy convener of the MQM’s Coordination Committee. “Our workers are being killed, tortured and kidnapped systematically by the law enforcement agencies… there have even been cases of forced disappearances — similar to Balochistan.”

The MQM says that since May 1, at least 52 of its workers have been killed, while another six remains missing. If the number of MQM’s deaths is counted from January 1, it would come to a staggering 168 as on June 26. The expanding list of MQM victims includes its Sindh Assembly lawmaker Sajid Qureshi and his son, who were gunned down by assailants outside a Karachi mosque on June 21 and many other important local leaders. Under these circumstances, making a choice to rejoin the provincial government indeed remains a tough call.

The results of the last elections also triggered some serious soul searching within the MQM, which is the only party belonging to the former ruling coalition, that by-and-large maintained its electoral turf. The elections witnessed the much discounted Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) candidates getting substantial number of votes in the MQM-dominated areas. The number of MQM’s popular votes declined by around two percent amidst allegations of rigging at a number of polling stations.

Jamal, the MQM’s young deputy convener, alleviated to this position in the recent organisational shake-up, admits that there is a lot of resentment among the party’s supporters about the five-year performance of the previous coalition government.

The PPP managed to keep the MQM on its side despite long patches of strained relationship largely by the sweet-talk of former interior minister Rehman Malik, who was the point person of President Asif Ali Zardari in managing Altaf Hussain and his team. Practically the PPP managed to keep the MQM on its side by offering some crumbs of power and concessions, but without yielding to its key demand of giving urban Sindh the local bodies system. There were talks and promises, and promises and talks, but the end result was that the term ended without the local bodies’ elections. The insult to injury was when the PPP provincial lawmakers scrapped the Sindh Local Bodies system only a few days before the end of their tenure after the MQM pulled out of the government.

The MQM was also kept at a receiving end in Karachi the way a section of the PPP, led by former provincial home minister Zulfikar Mirza —  a close friend of Zardari —  propped up the Lyari Aman Committee that has been blamed for most street crimes, kidnappings for ransom cases and extortion in the commercial and business hubs of the city.

A senior PPP leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that supporting criminals and gangsters had never been in party’s creed. But a section of the provincial leadership spearheaded by Mirza thought that it remains the best way to contain the MQM and its militancy and its ever expanding demands. “This flawed approach resulted in establishing the Aman Committee’s control in the PPP stronghold of Lyari, where we were forced to award tickets over the dictates of the ring leaders of this committee.”

However, despite some internal criticism, the third term of Qaim Ali Shah as chief minister started with Lyari’s visit where he attended a reception organised by the controversial committee, which was symbolically banned by his government to appease the MQM in his second stint in power.

This indeed remains a worrying start of the PPP’s third term in Sindh —  at least for the people of Karachi in general and traders, businesspeople and industrialists in particular, who continue to suffer from gangs operating from Lyari —  one of the many North Waziristans of this teeming city where writ of the state hardly exists.

The MQM hardly sees any change in the PPP’s stance on the two key issues which matters the most for Karachi — the poor law and order and the local bodies system.

“We cannot deliver anything to our electorate without the local bodies,” Jamal says. “The deteriorating law and order, killings and the rampant street crimes remain the second issue which hurts us the most.”

In the recent meeting with the PPP stalwarts, the MQM raised these two key issues on which the PPP has always been long on promises and short of actions.

In an attempt to gauge the public mood and sentiment, which is already known to the party leadership, it conducted a referendum to gather views from workers and sympathisers whether to join the provincial government. Although the official results of the referendum have been withheld in the wake of the killing of party’s provincial law maker Sajid Qureshi, the party sources say that the overwhelming response remained a firm ‘no’ to this question.

Ideally speaking, an alliance between the forces representing rural and urban Sindh makes sense. But when politics is driven more by narrow self- or party-interest, right choices are seldom made.

The MQM, which remained in power for more than a decade, seems to make the difficult choice of staying in the opposition as the general mood of its supporters’ favours this option — at least for now. This means not just difficult times ahead for the MQM, but also for this already traumatised city where crime and politics walks hand-in-hand and criminals and mafias rule.

Nothing But Confusion

By Amir Zia
Monday, June 24, 2013
The News 

The only problem with this pro-talk narrative is that there is no parallel between Afghanistan and Pakistan when it comes to engaging with militants...In the Pakistani context, it is the question of whether the state is prepared to abdicate its writ from parts of its territory and allow militants to use it for terrorism within the country and across the world.

  Many innocent minds thought that the new government would at least have a plan, some strategy to tackle the twin challenges of religious extremism and terrorism that now pose an existential threat to the state called Pakistan. Alas, Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s opening shots in the first couple of weeks in power fail to stir much confidence or give us hope.
The facts are depressing; since Sharif took oath as prime minister on June 5, there have been at least 10 major- to mid-level terror attacks and a spate of targeted killings across the country in which more than 150 people have been killed, with many more wounded. The victims of terrorism and religious, political and ethnic violence include two provincial assembly lawmakers – one each from Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while others on this ever-expanding list are Pakistan Army officers and soldiers, policemen, Shia Muslims, an Ahmadi, members of various political parties and of course ordinary men, women and children.
Most of them had nothing whatsoever to do with any of the simmering conflicts within the country – from North Waziristan to Balochistan. They also did not invite or permit US drones to target Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, who successfully managed to bring the Afghan war on Pakistani territory. These civilians, seen as a legitimate and fair target by militants, just happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.
Equally disappointing remains the new government’s response to the brutalities unleashed by the Al-Qaeda-inspired local militants and those committing barbaric acts in the name of Balochistan’s rights or under the banner of some ‘lashkar’, tehreek or the George Orwellian ‘peace’ committee in Karachi.
Our ‘lion-hearted’ prime minister, his ‘hawkish’ interior minister, the ‘talented’ brother, and even the smooth-talking information minister – all failed even to talk the right talk, let alone showing any signs that the government at least plans to take practical steps and a holistic approach to tackle the ghost of terrorism and extremism.
Yes, we all know that the new setup is still very new and in the process of settling in. The elected government has yet to come to terms with power and its various stakeholders. It is still struggling to make sense out of all the chaos around it. And most importantly, it has no magic wand to put back in the bottle the genie of extremism and terrorism – unleashed in the 1980s by Sharif’s one-time mentor and boss General Ziaul Haq – transforming Pakistan into the abnormal country the world knows today.
But the new government should have at least given a clear-cut policy statement, an outline of its strategy or even a mere expression of interest on whether it wants to confront the challenge of terrorism. If the answer is yes; then the question remains: how? However, all we got was a timid, meek, confusing and self-contradictory response at various government levels and a ‘meaningless’ silence from the prime minister himself.
His lieutenants keep giving the message that the government wants to talk with those ‘who are willing to talk’ and vow stern action against those who continue to remain on the path of violence and terrorism. At the same time, our new rulers and masters also frequently come up with one of the most fashionable policy statements of these unfortunate times – ‘dialogue is the only way to bring peace and put an end to terrorism’.
But haven’t we all heard, read and suffered such confusing statements countless times before? What remains unclear is whether the government wants to talk and fight at the same time or just talk and not fight at all. Will it impose any preconditions for talks with militants of different shades or first surrender to their demands that include freeing prisoners, pulling out troops from the conflict zones and handing over parts of Pakistan’s territory to them? All these questions merit straight answers.
The contrast between the single-mindedness of militants and the lack of direction on the part of the government is scary. While militants are on a killing spree our elected representatives overwhelmingly are of the view that the struggle against terrorism and extremism is not Pakistan’s concern. They want to believe that once Islamabad somehow manages to halt the US drone attacks and disassociates itself from what they call an ‘American war’, Pakistan will be back to normal. They also mistakenly think that the militants are organised under some broad monolith umbrella having a centralised control that can be switched on and off by pressing the right buttons. Such presumptions are flawed, dangerous and self-defeating.
It would be interesting to hear what the military leaders and their foot soldiers, who stand in the line of fire, have to say to these pearls of wisdom by elected and unelected politicians.
However, the so-called ‘talks lobby’ comprising religious and right-wing forces, many of which are sympathetic to the Taliban’s controversial version of Islam, are likely to become more assertive in their demand that the government should hold talks with the local militants following the fact that the US is now openly engaging with the Afghan Taliban as part of its exit strategy from Afghanistan. The opening up of the Afghan Taliban’s office in Doha is likely to embolden and encourage not just the pro-talk lobbies, but also the local militants as key Pakistani institutions and political players appear to be struggling for a consensus.
The only problem with this pro-talk narrative is that there is no parallel between Afghanistan and Pakistan when it comes to engaging with militants. In Afghanistan, a foreign occupation force is trying to strike a deal with a local force that dominates the majority Pakthun belt of that war-torn country. In Pakistan, the security forces are trying to establish the writ of the state in some fringe areas where local and foreign militants have taken shelter. In the Pakistani context, it is the question of whether the state is prepared to abdicate its writ from parts of its territory and allow militants to use it for terrorism within the country and across the world.
Are Sharif, Imran Khan, Maulana Fazlur Rehman and others who plead the case for talks ready to settle in for the second option? The nation demands an answer. The military, which is by far spearheading the struggle against militants amidst allegations that it patronises some favourites among them, should think twice before committing to a position in the supposed ‘end game’ in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-inspired groups take a lead from their Afghan counterparts who, as proven in the past, remain more committed to their pan-Islamist political agenda than obliging Pakistan. We tried and tested this approach in the run-up to start of the US’ more than a decade long great adventure in Afghanistan and found it wanting.
History shows that policies of appeasement and deals with non-state actors at the cost of the country’s constitution, sovereignty and political order always boomerang. The moment the state and its institutions show signs of fatigue and weakness in a conflict, militants get a psychological edge in the battle of nerves.
Our civilian leaders’ desperation to negotiate with those responsible for the killings of thousands of innocent people is nothing but an open admission of weakness. Should one take this desperation to hold talks with militants as an epitaph to Jinnah’s Pakistan? Or is there hope that the military and civilian leadership will be on the same page and do the needful – take the bull by its horns and save Pakistan from these forces of darkness? The armed forces should at least have the capacity to show some light to the elected ones to counter this internal threat and destroy their own Frankenstein’s monsters – or is this too a tall order?

No Time For A Honeymoon

By Amir Zia
Monday, June 17, 2013

The News

The aggressive and unkind criticism that greeted the proposed budget at the very start of the PML-N government’s third innings shows the mood of the moment, which remains ruthless in judgement. Welcome to the restless, troubled and teeming Pakistan of 2013 where there is no honeymoon period for the new government. The expectations of the people are as enormous as the challenges that make the task of economic revival a lot more difficult. 

One can understand why Nawaz Sharif seldom smiles and mostly wears a sombre-look on his face during his official and public engagements ever since he has donned the cap of prime minister on June 5. Yes, the sheer realisation of the multitude of mega challenges the country confronts today should be enough to wipe a smile off from the face of any ‘lion-heart’ prime minister, expected to perform quick miracles by desperate masses and an impatient media.
A small taste of what awaits the newly-elected prime minister and his team in the days to come is reflected in the scepticism and criticism with which various interest groups, economic experts and the mainstream media received the proposed 2013-14 (July-June) budget.
Popular narrative, by and large, has given a thumbs down to the proposed budget through which the government aims to stabilise the country’s battered economy and attempts to trigger growth that has remained pegged at below three percent on an average during the last five years of the PPP-led rule.
The man on the street is worried and bitter about the inflationary impact of the one percent increase in the general sales tax, the slight tweaking of the tax slabs on the higher side and the absence of what opinion makers call any ‘relief’ for the masses. The economic czars and wizards are doubtful about the government’s capacity to achieve its proposed revenue collection target of Rs3,420 billion – 21 percent higher from the revised figures of Rs2,837 billion in the current financial year – and meeting the fiscal deficit target of 6.3 percent in 2013-14, given the government’s plans to allocate Rs712 billion under the Public Sector Development Programme and ‘other development expenditure’ in an attempt to trigger growth.
These are not the only concerns being hotly debated as the proposed budget is dissected and scrutinised by various interest groups and experts. Proposals such as the elimination of duty on hybrid vehicles up to 1200cc, soft loans for the youth and the controversial laptop scheme are also in the line of fire – along with issues the budget speech failed to address. According to some experts, top omissions include steps needed to expand direct taxation as the government continues to rely heavily on the current oppressive indirect taxes that hurt the lower and middle classes more than the higher-income group. The imposition of the much-desired tax on agricultural income has also been conveniently ignored because under the constitution only provinces are entitled to levy it. The energy sector’s tariff reforms also fail to figure on the radar of the policymakers despite the fact that it consumes the bulk of subsidies.
The aggressive and unkind criticism that greeted the proposed budget at the very start of the PML-N government’s third innings in power shows the mood of the moment, which remains ruthless in judgement. Welcome to the restless, troubled and teeming Pakistan of 2013 where there is no honeymoon period for the new government. The expectations of the people are as enormous as the challenges that make the task of economic revival a lot more difficult. This is a nightmarish situation for any government.
Agreed that it is a far from ideal budget, but given the limited space of financial manoeuvrability and the paucity of time in which the new government came up with the budget proposals, its economic team has done a fairly decent job.
The policymakers are attempting to achieve economic stability and growth in tandem, which is what the country requires. But a number of economic experts insist that with the balance of payment crisis staring Pakistan in its face because of its heavy foreign debt repayments and huge trade deficit, the government should first aim for economic stabilisation. But the idea is self-defeating since without boosting economic activity and growth achieving the goal of stability would remain elusive.
The private sector needs incentives, confidence and encouragement to play its role in this effort, which cannot be done until the government takes a lead by launching some big and medium-seized development and infrastructure projects. The calculated risk of boosting the PSDP and other development spending in the proposed budget remains vital to kick-start economic activity.
For resource mobilisation, the budget proposals do not contain any radical steps. Rather the government has, more or less, cautiously opted for the existing framework promising efficient and corruption-free revenue collection, increase in the general sales tax to 17 percent from 16 percent, a nominal increase in the taxes of the high-income salaried class, and imposition of various small taxes on select sectors – from hospitality services to builders.
For sceptics such steps won’t be sufficient to meet the government’s ambitious target of 21 percent higher revenue collection in the next financial year. However, any radical and bold steps for raising the revenues, including the imposition of value added tax (VAT) which has been vehemently opposed in the past by traders and shopkeepers – one of the key support base of the PML-N – would have certainly triggered a much stronger backlash. At this critical juncture, the government can hardly afford a new front. Therefore, the cautious approach seems sensible. However, the federal government should encourage and push provinces to tax the agriculture income – no matter how nominal in the first phase – to at least get the ball rolling in the right direction.
There are also concerns on whether the government will be able to meet its fiscal deficit target of 6.3 percent in the next financial year, given its planned higher spending and unprecedented revenue collection target of Rs3,420 billion. Will all the proposed austerity measures and cuts in the government’s running administrative expenditure really make an impact in the final calculations of keeping the fiscal deficit – described as the mother of all troubles for an economy – in the targeted range? The outcome of the government’s effort would obviously bank on how it performs on the resource mobilisation and spending fronts.
There are no quick fixes for Pakistan’s ailing economy, which requires much tougher measures and more difficult decisions to get back on the high growth trajectory. Sceptics and critics should give time to the government and allow its plan to work before aiming and firing their guns at its economic team. It would be unfair to start shouting ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in the opening spell of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s third innings. The man on the street, opinion makers, the opposition and the ‘independent’ economic experts must allow his government to settle in and start the process of rebuilding.
There is some room for optimism. The first good news is that the Sharif government – whether we agree or disagree with its budget proposals – has an economic vision and a team that means business. This makes it different from the previous government that hardly had any agenda of its own and is remembered for its misrule and economic mismanagement. Second, one should expect efficient decision-making and a hands-on approach from the Sharif government in handling the country’s tricky economic affairs. Third, many businesspeople and foreign and local investors see this government as a sentiment-changer – which is also a good omen. For, it is often the sentiment that sets the course of economic growth and gives it momentum even before things really start happening on the ground.
It is time to wish good luck to Sharif and his team. Let’s hope that the new government rises up to the challenge and proves itself worthy of the task. Pakistan desperately needs a success story for a change.

The Bilawal Wall

By Amir Zia
The News
June 10, 2013

Are we forever fated to have these Bilawal Walls surround us? Is there no escape from them? Is it too cynical to demand that all rulers, the high and mighty and their protectors, move out of city centres and densely populated civilian areas and live where they are away from the evil eye and real or imaginary dangers?  


It is not as grand and imposing as the Great Wall of China or as menacing and oppressive as the Berlin Wall used to be. But for many citizens of Karachi, this half-a-kilometre-long wall protecting Bilawal House remains one of the greatest banes in their lives.
Although it has not been officially baptised, a large number of ordinary citizens living in nearby apartments and houses, operating shops and businesses in its vicinity or commuting under its shadow, calls this fortification ‘the Bilawal Wall’.
They have seen this wall emerge as a permanent encroachment on the wide two-way Khayaban-e-Saadi during the previous Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led government and transform into a protective buffer at the Karachi residence of President Asif Ali Zardari.
Now one of the narrow service lanes running parallel to Khayaban-e-Saadi has become the so-called two-way main road for commuters. The authorities have tried to broaden the service lane at places by merging the parking space and green belt into it, but this ingenuity has created even more issues. Property prices around Bilawal House have taken a beating compared with other localities in the same Clifton neighbourhood. Many shopkeepers in the area have been forced to close down their businesses, while others have witnessed a drop in sales due to the obstructions in traffic here.
When President Zardari visits Karachi, as he did earlier this month, the security shadow of the Bilawal Wall expands and results in the blockade of all key roads and roundabouts within the radius of up to two kilometres by iron containers, trucks and police vehicles.
All the while the president is in the city, the permanent and temporary Bilawal Walls turn reaching one’s own home into an ordeal – and forces businesses and shops to close. These walls even prevent patients from visiting the key hospitals and medical centres that are located nearby including the Ziauddin Hospital, where Zardari once spent a considerable amount of time as a prisoner in a room declared a sub-jail during his multiple trials on corruption and murder charges.
If President Zardari is in a kind mood, he orders the lifting of the temporary Bilawal Wall as he did last week after great media and public uproar. If not, people just suffer and continue to pray for the long life and well-being of their tormentors.
True to overwhelming Pakistani spirit, the permanent Bilawal Wall emerged not as part of any well thought-out plan, but started in bits and pieces. During the initial days of the previous PPP rule, one part of the two-way main road running parallel to Bilawal House used to be cordoned off by innocent-looking traffic barricades. This usually happened when Zardari graced the city with his presence. Soon after, the temporary barricades became a permanent fixture – shutting one part of the two-way road for good.
Real and imagined security concerns then led to the construction of an iron-grill right in the middle of the green belt that divides the Khayaban-e-Saadi. This was followed by the closure of the entire Khayaban on a permanent basis for ordinary Pakistanis as authorities quickly constructed the concrete wall – complete with iron spikes and barbed wires on top. Thus a new eyesore and cause of perpetual public inconvenience was added to Karachi’s already disfigured and mutilated landscape.
The security concerns of the post-9/11 world may be a justifiable reason for Zardari, his security managers and loyalists to build iron grills and walls around Bilawal House – especially when the PPP lost its charismatic leader, Benazir Bhutto, in a grenade and gun attack in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007. Earlier, on October 18, 2007, Bhutto survived a massive attack on her motorcade when she landed in Karachi, ending a more than eight-year self-imposed exile.
Given the history of tragic incidents the Bhutto family suffered as a price of its politics, the extra-cautious approach toward safety is understandable. Pakistan can now ill-afford any other tragedy such as the killing of a frontline politician, but while making Karachi’s Bilawal House impregnable, perhaps Zardari and Co. have gone overboard.
This very important house is not located right on the main road. Its main building has the necessary ‘depth’ as the service road adjacent to it remains closed for traffic. The place has been further fortified by the tight security at its entry points, while many of the prized neighbourhood properties are now also in the hands of the friends and family of President Zardari or his associates.
The irony in all this remains that the young Bilawal Bhutto Zardari whose name is perhaps unnecessarily being blotted – at least in the metaphorical sense – by such measures might have no say in these affairs at all. The naming of Bilawal Chowrangi, the construction of the Bilawal Wall or the extension of Bilawal House are all being done in his name just as the PPP’s policymaking and politics bears his signboard. Giving Bilawal the benefit of the doubt, this remains a far from ideal situation for the young man, who probably aspires to prove himself as the true heir to the legacy of his illustrious maternal grandfather and mother.
Let alone the hue and cry from residents of the area, even the Supreme Court’s concerns regarding the Bilawal Wall failed to move the provincial authorities, which insist that citizens’ rights are not being violated by blocking one of the key roads of Karachi.
Though Zardari’s term as president ends in September, there appear little chances that the authorities have any plans to tear down the Bilawal Wall. Being the former president and leader of a party that still rules Sindh, Zardari and his Karachi residence appear all set to continue receiving a privileged treatment. After another couple of years, perhaps we will take Bilawal Wall as part of our fate and forget all about the broad two-way road at this unlucky place, which once provided a free and open access to the seafront.
But Zardari and his near and dear ones are not the only ones who hide behind such walls. It is a syndrome that has caught the imagination of all the rich and powerful in this land of the pure. Every high and mighty individual or institution loves to have their very own Bilawal Wall.
Sindh’s octogenarian Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah has his own wall, which he constructs and removes almost on a daily basis, outside his official residence without any warning to commuters. This wall, made of iron containers, concrete blocks and ordinary traffic barriers keeps the road regularly closed off at night, often for days, because of unspecified security threat without any prior warning or explanation. The official residence of the chief minister is deep inside the compound and surrounded by a huge wall. The noise of the motor rickshaw can hardly disturb Shah’s sleep during the night and even a suicide bomber hardly poses a security threat. The road, however, still remains closed, more often than open, to traffic.
Our paramilitary rangers, the coast guards, the customs, the police...you name it. All have built their own tiny Bilawal Walls that have encroached footpaths, sections of the roads and public places – all in the name of security. The very presence of these mighty individuals and institutions in the heart of the city not just hinders free flow of traffic and movement of pedestrians, but also exposes citizens to danger.
Are we forever fated to have these Bilawal Walls surround us? Is there no escape from them? Is it too cynical to demand that all rulers, the high and mighty and their protectors, move out of city centres and densely populated civilian areas and live where they are away from the evil eye and real or imaginary dangers? Their proximity only brings inconvenience, trouble and distress to the common citizen. The 2013 elections have hardly been a game-changer when it comes to these Bilawal Walls. They seem to be here to stay for the foreseeable future.

Sharif For Peace

Amir Zia 
The News
Monday, June 3, 2013

Many other nations face similar challenges but have managed to find ways to keep themselves engaged for the resolution of such disputes while also expanding trade ties. Can Pakistan and India perform this high-wire act or will they remain hostage to history? Sharif offers a ray of hope, at least on Pakistan’s side.

When it comes to efforts towards improving Islamabad’s often frosty ties with arch-rival India, the score of the previous PPP-led government remains relatively good given the odds it was pitted against during its five-year term. But with Nawaz Sharif back in power for a record third time, peaceniks appear more bullish on prospects of normalisation of relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The optimism and excitement within the peace lobbies on both sides of the great divide is understandable. Sharif is seen as a leader who tried to bring about a paradigm shift in Pakistan-India relations along with his then Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, way back in 1999. Even at that time pro-business Nawaz Sharif’s vision was to allow the economy to determine diplomacy. The problem was that he did not manage to take other important stakeholders, including the army, on board on this vital issue. The result was the Kargil conflict, which derailed the entire peace process. Its aftermath also sent the Sharif government packing in the bloodless military coup of October 1999. What happened after is history.
This time around Sharif is unlikely to face the kind of hostilities he had to confront in 1999 when the military establishment and the mainstream religious parties stood vehemently opposed to the way he was pushing the peace process. Today there is a broad consensus among all the mainstream political parties of Pakistan to improve ties with India. The mighty military establishment, though cautious, is not dead set against any such move. In fact, many of the track two diplomatic efforts and peace overtures came following its silent nod.
The peace lobbies within the two countries are also much stronger and more vocal compared to the past.
The unique and unprecedented media-led peace movement Aman Ki Asha – jointly sponsored by Pakistan’s media giant the Jang Group and India’s biggest group, The Times of India – has also managed to create waves and bring peace and economy on the front burner by organising a series of events and sponsoring and supporting open public debates.
If the former military-led government paved the way for peace by effectively halting the infiltration of Islamist militants into Indian-occupied Kashmir and allowing cultural ties to flourish – including official permission to screen Indian movies in Pakistani cinemas and airing Indian programmes and music on local television channels and radio stations – the previous PPP-led government managed to push for trade ties despite the November 2008 terror attack in Mumbai.
The last two years of the PPP-led government proved fruitful for Pakistan-India relations as trade diplomacy intensified. The tangible achievements included opening of an integrated Wagah-Attari land border crossing in April 2012. This crossing has the potential to handle a tenfold increase in trade goods. The same month New Delhi announced that it would permit foreign direct investment from Pakistan. Soon after, India removed a ban on Pakistani businesses setting up operations inside India.
On its part, Pakistan scrapped its positive list of 2,000 goods that could be imported from India and replaced it by a negative list of about 1,200 items that could not be imported. Islamabad promised to eliminate the negative list by end-2012, which could have opened the way for granting a fully operational most favoured nation (MFN) status to India. In return, Pakistan pressed for removal of non-tariff barriers and trade concessions from India under the South Asian Free Trade Area (Safta) agreement.
However, the PPP government was unable to tie up these important loose ends, including the abolishment of the negative list as relations between the two countries continued to oscillate between goodwill and deep mistrust and hostility.
The momentum of normalising trade relations fizzled out in the wake of Pakistan’s pre-election domestic political compulsions and border tensions with India. But the process can be revived and reaccelerated by Sharif, who enjoys a lot of goodwill across the border and is expected to form a much more stable and efficient government than the PPP.
The cheerleaders and backers of peace, however, should not expect dramatic developments within a short period. If history is any guide, expectations of quick results in diplomacy can prove lethal and counterproductive. Therefore, Pakistan-India relations must be kept out of the breaking news syndrome. Expectations should not be inflated at the very start of the new innings by Sharif who faces many grave challenges and pressing issues, and of which our relations with India are one.
Nevertheless, the public posturing from both Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been more than positive and encouraging so far. The two leaders appear to have hit a cord when Singh made a congratulatory call to Sharif. This was followed by the special envoy of the Indian premier calling on Nawaz Sharif and discussing how to take the Pakistan-India dialogue process forward.
Sharif and Singh should first aim to finish what remains incomplete under the previous PPP government. This includes the removal of the negative list of goods imported from India, granting India MFN status and allowing the import of all goods from the Wagah-Attari border in exchange for the removal of non-tariff barriers and trade concessions by New Delhi to Pakistan. While this will open up the huge Indian market for Pakistani goods, Indian businesses and traders will benefit from access to Pakistan’s 180 million people strong market.
The two governments should also aim to implement the new visa regime, which has already been agreed on but not implemented in totality because of routine tensions and the jingoistic stance taken more by India than Pakistan. The window to achieving this before the Indian general elections – due in 2014 – remains small since no Indian government would like to be seen giving concessions to Pakistan ahead of the polls.
Sharif and Pakistani peace activists should sallow this bitter fact that in recent years the Indian establishment’s position has hardened towards Pakistan when it comes to the resolution of core political issues – starting from the troops’ pullout from Siachen to the Sir Creek dispute, both once considered low-hanging fruits. The protracted Kashmir dispute hardly figures on India’s priority list as New Delhi has been increasingly trying to make terrorism the core issue rather than this divided Himalayan region.
With the Indian economy booming and New Delhi aspiring to join the ‘big boys’ club internationally, there is a growing feeling in India that this is hardly the right time for any give and take with Pakistan – which is on a slippery slope due to internal strife, terrorism, and militancy on the one hand and a weak economy on the other.
Therefore, it would be prudent of Pakistan’s new government to move cautiously in normalising relations with India rather than rushing on this path. Yes, boosting trade and economic ties within the region is vital, but without addressing the core political issues between the two countries, it would be like building castles on shifting sands.
Sharif, who is now a much more mature and astute politician compared to what he was in 1999, should also ensure that all stakeholders, including the military, remain on board when he attempts to expand and improve ties with India in a slow and gradual manner. The unity of thought and action within all institutions of Pakistan remains a must for any tangible and sustained gains on this front.
Pakistan and India are not the only two countries in the world with border disputes. Many other nations face similar challenges but have managed to find ways to keep themselves engaged for the resolution of such disputes while at the same time carrying on with day-to-day business including that of expanding trade and economic ties. Can Pakistan and India perform this high-wire act or will they remain hostage to history? Sharif offers a ray of hope, at least on Pakistan’s side.