Book Review: The Other Faiz

A collection of prose writings reveals another side of the legendary poet.

By Amir Zia
Newsline - Feb. 2006

The poet in Faiz Ahmed Faiz outshines and eclipses all the other aspects of his personality: Faiz, the journalist, the teacher, the trade unionist, the left-wing intellectual. However, a glimpse of other dimensions of Faiz leads one to a greater appreciation and understanding of his poetic genius, and his character as a whole.
Culture and Identity - Selected English Writings of Faiz, a recent book published by the Oxford University Press, offers readers a chance to peer into the mind of this great genius of our times through some of his little known and forgotten writings and essays. These works remain as important and relevant to our age as they were when Faiz wrote them. They reveal a part of his personality as well as his views on issues of culture, art, literature, society and politics. An encounter with Faiz's prose can be as fulfilling, and intellectually and emotionally stimulating, as one with his poetry.
Sheema Majeed - a renowned literary researcher of Pakistan - has done a commendable job as the editor of this book by compiling the poet's writings from a range of varied and scattered sources.
The book, which also includes Faiz's only published English-language poem, 'The Unicorn and The Dancing Girl', is certainly not just a gift for Faiz fans, but a great reference for scholars and researchers as well. His lucid style and simplicity of expression hook the reader to his observations on varied topics.
The autobiographical section of the book, which opens with 'Faiz by Faiz,' is a treat to read. It is a slightly edited version of an extempore talk delivered by Faiz to the Asia Study Group in Islamabad just eight months before he died in March 1984.
Here Faiz reveals how he helped the British organise Communist Party-like cells in each unit of the Indian army to bolster war efforts among Indian soldiers against the Japanese and German forces during World War II.
He was awarded the Order of the British Empire for this feat, rising within a short span of three years to the rank of colonel - the highest position an Indian could attain at that time. He ran the propaganda machinery of the entire Indian army on all its fronts until the war ended.
Another interesting account in this section is about the much publicised Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in which Faiz was arrested along with several military officials and had to spend four years in prison.
"Nothing had happened, you see, nothing was going to be done," said Faiz. In what Faiz called "a very stupid way," he along with two civilian friends went to attend a meeting of 14 to 16 army officers at the invitation of General Akbar Khan to plan a coup. The participants did discuss ways to overthrow the government, but towards the end of the meeting realised that it was impractical and "not on." So the decision was that nothing had to be done, but this "thought-crime," as George Orwell would have termed it, resulted in one of the most famous cases in our history.
Faiz's stint in prison, however, proved productive for his poetry. He came out with two books which turned him into an "even greater celebrity than before."
This section also contains Faiz's account of his father, who rose from the ranks of a landless peasant to serve an Afghan monarch, as his chief secretary and minister, went on to Cambridge University for education and became a barrister before settling for good in his hometown, Sialkot.
"I was born in the house of a gentleman who was a 19th century adventurer, who had a far more colourful life than I have had," Faiz said while giving his family background.
Faiz's eight articles on culture raise many issues and questions, which not only remain relevant to this day, but highlight those anomalies and contradictions that grip Pakistan even now.
He attempted to identify and understand the essence of the culture of peoples living in Pakistan, the impact of imperialism on their lives and the burden imposed on them by primitive tribal and feudal societies.
"Before independence, the only radical change which occurred in our economic and social structure was under the impact of British Imperialism," he wrote in an article - 'The Quest for Identity in Culture' - published in Viewpoint in February 1976.
In his articles on culture, Faiz focused on raising questions rather than providing answers. He pointed out various interpretations on issues such as language and tradition, rather than drawing a definite conclusion. He attempted to understand the basic cultural problems of third world countries by applying the Marxist yardstick for understanding history.
"Very broadly speaking, these problems are primarily the problems of arrested growth; they originate primarily from long years of imperialist-colonialist domination and the remnants of a backward, outmoded social structure," he wrote in the article titled 'Cultural Problems in Underdeveloped Countries.'
He, however, does not shy away from accepting the massive social change the imperialist powers brought into their colonies, nor does he hesitate to point out the flaws and inherent weaknesses of feudal and tribal societies.
"The culture of these ancient feudal societies, in spite of much technical and intellectual excellence, was restricted to a small privileged class and rarely intermingled with the parallel unsophisticated folk culture of the general masses. Primitive tribal culture, in spite of its childlike beauty, had little intellectual content."
The readers get a flavour of Faiz's concept of beauty - both external and internal - and its elusiveness and tangibility in the brief section on art in which there is also an article on "The World of Sadequain."
In the section on literature, containing 16 articles, he provides a bird's eye view of the literary heritage of Pakistan - from the Arab and Persian influences to the contemporary age - and discusses the work and art of our literary giants including Ameer Khusrau, Mirza Asadullah Khan Ghalib and Sir Allama Mohammed Iqbal.
In the three separate articles on Iqbal, Faiz discusses his poetic technique - on which, according to him, "very little analysis has been done"- as well as the four key distinct phases of poetry starting from his youthful days to the final phase of philosophical humanism. Faiz describes Iqbal's final phase as "most mature and most valuable," saying that his approach and exposition of themes was abstract and philosophical which frequently gave rise to contradictory expositions by his followers and admirers.
"To understand Iqbal correctly… it is necessary to keep in mind that his work reflected all the inner intellectual contradictions, all the conflicting impulses, all the confused dreams and aspirations of the middle strata of Indo-Pakistan Muslims during the first three or four decades of this century and it is precisely because of this that his work is popular among progressives and reactionaries alike and make for his title as the national poet of Pakistan."
Faiz's interpretation of Iqbal stands in contrast to the official and widely accepted line in which our philosopher- poet is being read and understood in Pakistan.
The three articles on social issues include a short and very moving piece on Sir Ganga Ram - one of the greatest philanthropists Lahore has produced to date. 'No Holiday From Virtue' was published in the Civil and Military Gazette in March 1961 and tells of how Faiz found Ram's samadhi in an utterly depleted, filthy and neglected state. Yet, it was home to many of the homeless and wretched of the world.
"The needs of the living, I thought to myself, must have precedence over reverence for the dead, even though it comes to this," wrote Faiz as he found a woman's cauldron bubbling over the place where the dead man's ashes lay buried. "They have sheltered here, homeless, nameless, disinherited, dehumanised, because no one else would give them shelter, except this dead philanthropist."
The final section on politics contains nine pieces by Faiz, including a compact, crisp and commanding article titled 'Disgrace.' As with some other pieces, the editor of the book does not mention the source and date of publication of this article. This remains one of the most irritating flaw of this otherwise fine collection.
"We have learnt with horror and surprise that a political detainee, who has recently undergone a serious eye operation, is receiving medical attention in the Mayo Hospital handcuffed to his bed. The detainee in question is Mirza Mohammed Ibrahim, the labour leader," wrote Faiz, questioning the authorities.
"We hold that any police or executive functionary who considers that he is serving Pakistan by aping Hitler's Belsen Guards, anyone who thinks that he is securing the interests of the State by indulging in unnecessary brutalities, is no friend of Pakistan."
The advise proferred by Faiz decades ago remains pertinent and potent even now - and will be in the days to come. This collection of writings is an important one and a must-have for all Faiz lovers - from all the former and serving comrades, to those in a state of political hibernation and, above all, those who simply adore him for his poetry, its romance and its immortal message.. ENDS

Viewpoint: This War is Our War

The new government needs to realise that Pakistan has more to lose than even the US if it does not conduct the war on terror effectively.
By Amir ZiaNewsline -July 2008

There is no dearth of Pakistani politicians and analysts who brand Islamabad's fight against religious extremism and militancy purely an "American war." Notwithstanding the numerous UN resolutions, which have made it mandatory on all its member states to cooperate in the global war on terror or risk sanctions, a vast number of ordinary Pakistanis have been made to believe that the country could have avoided all the suicide bombings and terror attacks in its major cities and violence in the restive tribal areas, if the former military-led government had not committed itself to the US-led war against terrorism.
Even one of the key partners in the new ruling coalition - the PML-N - has been trying to whip up popular sentiment against the besieged President Pervez Musharraf by playing this right-wing card. In fact, its chief whip - former premier Nawaz Sharif - has been demanding that Musharraf be held accountable for last year's operation against the militants in Islamabad's Lal Masjid, accusing him of killing 'innocent' people. In an attempt to win the support of the traditional religious lobby and Islamic radicals, and channelise their anger towards Musharraf, Sharif seems to have deliberately overlooked the fact that the armed militants of Lal Masjid were resorting to criminal and terrorist acts - including kidnapping and harassment of foreign and local nationals, in their zeal to enforce a myopic version of Islam. No state can tolerate such unlawful acts, especially an open revolt against the government's writ in the federal capital. Acting out of political expediency, the members of the ruling coalition, including the PPP, announced compensation for the Lal Masjid militants, but this has only served to embolden the extremist elements.
No wonder the lobby opposed to the fight against extremists has become louder and bolder since the installation of the PPP-led government in Islamabad in March 2008. The deaths of thousands of Pakistanis in recent years, and the damage to the very fabric of our society, are being conveniently ignored or forgotten amidst the clichéd anti-US rhetoric of the religious and right-wing forces.
As the country remains in the grip of political instability and uncertainty because of the lawyers' campaign for the restoration of the controversial deposed chief justice, and the mounting pressure on President Musharraf to resign, there has been a marked confusion in the government's anti-terror war policy, which appears to lack initiative, drive and resolve. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani's government - under pressure from its allies and right-wing forces - seems to be sending mixed signals, both within the country and abroad, regarding its commitment on how to conduct this war against the backdrop of a rapid deterioration in the law and order situation in parts of the NWFP. Emboldened militants have increased violent attacks not just in the tribal region, but also in nearby settled areas of the NWFP.
The Taliban extremists are executing people, burning schools, hitting at government installations and the security forces, and targeting women. The dark shadow of their activities is no longer confined to the remote mountainous region; it is fast spreading its tentacles in the populated areas as well. How can one hold talks with these forces who refuse to pay heed to reason? Should the government allow the creation of states within the state, in turn, allowing a rapid Talibanisation in parts of the NWFP?
The international community was becoming increasingly wary of Pakistan's intentions and its capacity to reign in militants, as the government is desperately trying to bank on the faltering talks in an attempt to restore peace in the volatile tribal region.
In the past, the pro-Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants used peace talks to re-group, re-organise and re-entrench themselves in the lawless mountainous tribal belt. This led to not just increased violence against US-led forces in Afghanistan, but also undermined whatever little writ the state had in its tribal belt.
The same mistake of appeasing the militants should not be repeated. The government should act to establish its writ and not give any ground to militants to make parts of the country a safe haven for international terrorists and use its territory for unleashing terrorism across the globe. This country of 160 million people should not be allowed to drift into complete anarchy and chaos.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's statement that his country had the right to send troops across the border to chase militants taking shelter in Pakistan, perhaps reflects the sentiment of his powerful NATO allies, who remain concerned about Islamabad's efforts to sign peace accords with militants. Karzai's statement remains in line with the UN Security Council resolutions - 1373 (passed in 2001) and 1566 (passed in 2004) - which make it mandatory for all its member states to deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support and commit terrorist acts. These resolutions also direct the member states to prohibit their nationals and entities from making funds, financial assets, economic resources, or any other related services available to those who commission or participate in the terrorist acts.
This has put the Gillani government in a quandary at a time when it is struggling to maintain balance between international expectations and obligations on the one hand, and growing pressure from the religious and right-wing forces, including some of its own allies, to change the course of the war against terror, on the other.
On June 25, the government announced that it was handing over powers to the army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, to take action against militants in the NWFP. The PPP-led government has to take ownership of this fight against extremists and terrorists, rather than give an impression that it has been dragged into an unwanted and unnecessary conflict. The Gillani government should fight this war boldly on the ideological front and help build public opinion in its favour, providing security forces the necessary cushion to weed out terrorism from Pakistani soil. The much-neglected Islamic seminary reforms also need to be pushed on a war-footing to stamp out the tide of terrorism and extremism in the long run.
If Pakistan fails to control militants on its own, it will provide foreign powers an excuse to intervene.
However, the PPP - seen as a pro-west liberal and secular force - has so far failed to grasp the initiative in this fight, although its leader, Benazir Bhutto, became one of its victims on December 27 in a gun and bomb attack, which bears all the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda-linked or inspired terrorism. This should give the present government the impetus to confront this scourge with a greater determination.
Extremism and terrorism are not challenges faced by the United States and its western allies alone. They pose a far graver challenge for Pakistan, which served as a conduit for waging the US-sponsored Afghan war against the former Soviet Union and its backed communist regime in Kabul during the 1980s. It is now well-documented history that it was American and Saudi Arabian dollars which fuelled the so-called holy war in Afghanistan for more than a decade during the 1980s with Pakistan's help. This dollar-sponsored so-called jihad not only resulted in the mushroom growth of Islamic seminaries all over the country, particularly in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan, but also attracted thousands of Islamic militants from across the world - especially from the Middle East - who learnt the art of terrorism in the ISI-operated training centres that were financed and armed by American and Saudi intelligence agencies. The Pakistani establishment of those days helped not only radical Afghan Islamic groups, but also the Pakistani militants to organise on similar patterns and used them in fuelling jihad in Indian-occupied Kashmir. This led to the establishment of the vast, resource-rich private jihadi empire, which spun out of control from the hands of its sponsors and started following its own extremist and self-styled pan-Islamic agenda.
The surge in sectarian killings during the 1990s, the phenomenal rise in religious extremism and intolerance in the country and the subsequent building of ties of the local militants with international terrorists, are the result of the myopic policies of General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq's era and his remnants. And just like the United States, in an ironic turn of events, Pakistan also faces a backlash from this Frankenstein it helped create with Washington.
By joining hands with Washington in the international war against terrorism, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil, President Musharraf, for the first time in the country's history, confronted these extremists head-on. Not only did Pakistan stop its support to the Afghan Taliban, it also gradually stopped militants from using Pakistani territory against Indian forces in occupied Kashmir, which led to the easing of tensions between the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours.
However, the task of defeating the extremist forces has so far proved easier said than done. The huge, well-financed extremists' empire, having tentacles even within the establishment, has upped the stakes by waging relentless terror and suicide attacks in an attempt to undermine Islamabad's efforts in this war. It is in Pakistan's national interest to defeat these forces, which remain incompatible with the modern world and aim to drag the country to a barbaric medieval period and enforce the outdated tribal system in the name of religion in this 21st century world.
The PPP, being a popular party, remains in a far better position to fight this war effectively and aggressively, both on the ideological and practical fronts, as compared to the previous government. Prime Minister Gillani should avail the opportunity created by the previous military-led government of confronting the extremist pro-Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, who remain a potent threat to Pakistan. For the first time in the country's history, the military leadership and the popularly elected government can have a convergence of views on this vital issue. Will the PPP and its democratic allies act now or let go of this historic opportunity and live to regret it forever? -- ENDS

Recipe for Disaster

Is the National Assembly already beginning to regret its near unanimous approval of the Nizam-e-Adl as the Taliban extend their writ in parts of Malakand?

By Amir Zia
Newsline - May 2009

Pakistani security forces swung into action against the Taliban militants in parts of Malakand division, less than two weeks after the National Assembly gave a near unanimous seal of approval to the controversial Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, which was supposed to usher in an era of peace in this scenic region.
The boom of guns in lower Dir and Buner has, for all practical purposes, shattered whatever remote chance this contentious regulation had of ending the bloody conflict in Swat and its neighbouring areas.
“We want this agreement to work,” says a close aide of President Asif Ali Zardari. “Sufi Mohammad has been assigned the task of bringing peace in the area. This is a home-grown solution and we want to give it a chance.”
But, ironically, even as these words were being uttered in Islamabad on the eve of April 27, security forces were already on their way to weed out those Taliban militants who had seized Buner – a rugged town of Malakand division – located barely 60 miles from the federal capital, Islamabad.
The militants marched into Buner after the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was signed, seizing government buildings and announcing plans of establishing their own writ in the region. They also went on an offensive in Dir – confirming apprehensions that the policy of appeasement and concessions had only served to embolden the militant elements.
As alarm bells rang from Karachi to Peshawar about the growing threat of the Taliban, the government continued to give mixed signals and vehemently defended the deal. But despite all its optimism, that Sufi Mohammad and his men would deliver peace in the region, the security forces launched the much-awaited operation in Dir and Buner on April 26 and 27, respectively, in which dozens of militants were killed in less than 48 hours of sporadic fighting.
Although the government and Sufi Mohammad are still trying to save the agreement, political analysts say that the authorities are back to square one.
This entire episode – from the signing of the controversial deal to the resumption of fighting – underlines the haphazard and confused government approach in dealing with the Taliban challenge.
After weeks of dragging his feet on the issue, on April 13 President Zardari finally signed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation that established a parallel system of justice in the entire Malakand division.
Under this system, the Qazi courts do not recognise the common law of the country and there is a distinct gender bias in the name of religion.
The supporters of the Nizam-e-Adl argue that it administers quick justice, but its critics maintain that it creates a state within a state, and proposes draconian laws – ranging from death by stoning to flogging – in the name of Islam.
Zia Ahmed Awan, an eminent human rights activist and lawyer, suggests that rather than establishing a separate system which fans insecurities of not just minorities, but women as well, the common law needs to be made more efficient. “There should be no compromise on this issue,” he says.
Religious scholars also stand divided on the issue, because Shariah is interpreted differently by every sect.
Former law minister Iqbal Haider declares the Regulation unconstitutional. “Under the constitution, only the Islamic Ideology Council can recommend Islamic laws to the parliament. Individuals or small bands and organisations cannot do so,” says Haider. “If this is allowed, we will have a separate set of laws and a different version of the Shariah in every neighbourhood. This will lead to absolute chaos and anarchy.”
Critics of the Regulation also argue that it undermines the writ of the state, and encourages individuals and armed groups to dictate terms to the government through the barrel of the gun. The Regulation rang alarm bells not just in the civil society, but also within the international community, which sees this as the government’s capitulation to the Taliban. “I am increasingly, both concerned and frustrated at the progression of the danger [in Pakistan],” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Mike Mullen told the US media. Additionally, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a congressional panel that the situation in Pakistan posed a “mortal threat” to world security. She accused Pakistan of abdicating to the Taliban by allowing them to control parts of the country such as Swat.
Washington has become increasingly critical of what it views as Islamabad’s “soft approach” towards the militants. The change in tone, under the new Democratic set-up in Washington, should be of some concern to the Pakistani leadership which seems unable to convince its domestic detractors and foreign friends about its strategy to combat terrorism.
Analysts say that the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation has, in fact, emboldened the militants. They have not only refused to surrender weapons, they have now fanned out to the nearby areas of Swat, vowing to spread their narrow version of Islam.
Sufi Mohammad, who led the banned Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM) shocked the world when he said that there was no room for democracy in Islam, and that running for the elections and becoming members of Parliament were against the tenets of Islam. His views should not come as a surprise. Sufi Mohammad has been campaigning for the imposition of his brand of Islam in Malakand since the early 1990s. His militant TNSM has a history of violence and of defying the writ of the state. He was also responsible for leading 10,000 Pakistani youth into Afghanistan in 2002 to fight against the US-led forces. Hundreds of these men were killed or incarcerated and Sufi himself ran for his life and returned to Pakistan, only to be imprisoned by the former military government. The same man has now been given the important task of restoring peace and coaxing his son-in-law, Maulvi Fazlullah and his men to lay down their arms. For many, it is a sure recipe for disaster.
There were many worried faces in Islamabad as reports of the Taliban gaining ground made headlines in the media. The government’s inaction in the initial weeks caused widespread nervousness, and residents of Islamabad started to debate whether or not they should leave the capital. Later, the tough statement of the army chief General Ashfaq Kayani against the Taliban helped calm frayed nerves.
The PPP-led government, however, defended the agreement tooth-and-nail, brushing aside concerns regarding the country’s slide into chaos because of its “wheelings and dealings” with the militants.
The secular ANP has consistently been making the plea that the people of Swat are all for the Nizam-e-Adl system. If that were indeed the case how do they explain the fact that in the 2008 elections, all the national and provincial assembly seats of Malakand division were won by secular and liberal parties – the PPP, the ANP and the PML-Q.
The collective wisdom of our lawmakers in the National Assembly failed the nation as they approved a resolution supporting the Nizam-e-Adl within a couple of hours. The only voice of dissent came from the MQM, which vehemently opposed it. However, the MQM paved the way for the near unanimous passage of this resolution as its members boycotted the session rather than voting against it.
The National Assembly’s endorsement of the Nizam-e-Adl came as a shocker for many Pakistanis, who had pinned their hopes that lawmakers would ensure that it would not be allowed to sail through parliament. The vision of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was betrayed by the National Assembly.
The herd mentality of the women parliamentarians, who should’ve been most concerned about the passage of this Regulation, but who chose to give it their approval, was appalling.
The double-speak and expediency of the mainstream political parties is ample proof of the fact that the national leadership does not have a strategy to combat terrorism. They lack both the will and the vision to deal with this challenge. It is a tried-and-tested truth that a policy of appeasement does not work with terrorists. They only use it to reorganise, re-group and raise the stakes. Had this not been the case, the past seven such deals, signed by consecutive governments since 2004, would not have been scrapped so unceremoniously.
The high hopes that a democratically elected and popular government would be in a far better position to fight extremism and terrorism are now turning into despair because the PPP-led government has so far failed to provide direction and leadership.
The credentials of this government have further eroded here as well as abroad. Washington and its allies have started voicing their concerns openly, and Pakistan is now being touted as the world’s most dangerous place.
This frightening image is taking its toll on every field – from economy and investment to sports. Pakistan is fast becoming a pariah state and every Pakistani who has a stake in this system is worried about his and the country’s future.
Although top government officials are trying to convey the impression that everything is under control, the ground reality appears to be totally different. President Zardari may be good at wheeling and dealing with politicians and rivals alike, but the same tactic will not necessarily work with terrorists.
Pakistan is paying a heavy price for the government’s inaction and unwillingness to take the bull by the horns. Whatever the ANP and PPP stalwarts might say to justify the Nizam-e-Adl, it has hit dead-end, even before its implementation. But the damage is done.
Is the government ready to learn from this experience and end the confusion in dealing with the Taliban and its allies? -- ENDS

A Star Bows Out

Sabihuddin Ghausi leaves behind a lasting legacy in the world of journalism with his commitment and courage.

By Amir Zia
Newsline - April 2009

One of the stars of Pakistani journalism bowed out on March 26. For nearly four decades, Sabihuddin Ghausi remained not just an integral figure of Karachi’s journalist community, but one of its leading stars. A star that sparkled both as a thorough professional as well as an activist.
Barring the last six or seven weeks of his life – when Ghausi was in and out of hospital following a brain haemorrhage – he remained in the thick of things. Reporting, writing, appearing on television talk shows as an economic and political analyst, running in the elections of the Karachi Press Club (KPC) and the Karachi Union of Journalists (KUJ) – Ghausi had his hands full. He remained active both on the professional and social fronts with the passion and energy of a youngster. Failing eyesight and a host of other health problems, which had caught him in the last couple of years, never dampened his spirits. Like any traditional journalist, he was a true bohemian and lived life in the fast lane.
I first met Ghausi sometime in 1992 at the KPC and was soon admitted to his inner circle. I was still new to the fascinating world of journalism and was struggling to learn the ropes, while Ghausi was a veteran – a frontline reporter at Dawn – whose stories I read as a student. It was indeed, an honour for a newcomer like myself to enjoy his hospitality. He shared not just his forbidden treasure stored in the cardroom locker with generosity, but also his rich professional experiences, anecdotes and lectured the young guns on the dos and don’ts of journalism.
He stressed on the power of facts. Tell your story as simply as possible. A news story based on strong facts does not need the crutches of adjectives and flowery language, remained the crux of his message. And he practiced what he preached – both in his incisive news reports and his articles. His strength was economic reporting, issues such as the distribution of resources among provinces being close to his heart.
I spent countless evenings in his company at the KPC’s smoke-filled cardroom, enjoying oil-soaked French fries, cheese, kebabs, and hard-boiled eggs, which explains a lot about our healthy eating habits. Those were the days when many other old hands were KPC regulars. Sadly, many of them are no longer with us including Altaf Siddiqui, Aleemuddin Pathan, Maqbool Jalees and Mushtaq Memon. Others, including Iqbal Jaffery, Salim Asmi and Abdul Hameed Chapara, have all faded away from the cardroom life. The younger journalists of those times and my contemporaries, including Ovais Subhani, Hasan Jaffery, and Ghulam Hasnain – have all migrated from Pakistan one by one. Ghausi was perhaps the last of the seniors, who often joked about the dwindling number of familiar faces around him.
He often painted a bleak and dismal picture of the state of affairs in Pakistan. His sense of loss of the diappearances of all the values dear to him – from social and individual liberties to freedom of expression, democracy and human rights – was great. Stories by Qurratulain Haider, the poetry of Habib Jalib, tales of his favourite city Mumbai, the tragedy of Bangladesh, military rule and democracy were some of Ghausi’s favourite and recurring topics.
Another of his favourite topics was the defunct daily Sun – his first newspaper job in 1970. According to him, Sun broke new grounds in Pakistani journalism in those days under the leadership of its editor, Shamim Ahmed. Ghausi also worked for PPI, Business Recorder, Morning News and Muslim before joining the daily Dawn in 1988, with which he remained associated till the last.
This outstanding professional was respected by the entire journalist community for his courage, commitment and credibility.
He was jailed during Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule and lost his job, but he remained committed to his ideals. The last time he went behind bars was in 2007, when journalists protested against the former military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s crackdown on the media. I visited him in the lock-up and was greeted by his trademark smile. He belonged to that old school of journalism who took pride in defiance and were proud to wear their hearts on their sleeve.
Just like his writings, Ghausi was also a bold and an eloquent speaker. KPC’s Ibrahim Jalees Hall is witness to the countless speeches made by him, in which he took top politicians, bureaucrats and his rivals, head-on. In one-on-one encounters, Ghausi was witty and never hesitated in making fun of himself. He had a penchant for asking direct and shocking questions. Like any good reporter, he was sceptical of appearances – a habit which often pitted him even against his own friends, and he suffered the collateral damage of writing and saying what he thought was right.
On a personal level, Ghausi was a caring and sensitive soul. He would worry about the son and widow of a friend, advised juniors like me to take good care of their parents and fretted for hours over the state of the underdogs.
He was among those rare newsmen who indulged in activism without compromising professional responsibilities. He remained among the best of the lot as he rubbed shoulders with the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ) giants like Minhaj Barna and Nisar Osmani.
There was a time when Ghausi’s presence alone could ensure the victory of a panel in KPC elections. He could bring hardcore leftists and rightists together and make them work as a team.
Ghausi was elected as president of KPC four times and president of KUJ twice. However, his last few months were hard on him. First, he lost the KPC elections to a junior and then, a month later in Janurary, he also lost the KUJ elections. These defeats were understandable. Many of those who knew him were now no more, and many others had drifted away from the KPC and KUJ’s electoral excitement.
Among many of his images sealed in my memory is that of the KUJ election day when Ghausi, clad in white shalwar kameez, stood at the KPC entrance welcoming voters. Another is that of Ghausi making his victory speech after being elected president in the 1995 KPC elections, in which I was elected his secretary. I owed my one and only win to Ghausi. His last, farewell image is of March 23rd – a few days before his death – in which I asked him to get well soon so that we could again celebrate at KPC, just like the good old days. Ghausi gave a faint smile, shook hands with me and I promised to return the next week. But that was not destined to be.
“A warrior, a good man has returned early. May Allah bless him always,” senior columnist Nusrat Nasarullah, one of Ghausi’s admirers, wrote in an SMS sent to me soon after his death. -- ENDS

Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Out In The Cold

Pressure on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa increases as India persuades the UNSC to impose sanctions against them for their alleged involvement in the Mumbai carnage.
By Amir Zia
Newsline - January 2009

The Jamaat-ud-Dawa leadership is in the eye of the storm once again. And this time round, the radical Wahhabi group appears to be battling for its survival. Never before has it appeared to be so isolated and under so much pressure as it does now, in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage for which Dawa’s top leaders are being blamed by India. Islamabad has outlawed the group and detained its key leaders, including Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, following the sanctions imposed on the group by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2008. But India and the western nations, including the United States, are far from satisfied and are demanding more stringent action.
Although Dawa has been quick to deny its involvement in the Mumbai incident, nobody seems to be taking its denials seriously. Even the Pakistani establishment, which at one time maintained links with the group, has been keeping a safe distance from its leaders in recent weeks, while police rounded up dozens of Dawa’s main operators, shuttered their offices and forced several others to go into hiding.
One top US publication, The Wall Street Journal, quoting anonymous Pakistani security officials, has claimed that one of the arrested members of the group – Zarrar Shah – had confessed to being involved in the Mumbai affair. The newspaper claimed that the 10 militants involved in the Mumbai attacks were trained in Azad Kashmir and Karachi.
However, there has been no official confirmation of the report from the government, which has reiterated that no Pakistani citizen will be handed over to the Indians. “It is too premature to say anything about the investigations,” said a foreign office official.
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa also rejected the report, calling it a smear campaign against the group. “This time, the pressure on us is much more,” a Jamaat-ud-Dawa leader requesting anonymity told Newsline in Islamabad. “We feel more insecure today than we did in 2002 following the crackdown by Musharraf’s government. The difference between Musharraf’s crackdown and the present one is that the communication lines with the establishment were open then, but this time round they are closed. Now our biggest concern is how to control our workers following the arrest of our front-line leaders.”
The signs of the changing times are evident from the manner in which the PPP-led government handled the issue of sanctions on Jamaat-ud-Dawa in the UNSC, where such attempts had been successfully thwarted twice in the past with China’s assistance. Beijing blocked the last such attempt in April 2006, but this time, the government ostensibly made no attempt to lobby its allies, including China, to stop the UNSC from taking action against Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The PPP’s passive approach on this issue, perhaps, stems from its desperation to address international concerns on terrorism. This, despite the fact that New Delhi has yet to provide any conclusive evidence against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. In 2002, the former military-led government also yielded to international pressure and launched a crackdown on Hafiz Saeed and his men in the aftermath of the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. Subsequently, the armies of the two South Asian nuclear rivals remained eyeball to eyeball for weeks in one of their biggest military stand-offs. In those days, Hafiz Saeed was leading the militant Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), which has a history of battling Indians in Indian-administered Kashmir since the early 1990s. Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi was the commander of LeT and operated from a camp on the outskirts of Azad Kashmir’s capital Muzaffarabad. Sensing both the international mood and domestic pressure, Hafiz Saeed announced that he was winding up LeT operations in Pakistan on December 24, 2001 – just a day before the United States placed it on the terrorist list. However, LeT remained operational as a key guerrilla group in Indian-administered Kashmir under the leadership of Qari Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, who still heads the organisation.
Former president Musharraf formally banned Lashkar and four other militant groups on January 12, 2002, in an attempt to normalise relations with India, though his government tacitly allowed some of these groups to operate under a new name and a different mandate.
“We formally severed ties with Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in 2002. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba that is active in occupied Kashmir is working as a Kashmiri organisation,” said a group insider, challenging Indian allegations that Jamaat-ud-Dawa is, in reality, a front for the militant group.
Hafiz Saeed reorganised his men under the banner of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, focusing on welfare and relief activities (see box).
“Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s mandate is only charity and humanitarian work; it is meant to ensure that our workers do not remain idle. They need to be kept engaged so that their commitment to Islam and jihad is not misused,” he said.
Pakistani security officials claim that LeT is the only jihadi group which has not been involved in terror activities within the country. “While disgruntled elements from other militant groups such as Fazlur Rehman Khalil’s Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Maulana Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed were found to be involved in terrorism in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba channelised its manpower towards charity and relief work,” said an official.
LeT insiders maintain that strict organisational control, discipline and ideological training ensured that its members accepted the change from militancy to humanitarian work.
“In fact, Hafiz Saeed provoked the Taliban when he openly condemned suicide bombings and said they went against the teachings of Islam,” remarked a Jamaat-ud-Dawa official. “We have not committed any crime under any Pakistani or international law. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is not involved in militancy inside or outside Pakistan,” he insisted.
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa is considering challenging the ban placed against it both in the UN and in Pakistan. It realises that it needs the government’s support to get delisted from the terror list, “but we hardly have any expectations of this government, which is trying to appease foreign powers,” says one its representatives.
Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s arguments do not seem to cut any ice with Indian and western governments, which continue to remain skeptical about its welfare activities.
Political analysts maintain that the Indians want to use the Mumbai carnage as a pretext not only to isolate Pakistan but also to place curbs on those groups that have a history of providing assistance to those Kashmiris who are resisting Indian rule in the valley. New Delhi is convinced that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is merely a front for its militant wing, the LeT, which remains active in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Jamaat-ud-Dawa – the new name of the outlawed LeT in Pakistan – has been derived from Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad, an organisation which Hafiz Saeed and his associates established in 1986 to preach Islam in line with the Wahhabi school of thought – popularly known as the Ahle-Hadith or Salafi in this region. In the early 1990s, LeT emerged as the militant wing of Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad to wage jihad. Like other Islamic militant groups, the seeds of the LeT were also sown during the days of jihad in Afghanistan against the former Soviet Union. This holy war had the blessings of the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and several western countries.
Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad itself made a humble start in 1984 with a group of madrassa students, who managed to convince a few university professors to join them in organising Quran study circles. Among them was Hafiz Saeed, who was a professor in the Islamic Learning department at the Engineering University of Lahore. Hafiz Saeed had studied in Saudi Arabia on a government scholarship and met Afghan resistance leaders, including Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, there.
“Hafiz sahib was a very simple person. He did not even mind sitting on a bicycle with us and going to the Dara-e-Quran classes,” says one of Saeed’s old colleagues.
Hafiz Saeed, whose family hails from Shimla, was born in 1946. He came into contact with radical Islamists in 1984 through Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian professor at the Islamic University in Islamabad. It was Azzam who inspired Hafiz Saeed to lead the first batch of Ahle Hadith followers into the Afghan jihad during those days. Hafiz Saeed took a 25-member group of volunteers, who were trained in an Arab-run camp called Saada in Kurram Agency.
Azzam, who was assassinated in Peshawar on November 24, 1989, was once a mentor of Osama bin Laden but later the two had a falling out.
The first batch of Ahle Hadith volunteers was followed by many other such groups, which all got a taste of war in Afghanistan against the Soviet troops. However, these operations were carried out under the banner of other organisations. In 1986, a few Ahle Hadith clerics formed the Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad, and Hafiz Saeed was handed the responsibility of leading that organisation.
According to insiders, most members of the Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad believed in jihad and were inspired by their peers who operated in Afghanistan. Their aim was to establish an organisation that focused on both preaching and jihad. Around 1988, the organisation managed to establish its own militant training centre – Maskar-e-Tayyaba – in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Saudi and Pakistani Muslims were its main source of funding. “However, we knew from the start that the real strength of an organisation comes from domestic sources. Consequently, Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad set up an organised system of raising funds at the grassroots level,” said an insider, claiming that the collection, which is done on a zonal level, runs into billions of rupees every year.
The group’s Afghan operations were mainly focused in the Jalalabad, Nooristan and Sarobi areas under the leadership of an Afghan Ahle Hadith commander, Sheikh Jameelur Rahman, who was assassinated by two Arab militants in Bajaur.
Among the Pakistani groups, Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad joined the Afghan resistance much later than many groups belonging to the Deobandi school of thought. Insiders say around 60 of its militants were killed during the Afghan operations, but Afghanistan proved to be a real training ground for the group. Around 2,500 of its members got a practical taste of guerrilla warfare.
The group’s presence in Afghanistan ended by 1993 – at the peak of the infighting between various Afghan factions.
However, before the winding up of the Afghan operations, the group had already commenced its activities in Indian-administered Kashmir in 1989, with the help of a local Kashmiri group Al-Baraq. In the initial two years, the group operated under the cover of Al-Baraq, but in 1991 Hafiz Saeed and his associates decided to form their own militant group, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.
The Lashkar guerrillas soon earned a reputation as committed and fierce fighters who, for the first time introduced “fidayeen” attacks on Indian troops in Kashmir. “The fidayeen attacks are not suicide attacks. We go after difficult military targets, and try to get out after inflicting maximum damage on the enemy,” one Lashkar militant told this scribe in a 1999 interview. The group maintains that since 1989 nearly 3,000 of its militants have sacrificed their lives for the Kashmiri freedom struggle. Many of those killed belong to the rural areas of Pakistan, especially Punjab and the North West Frontier Province.
A 372-page book, Akhari Tehrir (The Last Writing), published by the group in 1997, lists more than 200 Pakistanis who were killed fighting Indians in Kashmir. The book comprises their last letters and wills to their families.
In LeT’s heyday, hundreds of youngsters made a beeline for its short military courses in Azad Kashmir. But in the initial phase of the training, more stress was placed on Islamic and ideological studies rather than combat training. Only the best among the lot were selected for advanced courses and only a handful among these were sent out on actual combat missions across the border.
Before Musharraf imposed a ban on LeT, it operated four militant training camps in Azad Kashmir where thousands of Pakistani youngsters – mostly hailing from rural areas and with poor backgrounds – had been given religious indoctrination and military training. All these camps were eventually shut down. However, the Markaz Dawaat-ul-Irshad and Jamaat-ud-Dawa continued to operate openly, claiming that militancy was no longer on their agenda.
The Jamaat presently owns a sprawling 65-acre centre in Muridke – around 40 kilometres from Lahore – where it runs several educational centres including an Islamic university, separate boys’ and girls’ colleges, a madrassa and hostels for students and teachers. Around 2,500 students study in Muridke, where the group also operates a hospital and agricultural farms. Pakistani security officials maintain that the Muridke centre remains one of the top potential targets of the Indians. But Jamaat-ud-Dawa insists that Murdike houses only its educational and welfare centres.
But given the present international mood, the future of the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa appears bleak in Pakistan. -- ENDS

Interview: The Media Divide

“In some of the major channels, we see individuals who are biased and openly sympathetic to the cause of extremists and militants”
– Amir Zia,
Director News and Current Affairs, Samaa

Newsline; December 2008

Q: Should there be a code of conduct/ethics that should shape the function and role of the electronic media?
A: The electronic media is still evolving in Pakistan and is far from perfect. Yes, we do need a code of conduct to ensure that our media organisations stick to the basic standards of journalism, which include being factual, impartial and fair in our coverage. At present, most of our channels often tend to be sensational, brazenly partial, and too opinionated. Many of our media persons behave more like activists rather than professionals. Therefore, not only is a code of conduct a must, we also need effective libel and defamation laws in the country to ensure that people who are being wronged by the media can get justice. This is a practice in all civilised countries. And we should also try to move in this direction.
Q: Should this code be devised by the government or by media persons?
A: All the stakeholders including the government, journalists’ groups, owners, editors and academia should help formulate the code of conduct. Already, recommendations have been made, but there is a need to build consensus and ensure that once such a document is formulated, it gets implemented. The media organisations should also prepare their in-house code of conduct. This is practiced the world over. The journalists should know the dos and don’ts of their trade.
Q: Do you feel that some of the media channels are biased towards the militants and, in some way, sympathetic of their cause?
A: In some of the major channels, we see individuals who are biased and openly sympathetic to the cause of extremists and militants. They manage to use these channels to propagate extremist and conservative ideas, tell half-truths and come up with bizarre conspiracy theories because of the lack of editorial control. And it is not just militants [they support]. We find many anchors and reporters openly supporting this political party or that, and toeing a particular political line. This bias and partiality was at its worst during the Lal Masjid crisis and the lawyers’ movement.
Q: Is it true that Samaa – unlike the other channels in their coverage – was pro-Musharraf?
A: The very approach that you have to be either pro- or anti- someone as a media organisation remains unprofessional. We were neither pro- nor anti-Musharraf, as an institution. In the same way as we are neither pro- nor anti-government today.
As journalists, we should remain impartial and tell the story as it unfolds, without lacing it with our opinion or distorting facts or exaggerating incidents or developments. We have to be objective – at all costs. That’s the basic tenet of journalism; that you have to give both versions of a story and try to remain balanced. Yes, there were channels which were staunchly anti-Musharraf. But Samaa did not join the bandwagon. We did not get carried away by sentiment. We remained impartial. Our policy is to stick to facts, provide undiluted information and serious analyses, rather being sensationalist and subjective. This is what we did during the Musharraf era and that’s what we are doing now.
Q: In your opinion, what is the role and responsibility of a talk show host, and are the current talk show hosts fulfilling that responsibility?
A: Obviously, the target of any discussion or an interview should be to leave viewers better informed and aware about an issue or development. Talk show hosts can do this by asking probing questions, providing facts and relevant background. Their job is to lead the discussion, without giving an impression that they are taking sides or are committed to any ideology. Unfortunately, many of our anchors are using their programmes to fan emotions. They follow their political agendas and blatantly take sides. Some even use television as a jumping-board to get government slots or other favours.
Then, there are those who take pride in the fact that they have become wheelers and dealers, carrying messages from one politician to another, giving them wanted or unwanted advice – both on camera and in private. There is little editorial control on content. The task of editorial control becomes more difficult when an anchor also holds a senior management position.
Haven’t we seen anchors trying to broker a deal between the government and militants during the Lal Masjid crisis? A few of them even became loudspeakers for the militants, while some tried to get governments changed through their programmes. A handful of television hosts behave as if they are judges, giving verdicts and sermons about everything under the sun. It is certainly not a journalist’s job. We are here to tell a story, not to become a part of it. We are not actors and should not try to become one.
It is good that now, questions about such negative practices are being raised even within the media, though it is making some media personnel angry and unhappy. However, we should excercise self-accountability. The media criticises everyone – because it is our job. But there is no harm in being self-critical as well. It will help us improve and become professional. Self-criticism in no way endangers press freedom, which can never exist without responsibility.
Q: Is it acceptable to show violence, dead bodies and suffering victims on TV?
A: No responsible newspaper or television channel shows bodies, blood and victims’ sufferings. It is a practice the world over – even in those nations which are seen as beacons of press freedom and expression. How many bodies of the September 11 victims were shown on television? Did we see any victims of the July 7 London bombings? We do not see any international channel showing the dead or the wounded of Afghanistan and Iraq. In Pakistan, however, most channels hardly exercise any self-restraint. They do not know where to stop. At hospitals, we see cameramen, photographers and reporters hampering the treatment of victims of violence, terrorism or accidents in their zeal to get footage, photographs or an eyewitness account.
In today’s context, suicide bombers and terrorists achieve their targets not just by staging attacks, but by gaining publicity, which remains their prime motive. They want to terrorise the people and create insecurity. The media has to rethink as to how they should report these events without the help of these desperate elements to achieve their ends. We should think about those who are sitting in front of their television sets. They should get information, not suffer at our hands. At Samaa, we do not show bodies, blood and victims as a matter of policy. -- ENDS

The Philistines Are Upon Us

The manner in which the NAPA issue is being dealt with gives us a glimpse of the prevailing narrow mindset, prejudice and apathy that is prevalent in our politicians.


By Amir ZiaNewsline; December 2008

The Sindh government seems on track to have the dubious “honour” of destroying an institution credited by many for reviving the performing arts in Karachi. Going by the present government’s mood, the days of the National Academy of Performing Arts (NAPA) seem numbered. The academy has already been served a notice to vacate the Hindu Gymkhana, which has been its home for more than three-and-a half years. If everything proceeds according to the government’s plan and the matter is not taken to court, December 13 should be NAPA’s last day in the Hindu Gymkhana, which has been transformed from a haunted and depleted building to the hub of drama, dance and music.
Once kicked out of its birthplace, NAPA’s chances of survival appear bleak in this “golden democratic era” which has nothing better to offer to this institution than an unsympathetic, hostile environment. Yes, the former military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, gave the people of Karachi NAPA – an institution that would be the pride and joy of any city­ – but the enlightened democrats are determined to throttle it under the pretext of preserving the provincial heritage. The PPP-led federal government has already slashed NAPA’s annual grant to a meager Rs.17 million this year from the Rs.50 million it used to get under the military-led government. The controversial charges about NAPA building an auditorium on a protected site have been levelled despite the fact that the relevant authorities had given clearance to this UAE government-sponsored state-of-the-art project. Even some of the key bureaucrats, who are currently spearheading the anti-NAPA drive, were part of the process that cleared this new construction, which in no way damaged the historic Gymkhana building. However, the lawful can become unlawful in our Islamic republic with a change of face in the government. Notwithstanding the 35-year lease given to NAPA, the Sindh government seems hell-bent on grabbing possession of the building and has issued marching orders to NAPA without any plans for its relocation. And apart from the vague announcements that the provincial government plans to build an arts and craft centre here and share the premises with the Hindu community, the people of Karachi and the students and faculty of NAPA do not know what will be the future of this prime piece of property.
Indeed, the manner in which this issue is being dealt with gives us a glimpse of the prevailing narrow mindset, prejudice and apathy in the ranks of the army of federal and provincial ministers and advisers who, despite their lip-service to the cause of promoting the performing arts and culture, are wrecking the only such institution we have in Karachi. The PPP has, undoubtedly, taken up a crusade that best suits zealots of Jamaat-e-Islami and its likes, who oppose and abhor all forms of performing arts. This so-called cause is only attracting bad publicity for the PPP and making Karachiites even more skeptical and suspicious about its motives and agenda for their city.
NAPA, inaugurated in February 2005, has filled a huge void in Karachi’s cultural horizons. It attracted the best and most credible names to its faculty. Giants of their respective fields including Zia Mohyeddin, Rahat Kazmi, Arshad Mehmood, Enver Sajjad, Talat Hussain – each an institution in his own right – are NAPA’s faculty members. Had it been some other time and place, these names would have been enough to dissuade any self-respecting government from targeting such an institution. But we are living in bad times in which the worst could happen to the best of the lot.
This country has seen countless ministers, like the Sindh Culture Minister Sassui Palejo, walking in and out of the corridors of power since 1947. A vast majority of these so-called high and mighty have been consigned to the garbage bin of history. Nobody knows their names or how many files they signed and which projects they inaugurated. But people do remember those who enrich their lives, add beauty, joy and colour to it. Art and the work of artists become the collective ethos of a society, which can never be forgotten or erased. It remains in our collective memory. NAPA, which restored and renovated the Hindu Gymkhana, built in 1925, is being punished for its good deeds. It is being punished perhaps for taking students belonging to middle and lower income groups under its umbrella, staging plays and organising other events in this otherwise barren cultural scene of Karachi.
The PPP’s Karachi leaders – who like to be portrayed as progressive, liberal and secular democrats – from Taj Haider to Nafees Siddiqui, and Raza Rabbani to Fauzia Wahab and Sherry Rehman – will get the credit of toeing the party line in totality. But surely have failed their city. These PPP leaders should perhaps understand why they fail to win the popular vote from Karachi – simply because of their inability to speak for the people of this city and articulate their aspirations. So far, there has not been a single voice of dissent in the PPP in favour of NAPA and against the myopic policies of the provincial government.
One wonders at the priorities of this government, which has failed to identify any other pressing issue in Karachi that needed immediate corrective measures. For instance, the encroachments of public parks by seminaries, mosques, shops, vendors and other interest groups are conveniently ignored. The mistreatment, degeneration and plunder of other historical sites – from Moenjo Daro to the Makli graves, are not an issue. Even if one takes the case of the original Hindu Gymkhana, one wonders why the government does not want to vacate the 27,000 square yards encroached upon by the police and the 7,200 square yards by the Federal Service Commission and a private party.
Common sense says that one should not destroy an institution to build another. So what prevents the government from building its planned Sindh Arts and Craft Centre elsewhere or providing a bigger building or bigger piece of land to the Hindu community – whose name is being used to grab the disputed building. One would certainly like to get a sensible answer to these questions.
For the record, a couple of decades down the road, Sindh Culture Minister Sassui Palejo will be remembered as the person who spearheaded the movement to destroy a worthy institution like NAPA. And, unfortunately, she belongs to a party which professes to be progressive, liberal and secular.-- ENDS