Trapped Again

By Amir Zia
The News
April 28, 2014

The coming together of political forces should ideally be seen as a welcome step. But political alliances should be based on principles, clear-cut objectives and vision for tomorrow rather than on getting handful of cabinet portfolios. The marriage of convenience never works – especially in an ethnically diverse and politically polarised province such as Sindh.
  
This time, there was no political chest-thumping when the Muttahida Qaumi Movement rejoined the Sindh provincial government as the junior partner of the Pakistan People’s Party. In fact, some senior leaders belonging to both the PPP and the MQM appeared quite sheepish while trying to explain the rationale behind conducting the same failed experiment yet again.
Their embarrassment remains understandable. Only till a few days back, the PPP- MQM lawmakers were locked in bitter verbal brawls inside Sindh Assembly as well as outside despite efforts by their top leadership for a patch-up in the recent months.
The wide gulf of differences and mutual distrust between the urban and rural representatives manifested itself on almost each and every issue. Whether it is the thorny and emotionally-loaded question of the quota system in Sindh, or relatively smaller issues pertaining to the creation of a new district in Karachi and setting up of a university in Hyderabad, these two sides love to disagree.
If on paper, the MQM wants a powerful local bodies system and immediate holding of local elections, the PPP’s interest lies in running the affairs of Sindh as it has been doing since 2008. If the people of Karachi crave for a modern mass transit system, the PPP leaders see holding a Rs450 million-worth Sindh Festival a far more important activity. From the allocation of funds and provincial taxation to the issue of exercising administrative authority over the key urban departments, the interests of the PPP and the MQM diverge on each one of them.
The ongoing operation against criminals and terrorists in Karachi is also a huge bone of contention. Just less than a week before shaking hands with the PPP, the MQM leaders were spitting fire and brimstone over the issue of ‘extrajudicial killings’ and ‘mysterious disappearances’ of its workers allegedly by law-enforcement agencies.
The MQM says that at least 25 of its workers have been executed by the law enforcers and another 45 remain in illegal detention, falling in the dubious category of ‘missing persons’, since the start of the Karachi Operation in early September. The party announced a series of protests on April 17, holding the Sindh government responsible for these killings and forced disappearances of its workers.
But the pendulum of their relations suddenly swung from one extreme to another at a time when it appeared that the MQM was gearing up to increase the political heat. However, the new deal again failed to give any public roadmap that provides the basis of their partnership.
For the MQM, so far the gains boil down to getting two of its men inducted as ministers and three as advisers in the Sindh cabinet, with a promise for a few more slots in the near- to mid-term. Being part of the Sindh government will also provide some shield to the MQM workers, who are being targeted in the Karachi Operation.
The PPP hopes to bring some stability in Karachi and manage its own lawmakers more effectively when it decides to execute an in-house change to replace its aging Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah. 
But these are short-term tactical reasons for the partnership as the two sides failed to give any vision about their province or how to bridge the rural-urban divide and remove at least some of the irritants that bedevilled their relations in the past.
There also appears to be no agreement on how to bring peace and rule of law in Karachi, which has transformed into the most dangerous city even by the standards of the lawless country called Pakistan. Every party – political, ethnic, religious, nationalist or outlawed – has huge financial stakes in this mega city. Extortion, ‘donations’, land grabbing, and direct and indirect links with crime mafias are some of the major means to earn megabucks here. No wonder, turf-wars, killings and violence remain order of the day in Karachi.
During their 2008-13 stint in power as coalition partners, the PPP and the MQM militants were often at each other’s throats, fighting bloody turf wars as their top leaders were vowing to stay together. Both the PPP’s Asif Ali Zardari and the MQM’s Altaf Hussain failed to bring their rank-and-file, and even many of the first and second tier leaders, onboard about the wisdom of an alliance between the rural-urban representatives.
Yet again, the entire thrust of forming a coalition government has come from the top. Zardari and Hussain managed to agree on terms and conditions despite some serious reservations within their party ranks and support-base. “The MQM has been trapped again”, a senior MQM leader confided requesting anonymity. “It was Rehman Malik (the former interior minister) who pulled off this deal because of his excellent relations with our Quaid (Hussain).”
And within the MQM, when the Quaid speaks all the others toe the line – no matter what remain the lessons of history. “We were taken for a ride during 2008-13 as none of the major grievances of urban Sindh got addressed from the holding of local elections to our concerns about the criminal activities of the Lyari Aman Committee. I expect no different results again.”
MQM insiders say that some provincial assembly members were keen to join hands with the PPP, while a number of the National Assembly and Senate members wanted a hand-shake with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz at the centre. The hardliners wanted to stay in the opposition, challenging the wisdom of joining, especially the provincial government with their inability to address any of the major issues concerning their voters.
However, the pro-PPP argument prevailed because the MQM needed a little breathing space on an urgent basis against the backdrop of the Karachi Operation and desire to resolve at least some of the issues of their followers, if not the city. In a nutshell, the MQM’s decision to become junior partners in Syed Qaim Ali Shah’s cabinet for the third time is based more on expediency rather than any long-term strategy to serve the interests of the urban Sindh.
The same is the storyline for the PPP, in which members from young Bilawal Bhutto Zardari to a long line of other hawks were firmly opposed to embracing the MQM again. It was Zardari and his close coterie of confidants, who succeeded in imposing their will and an unpopular decision, especially in the rural areas.
“We don’t need the MQM”, said a visibly upset PPP Sindh Assembly member, accusing the urban-based party of violence and killing many PPP workers. “In Sindh’s politics, the MQM is more of a liability… our leadership should have concentrated on expanding its influence in Karachi rather than comprising with the MQM.”
Many supporters and leaders of the two parties feel that have been trapped in an alliance that failed to deliver in the past and is unlikely to do so again this time. The wounds of the recent past are still fresh and there is simply too much bad blood.
Yes, the coming together of political forces should ideally be seen as a welcome step. But political alliances should be based on principles, clear-cut objectives and vision for tomorrow rather than on getting handful of cabinet portfolios. The marriage of convenience never works – especially in an ethnically diverse and politically polarised province such as Sindh.
What our beleaguered province needs from its representatives are sincerity, moral uprightness and intellectual honesty, which can pave the way for a consensus on the basis of give-and-take and resolve the long standing issues. But if history is any guide, these are the very qualities that are found wanting in our leaders.
Will it be any different this time around? Even the statements of the PPP-MQM leaders fail to give any hope let alone their actions. It is simply the politics of convenience as the key life-and-death issues including peace, prosperity and improving the quality of life of the masses continue to stay on the backburner. Let’s admit it. Even the people of Sindh stay trapped between these two parties.

Democracy on Trial

By Amir Zia
April 21, 2014
The News

Who should know this better than Sharif that Pakistani democracy faces no external threat today. If there is any threat, it comes from within this democratic setup as was in the past. What makes democracy vulnerable in the present context is its inability to deliver the promised fruits...and failing to understand the wisdom of compromise.

What’s the best way to protect and strengthen Pakistan’s fragile democratic system? This perhaps remains the mother of all questions for many of the movers and shakers of Pakistani politics who have stakes in the current order.
This question becomes all the more pertinent now as civil-military ties have again slid into the choppy waters – thanks to the recent politics of brinkmanship by some stalwarts of the ruling party. Although these strained relations have not yet crossed the red line where the entire system can be seen under threat, the belligerent posturing by some of the key players exposes the vulnerability and inherent weaknesses of our democratic institutions, which remain overwhelmingly dominated by feudals, tribal chiefs and leading businesspeople-cum-land owners.
Nevertheless, despite the undemocratic mindset of Pakistan’s elected ruling elite, these tensions could have been avoided in the first place if sane and mature minds ran the show in our corridors of power – those politicians who could set their priorities in the right order by differentiating between the important and the unimportant at this crucial juncture of history. But alas, this is too much to expect from the majority of our parliamentarians.
What we are witnessing instead are crude symbolic statements and thoughtless actions by many of the elected representatives and their cronies, which seem to focus more on the secondary rather than the primary issues. And that too at the cost of triggering unneeded controversies, causing friction within institutions and increasing polarisation in an already polarised and divided society. This should not come as a surprise because our parliament has bags full of politicians to offer but hardly any leader or statesman.
Let’s ask our self-proclaimed champions of democracy whether they are strengthening the system and ensuring its continuity by their brash, irresponsible statements. Does a huddle between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and a very tainted former president, Asif Ali Zardari, guarantee continuation of the civilian rule and make it impregnable? Are our civilian lords and masters serving democracy by trying to appease the Al-Qaeda inspired violent extremists and accepting them as ‘legitimate stakeholders’ by holding direct talks with their representatives? 
Is the administration of selective justice the only way to establish the supremacy of the constitution? Will the conviction of a former military ruler – retired general Pervez Musharraf – on the controversial treason charges for imposing emergency in November 2007 close the door on any future military coup? And lastly, is this the right time for any overt or covert effort to change the civil-military balance of power and stir up tensions which could have easily been avoided?
Going by the mere symbolic fallout of pursuing all or any of these goals, one can easily say that they are not the shortest, safest and surest path to bolster democracy. The more Pakistan’s civilian political bosses assert that they won’t allow the system to get derailed and stand as one to safeguard democracy, the more they intensify speculations and uncertainty about its future.
The civilian Sharif and Zardari first need to explain against whom they have joined hands to protect democracy. Of course ‘enemies of democracy’ will be their answer. But these politicians need to spell it out for innocent people like this scribe what they mean by these enemies rather than talking about them in vague terms. Shouldn’t they name and identify these enemies? Remember the old cliché: ‘the devil is in the detail.’
Are the elected ones pointing fingers at their civilian rivals and fear that they could lead a move to overthrow the system? But civilians, no matter how villainous they are, hardly have any such power or clout. They can only play second fiddle, as once Sharif and many of his top aides did during the inglorious days of General Ziaul Haq. On their own they were nought at that time.
Let’s guess again. Does the Sharif-Zardari duo mean that the enemies of democracy are the retired army personnel? But they should know better that oldies too can’t make this happen. Once they are out of the mighty institution, they don’t wield any make-or-break power and influence.
In this guessing game, even the Al-Qaeda linked local militants cannot be tipped as the enemies because this government is holding talks with them under the ambit of the constitution – ceasefire or no ceasefire. Any foreign power conspiring against democracy is also hard to fathom as our friends and foes all want at least democracy to flourish – even if not the country. 
Then, who is the enemy of democracy?
Are Sharif and Zardari pointing fingers at the armed forces, which helped the country’s first democratic transition in 2013 and continued to support the system since the country’s return to full-fledged democracy in 2008? 
Who then is this enemy that is toying with the idea of taking ‘illegal and unconstitutional steps’? What these two politicians and their associates say in whispers, behind closed-doors and off-the-record sessions, can they please spell it out openly in the larger national interest?
Let’s hope that these champions of democracy are not chasing shadows or imagining conspiracies because of some hidden guilt. But one should rule out that experienced Sharif and wily Zardari can fall to such follies. If they are putting on a united front against an unnamed force and issuing warnings in metaphors, they must have crossed a line or seen someone doing it. 
But as per informed ones, it’s the elected government that backtracked on some of the commitments and upped the ante too high and too soon in its desire to dominate Pakistan’s political chessboard, which led to the mistrust and tensions in civil-military relations.
This is the same error Sharif and his team committed in their second stint in power. The desire to dominate every other institution, the confrontationist style of politics and sticking to the mantra of having ‘my way or the highway’ brought the two-thirds majority government of Sharif down. And that too not with a bang, but a small whimper.
Who should know this better than Sharif that Pakistani democracy faces no external threat today. If there is any threat, it comes from within this democratic setup as was in the past. What makes democracy vulnerable in the present context is its inability to deliver the promised fruits to the masses by going beyond holding the mere exercise of elections and failing to understand the wisdom of compromise to achieve bigger and grander goals.
Musharraf, the former military ruler, can rightly or wrongly be on trial for his 2007 actions. It is now up to the court to acquit or pronounce him guilty.
But the far bigger trial taking place in the court of history remains of this democratic order. Will the elected government be able to make a difference in the lives of the ordinary Pakistanis? Will it be able to give them peace, rule of law and good governance? From fighting corruption, boosting economic growth, ensuring prosperity and political stability to getting rid of the scourge of religious extremism and terrorism – the elected government’s performance will be judged on these vital issues and not secondary ones that hold no value for the present or the future of this country. 
The state institutions should work in tandem and not be seen as competing against one another. The very narrative that this or that institution needs to be dominant is a flawed one. The adventurist souls among the civilian setup must abandon their dream of transforming and treating the armed forces as the Sindh or the Punjab Police.
The best bet to safeguard democracy is the civilian setup’s ability to raise the bar of its performance. This it can do by providing clean and efficient governance and tackling some pressing issues, including fighting terrorism and extremism, that make Pakistan one of the most dangerous and lawless countries of the world. The Sharif government must redo its list of priorities.

Brinkmanship Won’t Pay

By Amir Zia
April 14, 2014
The News

The onus of making democracy work and deliver primarily lies on the elected government. The politics of confrontation on non-vital issues will only push the vital ones on the backburner. And then, there is always a price attached to the politics of dare. 

It is not an everyday occurrence that Pakistan’s army chief warns distracters against undermining the military’s institutional morale. It is also unusual that a couple of federal ministers have to repeatedly clarify that the target of their recent contentious statements was not the armed forces, but a former military ruler. 
While Army Chief General Raheel Sharif in his rare statement last week vowed that the military will “resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional pride,” the two ministers also appear unrepentant for their harsh remarks ridiculing General (r) Pervez Musharraf.
This apparent tiff between the government and the army certainly serves as an ominous sign for the country’s fragile democratic process even if it has not become alarming at this stage.
The fundamental question that remains is: what forced the army chief to issue this stern warning that reflects the collective sentiment of the armed forces? Certainly a couple of irresponsible statements by the two federal ministers alone could not have triggered this reaction. This highlights the problem within civil-military relations and the feeling of distrust that seems to be growing between these two important institutions at a time when the Pakistani security forces and agencies remain the prime target of various anti-state political and militant groups as well as foreign powers.
The discontent of the armed forces at this stage is more telling; since the return of democracy in 2008, the military leadership has firmly supported democracy and democratic institutions despite serious reservations about the alleged mega-corruption and misrule under the PPP-led government. The military has also backed the democratic transition from one elected government to another following the 2013 general elections.
In a way Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif got an ideal start to his third stint in power as there has been an overwhelming consensus among all the institutions, including the army, about the supremacy of the constitution and continuation of the democratic process. 
This intra-institutional honeymoon, however, seems to be short-lived. Military insiders blame the recklessness of the civilian leadership in handling important issues for the strained ties, but they admit that the tussle has not crossed the Rubicon.
Government stalwarts also appear confident that Prime Minister Sharif will not allow his government’s tensions with the mighty military establishment to aggravate or get out of control.
The calculated brinkmanship by some close confidants of Prime Minister Sharif is seen as an attempt to ‘gradually’ bring the civilian leadership in an assertive role and push the boundaries of elected institutions a little further.
The small trusted coterie around Sharif thinks that the timing to achieve the target of bridling the army’s influence and establishing ‘their’ supremacy could not have been better.
The obvious basis of this civilian leadership’s assumption is; the army remains too bogged down and over-stretched because of the grave internal and external security challenges it faces. The country’s weak economy, governance issues and the fact that the US-led western powers support democracy and democratic institutions at least in Pakistan’s case – these are all seen together as restraining factors for the generals from adopting any ‘adventurous course.’
Some analysts also tend to believe that the military is no longer that powerful or the sole deciding factor in Pakistani politics as it once used to be.
In the mission to expand its turf, Musharraf is not just one easy symbolic punch-bag for the government, but the former military ruler’s trials and tribulation also help settle the personal scores of the Sharif family and their loyalists.
Indeed national opinion remains fragmented over former army chief’s trial for his ‘secondary sin’ of enforcing the Nov 3, 2007 emergency, and is causing discontent and resentment within the ranks of the armed forces. But the treason charges against Musharraf and the indirect approach adopted by Sharif’s key cabinet members to criticise, attack and undermine the institution of the armed forces is not the only factor that bedevils civil-military relations.
There are several other important issues on which the civilian and the military leaders do not see eye-to-eye despite repeated claims by top government officials that the two sides remain on the same page. The foremost is the way the government is handling and holding talks with the Al-Qeada linked local militants, responsible for killing more than 45,000 civilians and approximately 5,000 security personnel during the more than a decade long conflict.
The armed forces – long been declared as enemy number one and a legitimate target by Al-Qaeda and all its affiliate and inspired local militant groups – have their concerns about this policy of appeasing the Taliban and yielding too much in too little time including the release of some militants without any substantial gains.
The talks have already hit a deadlock as accepting many of the key demands of the militants is beyond the powers of the civilian negotiators.
The military leadership rightly refuses to pull troops out of the troubled tribal areas. There are also question marks whether the army will be able to forget and forgive those terror masterminds that ordered and executed attacks on sensitive defence installations across Pakistan and killed and beheaded soldiers.
The passionate defence of the killers of Pakistani soldiers by some federal ministers and attempts to legitimise these groups by holding direct talks with them as equal stakeholders is also creating resentment among the soldiers and their families which have given immense sacrifices in this protracted conflict.
The release of hardened militants is also a knotty question despite the inclination to do so by Sharif’s security affairs think-tank led by Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan. Setting the pace of the process of improving ties with India also remains a divisive issue, though the GHQ supports the peace overtures with New Delhi. 
Instead of managing the civil-military relations with caution, maturity and in the spirit of building institutional consensus, the Sharif government appears to be treading the same old confrontationist path that failed this ruling party in the past when it had two-thirds majority in parliament. 
Agreed that the constitution and parliament remain supreme in a democratic setup, but the overtly simplistic and selective interpretation of these notions can be self-defeating and dangerous for the democratic institutions that continue to work in a flawed and dysfunctional manner.
Using these notions as mere slogans and based on the narrative set by a section of the popular media, which often fails to understand and appreciate the complex nature of intra-institutional relations, the complexity of statecraft and politics can unnecessarily pit one institution against the other.
Instead of the desire to dominate, the civilian leaders must focus on building consensus and developing a harmonious working relationship within institutions. This can only be done by shunning the politics of brinkmanship, curbing the desire of administrating personal vendetta, and taking into account the concerns of all the other stakeholders.
The civilian leadership also needs to set its priorities right and make a clear-cut demarcation between what is important for the country at this stage and what is not.
The onus of making democracy work and deliver primarily lies on the elected government. The politics of confrontation on non-vital issues will only push the vital ones on the backburner. And then, there is always a price attached to the politics of dare. 
Who should know this better than Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif? Twice in the past he has paid the price of confrontation and picking fights too early. Should he go for the same course of action a third time again? Whatever hardliners around him may say, the prime minister must adopt a sensible course which brings the political heat and temperatures back to normal.

The Battle Of Ideas

By Amir Zia
Monthly Hilal
March 2014

The state institutions have the national duty and international responsibility to ensure that Pakistani territory is not being used by the non-state actors to foment terrorism within the country or across the globe. Let there be no ambiguity on this count... The policy of appeasing terrorists and violent non-state actors has not worked in the past. It is not going to lead us anywhere now. 

A leading English-language monthly magazine carried Pakistan’s founding father Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s caricature on the cover of its February issue, showing him espousing a beard instead of the familiar clean-shaven face we all know and love. The shocking cover attempted to symbolize efforts made by
handful of extremists and violent non-state actors to distort and tarnish our revered leader’s vision of a prosperous, moderate and progressive Pakistan.
The alteration of Quaid-e-Azam’s image ignited some intense debate on the social media and concerned circles, but perhaps it’s a topic for a different forum where values and ethics of journalism are under the microscope. In the larger scheme of things, the cover is just another small manifestation of the ideological chasms in our society that remains caught in the vortex of unabated incidents of terrorism and violence for the past many years.
The vital question, however, is whether these ideological differences have seeped into the hearts and minds of majority of Pakistanis or confined to the small and organized minority, holding our entire country hostage to their extremist views? What are the aspirations and dreams of majority of Pakistanis, who are proud of
their Muslim identity and want to carry on with their lives holding both modernity and tradition hand-in-hand? Equally important are Pakistani Christians, Parsis, Hindus and other religious groups that have as much stake in the country as Pakistani Muslims.
As a whole, this Pakistani majority today is pitted against the organised and violent parochial forces, which stand against the tide of times and want to push the country into strife and discord on narrow sectarian and religious lines and international isolation.
This is more or less a similar challenge Sir Syed Ahmed Khan faced when he tried to introduce modern education and rational thinking among Muslims following the demise of Mughal Empire in the subcontinent in the 19th the challenge which Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal had to confront when he wrote “The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam” and tried to mobilize and rejuvenate Muslims through his splendid Urdu and Persian poetry. And this was the monumental task Quaid-e-Azam found at hand when he was tirelessly leading the struggle for an Independent homeland to ensure the political and economic rights of the South Asian Muslims.
All these icons of our freedom struggle were rejected, ridiculed, attacked and even branded “infidels” by the small bands of fundamentalists, who remained opposed to the very idea of Pakistan. But the Muslim masses rejected this fundamentalist minority and followed the modern and moderate Muslim leaders of their times.
Unfortunately today again in the sacred name of Islam, heirs of the same dark anti-Pakistan forces are trying to shake the foundations of the world’s lone nuclear-armed Muslim state. Ideologically, this internal enemy is no different than what the founding fathers of this nation were pitted against. It is the proverbial tussle --
tolerance versus intolerance, moderation versus extremism, order versus disorder, progress versus regression and true Islam versus the narrow-minded religious beliefs flaunted by the misguided ones.
Leaders of the Pakistan Movement overcame this challenge with flying colours. The mark of their achievement is Pakistan itself. Now it is up to this generation to keep our crescent and star studded flag fluttering high when it is being attacked by the similar internal, but a more lethal enemy.
A small, fringe minority of al-Qaeda-infected extremists have imposed a deadly war on Pakistan, its key state institutions, including the armed forces, and the people. To justify all their barbaric killings and cowardly acts of terrorism, they present a hotchpotch ideology which is an amalgamation of a highly flawed interpretation of Islam, a confrontationist worldview and regional and global political ambitions presented in the garb of religion. The bitter fact is that these forces are incompatible with the modern age and times.
Some of the fundamentalist and rightwing parties that historically fared poorly in electoral politics and represent the same forces opposed to the creation of Pakistan have emerged as their main apologist and cheerleaders.
They are trying to confuse the issue of terrorism and extremist violence in Pakistan by linking it to the US/NATO presence in Afghanistan and opposing the legitimate efforts by the state to establish writ on its territory. The heart of the conflict remains that militants and their supporters are trying to undermine the state and its institutions, establish a state within state, impose a controversial ideology that has few takers in the country and use our territory for global terrorism. Can any modern state allow this? The answer is a firm ‘no.’

The state institutions have the national duty and international responsibility to ensure that Pakistani territory is not being used by any group of non-state actor to foment terrorism within the country or across the globe. Let there be no ambiguity on this count.
One silver-lining in this tussle remains that all the extremist forces and their supporters even if put together do not represent the real Pakistan and the aspirations and dreams of majority of Pakistanis, who want peace, education, economic development, order and rule of the law.
A close scrutiny of these violent and radical religious forces shows that they are not a cohesive and integrated ideological force as they might appear or want us to believe. They suffer from inherent contradictions in their narrative, unbridgeable theological differences and remain divided because of their narrow vested interests.
This means that they may have the near to mid-term ability to continue carry on their deadly acts in the absence of a decisive action against them, but can never emerge as a force that can bring down the state, let alone ambitions to fulfill their pipe-dream of creating a new system – for better or for worse.
After the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union’s forces from Afghanistan, the Afghan insurgents brandishing more or less similar ideology resorted to infighting as they miserably failed to create a system for peace and stability in their war-ravaged country. They could not raise themselves above the level of mere proxies against the backdrop of complex great game being played among the regional and global forces to emerge as a unifying force in their country. The few years of the Afghan Taliban rule (1996-2001) was mainly at the back of foreign support, but it too failed to bring unity and peace in Afghanistan. Luckily, Pakistan, despite its set of some grave problem and challenges, is not Afghanistan. As a state, Pakistan’s socio-economic structure and strong institutions -- in which the armed forces remain the mainstay -- are far more advanced and strong than its landlocked neighbour. The drag of the archaic feudal and tribal pockets gets offset by Pakistan’s large urban-base, vibrant trade, commerce and industry, mid-level farmers and strong educated middle and lower middle classes.
Whatever the prophets of doom might say, we as a nation have the capacity and ability to overcome the challenge posed by the violent extremist forces. Whenever our armed forces have been called into action against militants -- responsible for more than 50,000 deaths of our civilians and security personnel -- over the last 12 years or so, they have managed to contain and put them on the ropes.
Then what is the reason that this challenge continue to stay as a festering wound?
One main reason is the absence of a holistic approach, especially since 2008, in confronting these terrorist organisations and smashing their infrastructure.
The first and foremost task remains creating a political and ideological narrative that squeezes space for the extremist mindset on which terrorists thrive, breed and multiply. Unfortunately this is one important front where the country is found lacking the most. The onus of producing such a counter-narrative -- which celebrates and advances moderation, modernity, tolerance, writ of the state, pluralism of our society and the constitution -- lies collectively on the mainstream political parties and the civilian leadership.
They have to show the vision and take initiative in the battle of ideas and create space in which the armed forces can do their job. They need not reinvent the wheel. The ethos of Pakistani society, our freedom struggle and the values and dreams of the country’s founding fathers provide its basis. Our leadership only has to articulate, restate and reassert this vision in clear-cut terms and align it with the modern-day challenges and realities.
This vision of a modern, strong and forward-looking Pakistan has no space for religious bigotry, intolerance and sectarian hatred in line with the golden humanitarian tenets of Islam. It rejects any discrimination on the basis of sex, sect and religious or ethnic identity. It calls for universal education. It guarantees to protect the life, honour, liberty and property to each and every citizen of Pakistan.It envisions pro-people governance and the rule of law.
Blowing up of schools, hunting down polio vaccinators, killing civilians, bombing markets and places of worship and targeting the armed forces and sensitive defence installations have no justification in the religious or any other ideological narrative.
The policy of appeasing terrorists and violent non-state actors has not worked in the past. It is not going to lead us anywhere now. It is time to be a little self-critical. It is time to explore where we have been lacking so far in countering the twin ghost of terrorism and religious extremism. It is time to come on the front-foot and concentrate on winning the battle of ideas first in which the civilian leadership, the civil society and the media all have to play their role and assist the armed forces so that they combat the extremists effectively and decisively.
Tied to this battle of ideas are the tasks of reforming the education system, including seminaries, promoting literacy and working for the social and economic uplift of the poor.
The administrative measures such as drying up the funding resources of terrorist groups and rehabilitation programmes for their militants also need to go hand-in-hand in a more comprehensive manner and of course at a larger scale. Effective prosecution of the accused and lifting of the moratorium on death penalty, which is
only benefiting convicts involved in heinous crimes and acts of terror, also remain an important aspect in fighting terrorism and extremist mindset.
These are some of the vital measures which the leadership needs to support and initiate. The operational aspect of containing and fighting militants is the job of the security forces in which the Pakistan Army remains the vanguard. The security institutions know their job. It is the civilian leaders who need to create conducive atmosphere in which our soldiers can perform their national duty in an effective manner. And the first step to eliminate this internal threat starts with the presence of political will. The will to transform Pakistan according to the dream envisioned by Pakistan’s founding fathers. The gauntlet is there. Someone has to accept this challenge.

On A Slippery Slope

By Amir Zia
April 7, 2014
The News

Satisfying the Jamaat-e-Islami’s cadre and expanding its clout, especially in electoral politics, will be a tough call for its new chief at a time when Islamic hard-liners are coming up with advanced slogans and resorting to do or die actions

In the more than 70-year-long history of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the first-ever refusal of a majority of its members to reselect their sitting chief for the party’s top slot is no ordinary event. This major deviation from the party’s long-set convention highlights the rethinking and ideological tussle about the strategy within its ranks, which remains a dominating question these days for many Islamic groups not just in Pakistan but the world over.
Syed Munawar Hasan, 72, the Jamaat’s outgoing ameer, had long symbolised its old inflexible, non-compromising ideological face. Leaders like him, indeed, remain a fast dwindling breed in the mainstream political and religious parties in this day and age of politics of expediency and pragmatism.
Sirajul Haq, 52, is Munawar Hasan’s much younger successor and is seen as a populist, practical and flexible politician. His ‘unique selling point’, according to Jamaat insiders, remains his vast experience of working in the corridors of power as a senior provincial minister and ability to get along with diverse set of political allies. He reportedly edged passed Hasan in the selection process by a narrow margin to emerge as the Jamaat-e-Islami’s long-term bet for the future.
The Jamaat is likely to redefine its politics under the new chief, who apparently is closer to the late Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s brand of popular politics than Munawar Hasan’s puritan and often confrontationist style.
Ironically, while Munawar Hasan’s political approach failed to expand the Jamaat-e-Islami’s clout in the electoral politics, Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s efforts to do so also came to naught despite diluting the party brand in the form of the Pakistan Islamic Front in the early 1990s and through politics of alliances in the later years.
However, both the radical and populist schools of thought remained committed to working within the democratic system rather than resorting to force or violence for the implementation of Shariah as advocated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan commander Omar Khalid Khurasani in his message to Sirajul Haq.
Which of these options suits the Jamaat more remains a fundamental question not just for its leadership, but perhaps all the Islamic groups striving to seize power in the world’s lone nuclear-armed nation or any other Muslim country.
One may love or hate Munawar Hasan for his blunt, provocative and controversial statements, but he is being seen as representing that idealist mindset which strived for a radical change in the society by remaining within the system.
For many Jamaat supporters and rivals alike, calls for an ‘Islamic revolution’ and yet struggling within the ambit of the constitution remain the biggest dichotomy of this party’s politics and an inherent flaw in its ideological narrative. The Jamaat-e-Islami’s radicals, including Munawar Hasan, appear deeply torn between their desire to work for their ultimate goal of Islamic revolution and their commitment to stay within the ambit of the system.
This delicate ideological balancing was possible during the cold-war era when the local Islamic forces, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, were aligned with Pakistan’s civil and military establishment and the US-led alliance comprising western powers and the conservative Muslim countries against the ‘evil Soviet Empire’ and the common threat of communism. But after the end of the cold war, many Islamic non-state actors, including masterminds of Al-Qaeda, turned their guns toward their western allies of yesteryears, leaving the mainstream Islamic parties in a lurch.
The protracted unresolved conflicts, including those of Palestine and Kashmir, and the apparent western hegemony and the alleged exploitation of resources in the Muslim lands fuelled the anger of Islamists in all parts of the world. These radicals also declared war against those Muslim rulers and institutions seen as ‘collaborators’ and ‘friends’ of Washington and its allied western countries.
In this post cold-war scenario, organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami faced an unprecedented challenge emitting from the hard-line non-state actors, who upped the ante of both ideological narrative and action though militancy – branded as ‘jihad’ or holy war.
This has resulted in the squeezing of space for the old-style, conventional Islamic parties, which offered high-sounding lip-service to the Islamic causes, but worked within the framework of the law.
Even when these conventional religious forces dabbled in militancy, it was with the blessings and support of their establishment as is the case with the Jamaat-e-Islami – among the first groups to provide gun-fodder from Pakistan in the US-sponsored Afghan resistance against the Soviet forces during the 1980s. However, this flirting with militancy was strictly regulated.
On the domestic front, the Jamaat despite being the main proxy in both Afghanistan and occupied Kashmir conflicts, by and large showed a policy of restraint when it came to advancing its goals within the country through the use of muscle power.
The Jamaat’s much touted organised street power and stick and gun-wielding youngsters belonging to the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT), who ruled most major campuses across Pakistan during 1980s and 1990s, today appear as ‘innocent moderates’ if compared with the new generation of Islamic militants involved in terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, that target civilians and security personnel across Pakistan and responsible for more than 50,000 killings.
This radicalisation blunted the influence and importance of the conventional religio-political parties and created confusion within their ranks. No wonder many hard-liners and young members of the Jamaat and its student wing directly joined hands with Al-Qaeda or formed terror cells of their own. A number of Al-Qaeda operative were given refuge by Jamaat members in their houses. This Al-Qaeda inspired dissent penetrated not just the Jamaat but other Islamist groups as well.
From being the main bulwark of the Islamic movement only a few years ago, the Jamaat-e-Islami saw its role and influence diminishing, especially after the former military-led government ended its support to the Afghan Taliban and joined the US-led war against terrorism in the post-9/11 days.
For ideological Jamaat leaders like Munawar Hasan this about-turn in the establishment’s policy was a shocker. There was a sense of betrayal that the Jamaat and its likes were used and then abandoned. He expressed his anger by refusing to condemn acts of terrorism in Pakistan, dubbing terrorist kingpins as martyrs and questioning the sacrifices of Pakistani soldiers killed in the line of duty. His strongly worded statements popularised him among hothead Islamists, but went against the grain of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s politics – one apparent reason for his downfall.
Unlike some other Islamic groups including the Jamaat-ud Dawah, which openly declared terrorism carried out in Pakistan against the tenets of Islam, the Jamaat was seen as an apologist for the actions of the local Taliban and pursued a highly unpopular line.
Munawar Hasan’s decision to boycott the May 2013 elections in Karachi and his rigid and non-comprising style of politics also alienated this aging Jamaat ideologue. Perhaps sensing the mood, he first declined to run in his party’s latest process of selection for the ameer, but he was asked by the Shura to remain a candidate.
The rise of moderate and populist Sirajul Haq to the top slot is likely to help the Jamaat-e-Islami repair its ties with the military establishment in the mid-term. However, a bitter fact remains that many of the strengths of the Jamaat’s new leader are seen as weaknesses by radicals.
He will face pressure from both the sides of the Islamist divide – those who want to work within the system and those wanting to take it on. Going by the party’s recent selection verdict, Sirajul Haq is likely to distance the party from extremists and violent Islamist forces.
But satisfying the Jamaat’s cadre and expanding its clout, especially in electoral politics, will definitely be a tough call for the new ameer at a time when Islamic hard-liners are coming up with advanced slogans and resorting to do or die actions.
How the Jamaat-e-Islami will perform the high-wire act between these competing trends within the Islamic movement is perhaps a $1.5 billion question. For now the Jamaat appears to be on a slippery slope and seems to be struggling for direction.