Back In The Line Of Fire

By Amir Zia
March 24, 2013
The News

Staging a coup and calling shots while in uniform is one thing and being a vulnerable civilian is totally a different ballgame. Musharraf will have to adjust and adapt himself to this changed, tough reality.

Former president Pervez Musharraf has played yet another gamble – this time by deciding to return to Pakistan at a time when the country stands just less than 50 days from the general elections. Any rational review of his war-inventory and battle-preparedness would reveal that most cards are decked against him.
To begin with, his All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) is still a paper tiger. The APML is devoid of notable politicians and lacks organisational structure and political cadre. Most of the politicians who were patronised and cultivated by the retired general during his nine-year rule have already joined various traditional political parties. Those who are still with the former king’s party – the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam Group) – are in an electoral alliance with the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP). At the most, Musharraf will be able to attract some feather-weight politicians who have been unable to find any takers in the major parties.
The argument that the APML needed Musharraf’s presence in the country to attract some big names in its folds and build a team carries weight, but the former president is landing in Pakistan a little too late for this. The electoral battle lines have already been drawn and there is hardly any time left to organise or reorganise the party.
Secondly, Musharraf’s hopes to forge an alliance with his former allies will also be a hard bargain to strike. His former allies, including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), will have to think twice before offering him any tangible support. Under the changed political circumstances when the rightwing narrative dominates Pakistan, Musharraf with all his efforts for the UN-backed war on terrorism and close alliance with the United States, will prove more of a liability than a winning card. At the most, Musharraf may secure support for his own seat – which too will come with a heavy political price tag.
But the absence of a team and the dearth of political allies are not the only challenges the former military ruler faces. The bigger challenge will come from the superior judiciary, which is hearing a number of high-profile cases against him including those of the assassinations of Benazir Bhutto and Akbar Bugti, the Lal Masjid operation and the confinement of 62 judges. How Musharraf faces the heat of the court rooms will be a test of his endurance and nerves. The judges and the ex-general have a history and some bitter memories. The face-off would indeed be an interesting affair.
Yes, staging a coup and calling shots while in uniform is one thing and being a vulnerable civilian is totally a different ballgame. Musharraf will have to adjust and adapt himself to this changed, tough reality, which is indeed not an easy task. Although, conventional wisdom believes that the mighty institution of the army will not ‘tolerate’ its ex-chief being in trouble, Musharraf’s presence in Pakistan will be more of a headache than a relief for the military leadership in the current situation. Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in particular, would have preferred that his former mentor and boss remained happy and secure in foreign lands.
Many of Musharraf’s well-wishers realise that the number of his powerful foes on the home turf exceeds the number of his friends. Starting from Mian Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League to the disgruntled Baloch nationalists, and from the religious parties to the born-again democrats that include Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf, the list of politicians who have an axe to grind with the country’s former strongman is indeed a long one. Musharraf will be an easy punchbag for them all, both literally and metaphorically.
But the opposition by traditional political rivals will be akin to a walk in the park for Musharraf if one considers the threat to his life, which comes from al-Qaeda and local militants of all hues. Musharraf had several close encounters with death when he was in power. But perhaps militants will be breathing at his neck again more closely now as he is no more the army chief and president. Will his private security arrangements and the ones provided by the government be enough to keep him out of the reach of lurking assassins and suicide bombers? Pakistan of today is a much more dangerous and lawless place than the one Musharraf left in 2008. He will be practically walking through a minefield every day in Pakistan.
Given these odds, what chance does Musharraf have of keeping himself afloat in the murky waters of the country’s politics or of carving out a role for himself? Even some of Musharraf’s ardent fans and close aides are sceptical of his decision to return to the country, though they talk of behind-the-scene guarantees from the military establishment, Riyadh and even Washington.
But the hard fact is that similar guarantees were also given to former premier Benazir Bhutto. They could not save her from the bomb and gun attack in Rawalpindi weeks after the first suicide attack on her in Karachi on October 18, 2007. Who could know better than Musharraf what happened to Bhutto with whom he struck a deal and promised and delivered the National Reconciliation Ordinance? Ironically, Musharraf finds himself in a more or less similar situation today – but without the following of a mass party.
Then what prompts his return?
According to one of his aides, the hurly-burly of elections offer the best opportunity to Musharraf to stage a return. The focus will not be solely on him. All his political opponents and foes will be busy targeting one another during their election campaign. The compulsions of practical electoral politics for the main players are likely to override their dislike for Musharraf – at least for the time being. This will provide a chance for him to create some space for himself in the post-2013 elections scenario. He may find some willing allies after the elections, at least on the opposition benches, if he can survive his hard landing and prove his mettle in the initial uncertainties and challenges following his return to Pakistan.
Therefore, it was now or never for Musharraf, who by nature remains an adventurous soul and often thrives on brinkmanship and games of dare. It is second nature to him. From his controversial adventure in the mountains of Kargil, he managed to find the route to power in Islamabad. But then he was the all-powerful army chief.
Today, he is seen as small fry on Pakistan’s complicated political chessboard, though in many middle and upper middle class Pakistani homes his name still evokes nostalgia and "politically incorrect" inspiration, given the high price the country has paid during the five-year democratic rule in terms of economic mismanagement, the crumbling writ of state and the spike in violence and terrorism.
However, this fond nostalgia for the days gone by can’t help Musharraf much in making him a heavyweight player in the country’s power politics again. Will he be able to prove his critics wrong and manage to bounce back with a bang? His chances are indeed slim, but if one were Musharraf, it would be worth a try.
After all, a man misses all those shots which were never attempted.

The General Speaks

By Amir Zia
Wednesday, March 06, 2013
The News

For the leader of a force that has sacrificed so much in the war against terror and is seen as the number one enemy by the local Taliban and their Al-Qaeda allies alike, these doubts and questions about its role and intentions should be worrying
Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Parvez Ashfaq Kayani, one of the most influential players on Pakistan’s power chessboard, may not have a ready-made answer to every challenge the country faces today, but he is indeed a politically correct and astute person. Issuing bombastic statements has never been his style. He is cautious, calculated and economical with words and likes to define himself as a general who takes into account ‘the grey area’ before deciding to act.
No wonder when a large group of senior journalists met him on a lazy Sunday afternoon in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, the general made sure that the politically correct message of constitutional supremacy, timely elections and peaceful transfer of power came across right at the start. The army chief’s talk, originally meant as an off-the-record session, eventually ended up as a widely reported, quoted and discussed event, though at first its contents hit the headlines in bits and pieces.
The credit of getting the embargo lifted should go to some persuasive journalists, who managed to get a nod from General Kayani and senior Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) officials to allow them to report part of the ‘politically correct’ message. Following the initial green signal, the media on its own expanded the scope of reporting, making a select part of General Kayani’s talk public. But even if the entire event has been reported verbatim, the army chief hardly uttered a word which could be deemed controversial. The general knows the art of speaking his mind and yet be mindful not to throw a loose delivery.
General Kayani’s widely reported strong pro-democracy stance should undoubtedly help calm the nerves of many front-line politicians, who till recently saw a grand establishment-backed conspiracy to derail the country’s fragile, but highly controversial and dysfunctional, democratic system. However, the general attempted to put at rest all the plots of a direct military intervention or installation of an army-backed technocrat setup for a longer-term in his opening remarks by saying that there would be no action outside the ambit of the constitution or the law. He also reiterated his commitment to the peaceful transfer of power to the majority party, saying that the army has no favourites.
However, Kayani’s commitment to democracy must have disappointed many of those civilians and men-in-uniform, who remain concerned about the crumbling writ of the state, growing lawlessness, challenge of extremism and terrorism, economic mismanagement, mis-governance and rampant corruption in the country. The critics of the current democratic setup advocate extraordinary measures, saying that the majority of the ruling elite members, who make it to parliament through elections, do not have the will and ability to tackle these extra-ordinary challenges.
But Kayani has resisted the temptation of acting as a saviour during both his terms as COAS. This aligns him to the politically correct ones, who see democracy – despite its high premium – as the only way forward. Whether Kayani’s belief in democracy is his vision or it stems from objective constraints remains a question that intrigues many analysts and political commentators. But if one talks of political correctness, then of course the general remains on the right side of the fence. In the last year in office as COAS before retirement, it is unlikely that he would upset the applecart despite all its rot.
While Kayani’s pro-democracy stance hit the headlines, it was the challenge of extremism and terrorism that consumed the bulk of Kayani’s time during his session with journalists. The general provoked some heated questions and debate when he said that one must differentiate between fundamentalists and extremists. “We all are fundamentalists because we believe in the principles of Islam”, he said. It is only the extremists, who need to be sorted out because they try to thrust their views using force and refuse to accept the point-of-view of the others, he said, explaining the stance that he also shares with his soldiers.
For some journalists, this definition of fundamentalism appeared too simplistic, especially in the Pakistani context where politically-motivated Islamists remain one step short of being extremists, and extremists one step short of being terrorists. Many members of the mainstream and highly organised and disciplined religious parties, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, have been found aiding and joining the Al-Qaeda-inspired militant groups responsible for targeting not just civilians, but also the nerve centres of the Pakistani armed forces.
The politicisation of religion has its cost, which the country has been paying dearly for a long time now. And ironically, the original sin of creating these monsters in the sacred name of Islam and jihad was committed by the military establishment itself during the dark days of former dictator General Ziaul Haq under the direct supervision of our American friends.
Although the military establishment has brought a sea change in its policy toward Islamist militant groups since 2002 and is trying to ensure that Pakistani territory should not be used to mastermind and launch terror attacks in other parts of the world and within the country, success has been limited. General Kayani blames this failure on the lack of political ownership of the war against terror, which prevents the army from going into top gear against militants.
The political fallout of any action against those seminaries and religious groups that directly or indirectly support extremism and terrorism seems to weigh heavy on the army chief’s mind. The same is the case for North Waziristan, where the army seems to find its hand tied despite the fact that this dangerous mountainous region remains the hub for all shades of local and foreign militants.
According to Kayani, another major obstacle in dealing with extremists and terrorists is the state’s inability to carry out an effective prosecution process.
The terror suspects, even if caught, hardly get convicted. Even if awarded death sentences in some cases, they have managed to escape execution because of the highly controversial decision of the PPP-led government to place a moratorium on the death penalty. During the last five years, one execution has been carried out in Pakistan, though more than 8,000 prisoners remain on death row. The gist of Kayani’s message remains that the armed forces are single-minded in confronting the challenge of extremism and terrorism. But at the same time, the general wants to tread this path carefully and sees the Afghan Taliban in a different context than the ones fighting Pakistani security forces and carrying out terrorist attacks across the country.
Some senior journalists, especially from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, spoke their hearts out as they gave details of the plight of their province and underlined the fast-eroding writ of the state and the establishment of a parallel power structure by militants there. The fear and dread of the local Taliban force people to corporate with them and dole out money in the name of the so-called ‘jihad funds’ even in a city like Peshawar, they said.
The political leadership wants peace talks with the Taliban because of fear and threat to their lives, a veteran from Peshawar pointed out. Politicians say that security decisions remain in the hands of the army leadership, said another senior journalist. People in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa feel that the state and security forces have left them at the mercy of the Taliban, he added.
General Kayani listened to the tirade by the journalists patiently, explaining his point of view on most questions and comments. But one may find it paradoxical that perception about the role of the army and its efforts in taking on militants are being viewed with scepticism by a strong section of the media. For the leader of a force that has sacrificed so much in the war against terror and is seen as the number one enemy by the local Taliban and their Al-Qaeda allies alike, these doubts and questions about its role and intentions should be worrying. After all, perceptions matter in today’s world. Who else but the COAS should know that better?