War Of Narratives

By Amir Zia

Monthly Hilal

The Pakistan Armed Forces' Magazine

September, 2015

The pseudo liberals criticize Pakistan and its security establishment for the alleged support to the religiously-motivated Afghan militants, while the religious extremists condemn and target the country exactly for the opposite reason; for fighting the Al-Qaeda-linked or inspired militants and destroying the safe havens of all foreign terrorists.

Two small, but motivated rival forces have long been trying to rule the public opinion in Pakistan. They are zealously pushing their competing narratives in schools, colleges, universities and seminaries to capture young minds. They are battling it out with each other in the mainstream media in an attempt to thrust their agendas. And they are trying to exploit the reach of the new media to propagate views and put across their messages. Despite deep fissures and countless variances within each of these forces, the westernized pseudo liberals and the religious extremists are two distinct groups, struggling to seize the national narrative.

But their ideological differences apart, these rivals also share some common traits.

For example, they both in their essence remain opposed to Pakistan and its basic idea apparently for conflicting reasons, yet aiming to achieve the similar outcome. If the so-called liberals think that the creation of Pakistan and the partition of British-India was a slip of history, the religious extremist, too, think in the same manner albeit under a different pretext. The religious extremists denounce the Freedom Movement and its achievement – Pakistan – because it clashes with their parochial, intolerant and theocratic worldview. Their rivals – the pseudo liberals – try to undermine the demand for a separate Muslim homeland in South Asia as a mere British conspiracy aimed at dividing India. By this naïve assertion, they ignore the strong demands of political, economic and social rights of Muslims, which culminated with the creation of Pakistan. The two rivals also appear on the same page in their criticism of Pakistan’s founding fathers and heroes of the Freedom Movement – from Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. If for the religious extremists these leaders were too open-minded, progressive and modern, their rivals declare them conservative, communal and pro-British.

In today’s context, these forces remain bitterly opposed to the Pakistan Armed Forces. For pseudo liberals, the security forces are the main stumbling block in their designs to make frontiers between Pakistan and India irrelevant. They justify their argument in the name of the so-called shared values, culture and history between the two states. The religious extremists stand at the other side of the pendulum and propagate that the armed forces are allies of the West and therefore, resorting to acts of terror against them remain justified.

The pseudo liberals criticize Pakistan and its security establishment for the alleged support to the religiously-motivated Afghan militants, while the religious extremists condemn and target the country exactly for the opposite reason; for fighting the Al-Qaeda-linked or inspired militants and destroying the safe havens of all foreign terrorists.

One can draw several other such parallels and dig deeper into the ideological stances of these two extreme views, which in a nutshell may appear contradictory, but aim to weaken and destroy Pakistan.

Many pseudo liberals, who also have been joined in by the leftists of yesteryears, will certainly raise eyebrows on what they might say the “audacity” of drawing similarities between them and their violent ideological rivals. Some can rightly say in their defence that unlike the religious extremists, they do not stand guilty of resorting to suicide bombings, explosions and acts of terrorism and sabotage, while others may like to draw attention toward their services for the EU-inspired human rights causes.

All this may be true, but the thrust of the argument is to highlight the commonalities of the two rivals. As far as actions are concerned, besides ideology, they are the result of many other factors, including strategy, the class and social backgrounds of activists, their political orientation and commitment.

The pseudo liberals overwhelmingly comprise mainly of the westernized and well-off middle, upper middle and elite classes, while the religious extremists draw most of their foot soldiers from the lower classes, especially from the rural areas and bank on select motivated individuals from the middle and upper-middle class as their ideologues, masterminds of complicated operations.

Both these rivals enjoy much more reach and clout in the traditional and the new media than their actual size in the society. For instance, pseudo liberals dominate the English-language press, which despite the small size, is seen influential because of its reach in the corridors of power. The so-called liberals freely run propaganda campaigns against the core national interests from undermining the Kashmir cause to that of the criticism on the country’s nuclear programme mainly in the English-language press, which serves as the main vehicle to highlight their small protests, conferences and other activities. They resort to propaganda against the country’s security agencies and the armed forces and try to portray them as rouge institutions. They also indulge in foreign-inspired advocacy campaigns in the name of human rights – by which they basically mean rights of criminals and terrorists. The organized, EU-backed campaign against the resumption of death penalty after last December’s barbarity at the Army Public School Peshawar is a case to point. As the national consensus stood solidly behind awarding capital punishment, the self-styled rights’ groups launched a drive to save the life of the child killer Shafqat Hussain by twisting facts and distorting evidence to prove that he was a juvenile when he kidnapped a seven-year-old boy and murdered him after sexual abuse. Their aim was to undermine Pakistan’s judiciary. Due to public pressure, the child killer was finally hanged to death in Karachi after evading death warrants at least half-a-dozen times.

Although the religious extremists do not have a direct clout on the traditional media, their apologist and allies in the mainstream religious and political parties help support their narrative. They urge for talks with terrorists – responsible for killing thousands of Pakistanis, including officers and soldiers of the armed forces – in the name of peace. There also are blatant attempts in the media to justify taking up arms against the state and arguments to support the policy of appeasement and reconciliation with the local and foreign terrorists, trying to run a state within the state. Such voices have bigger influence on the Urdu-language media, which has become a tool to propagate hate speech, intolerance, conservative ideas and ideals and twist the vision of Pakistan by attempting to paint it as a theocratic state. Such ideas are also reinforced by many pulpits and seminaries as well as big and small religious groups. Their narrow, myopic, flawed and confrontationist interpretation of the sacred religion of Islam creates favourable ground where extremist ideas breed and grow.

The extremists also have an organized propaganda machinery of their own and have mastered the art of using the new media. They are not just banking on the written word to disseminate propaganda, but use audios, videos and photographs through dedicated or third party websites and countless fake accounts on the social media. If any of these accounts get blocked, a new one is created under another fake identity.

However, the pseudo liberals and the religious extremists remain a minority in this country of more than 180 million people. Yet they have managed to create a lot of dust, which tarnishes Pakistan’s image and creates despondency, negativism and anger in the society. Ironically, the rational Pakistani nationalist narrative is missing from both the traditional and the new media. Even if it exists, it is disorganized and finds little space, though it articulates the aspirations and will of overwhelming majority of Pakistanis. What does this nationalist narrative mean in a nutshell given Pakistan’s present day challenges?

Firstly, it represents modernity rooted in our tradition, culture and religion. The same way, Pakistan’s founding fathers conceived and articulated it by investing in the modern education starting from Aligarh, Sindh Madrassatul Islam, Islamia College Peshawar and other modern education institutions, which in turn became the vanguard of the freedom struggle.

Secondly, it means rising above the bigoted sectarian, ethnic and provincial divide and promoting national cohesion and unity. This again remains the crux of the message of Pakistan’s founders, who managed to unite Muslims of South Asia for a single cause regardless of their class, ethnic, sectarian or provincial background.

Thirdly, it is establishing the writ of the state and rule of law in the country. This means zero-tolerance for armed groups and bands of non-state actors operating under any pretext. The state should ensure its monopoly over violence. The Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the crackdown on criminals and terrorists in Karachi are aimed at achieving this goal. Support to these causes is vital in the battle of ideas to achieve the goal of a peaceful and stable Pakistan as envisioned by its founders.

Fourthly, it should aim at making Pakistan’s defence impregnable against any direct aggression as well as the indirect soft invasion diluting our national cohesion and unity. This means unflinching support for the guardians of Pakistan’s frontiers – the armed forces – and countering those individuals, commercial organizations and media ventures working against Pakistan’s core interests.

And fifthly, it should promote the idea of economically prosperous, progressive and strong Pakistan to ensure not just the wellbeing and upward social mobility of citizens, but also guarantees peace and stability in the region. This was the dream of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali and his companions. The first key to achieve these goals is to aggressively and unapologetically dominate the battle of narratives and counter those tiny organized minorities of pseudo liberals and the religious extremists, who are trying to weaken Pakistan. It is time for the Team Pakistan to rise, make a difference and win this battle.

The Reckoning

By Amir Zia

Monthly Newsline

July 2015

Security officials say that the major political and religious parties are the “patrons, protectors and pals” of the criminal-cum-terrorist mafias operating in Karachi. “The military leadership, including the Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, raised the issue countless times at the provincial apex committee and other relevant forums. But, barring some laboured lip-service, the provincial government failed to initiate any meaningful steps.”

It is not yet an all-out declaration of hostilities but the long lingering distrust between the Asif Zardari-led PPP and the military establishment is in the full media glare now. Whether it will lead to any change in the power equation in Sindh in the near- or midterm or culminate in another uneasy political stalemate remains a pertinent question. One part of the answer to this question depends on the flexibility of Zardari, who is called a doctor by some of his admirers for his pragmatic solutions to grave problems. The other rests on how far top security officials are willing to push the envelope in their attempt to fix Sindh, and particularly Karachi, where crime and politics go hand-in-hand.

For Zardari and his loyalists, the PPP is again being pushed to the wall as they accuse the ‘military establishment’ of overstepping its domain.

The reason behind Zardari’s concerns is the way the Rangers openly accused influential politicians from Sindh of having ties with criminal and terrorist mafias in a statement issued on June 11.

However, what angered and panicked many of the PPP stalwarts most were the follow-up actions by the Rangers that included a raid at the Sindh Building Control Authority and arrest of the alleged corrupt officials seen as being close to the PPP high command. “If you do not stop, I will come out with a list of generals [accused of corruption] since Pakistan's creation," Zardari said in a hard-hitting speech while addressing an oath taking ceremony of newly-elected office bearers from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in Islamabad, before a charged crowd of party followers. “The army chiefs come and go every three years, but the political leadership stays,” the former president said, raising the tension level with the security establishment.

Even for many senior PPP officials, Zardari’s harsh words targeting the military top brass appeared out of sync with the public image he has carefully carved out for himself as a leader advocating national reconciliation, following the assassination of his wife and party chairperson, Benazir Bhutto.

All the anti-establishment opinions which Zardari expressed in whispers, behind closed doors and in small unofficial gatherings, became official as he took on the mighty establishment brazenly and openly in the wake of renewed focus of the Rangers on corruption, along with fighting terrorism and crime in urban Sindh. However, Zardari’s anti-army tirade is being seen even by some of his close associates as the mark of desperation rather than a well thought-out strategy. 

The reasons for desperation and alarm are obvious, according to a senior security official. The ill-gotten money trail often ends at a powerful political house, he said, without stating the obvious. A number of provincial ministers, friends and relatives are involved in the racket directly or through their front men, he added.

The mood in military quarters, indeed, appears grim – thanks to the tales of mega-corruption and organised, systematic crimes in which many of the important politicians are involved. No wonder then, that in the aftermath of his criticism of the army, Zardari found himself the prime target of various political and religious parties – including the ruling PML-N – as each one of them distanced itself from the PPP and put all their weight behind the armed forces.

The MQM, already under fire and in the shadows for its alleged involvement in crime and militancy and ties with India, appeared as the only political force offering support to Zardari. However, for many political observers, both the PPP and the MQM stand on common ground as far as their friction with the establishment is concerned. This makes them turn to one another despite their own, often, frosty relations and clash of interests over the control of Karachi. The closeness of these two main political forces belonging to Sindh, in their attempts to ward off army pressure, definitely adds one more complication in the already complicated scenario of Sindh politics – if seen from the perspective of the security agencies.

While many senior PPP officials are trying to control the damage done by Zardari’s remarks, these fireworks are a sign of the troubled nature of the party’s relations with the army in recent years.

The Sindh government, in an apparent move to ease tensions with the army, announced giving 9,000 acres of forest land in the Shikarpur district to the heirs of martyred soldiers and wounded war veterans. However, PPP insiders reveal that friction between their leader and the army is far from over. For Zardari, he has always been the target of a “ferocious” and “unjustified” media trial.

Despite spending more than a decade in prison under corruption charges, the authorities could not prove any of the cases against him. The latest allegations, seen from his point of view, are just another attempt to tarnish his already mutilated image. But from the security establishment’s perspective, Zardari & Company are incorrigible. The charge-sheet issued by the Rangers is a manifestation of the fast-growing strains between the provincial government and the men-in-uniform in managing the affairs of Sindh and confronting the twin ghosts of terrorism and crime in its capital, Karachi.

“The statement reflects the growing frustration of the security establishment with the state of affairs in Sindh,” confides a senior official of the Sindh Police, requesting anonymity. “The ties between crime and politics are too deep and the network too broad. Nowhere else in Pakistan does such a complex challenge exist.”

Security officials say that the major political and religious parties are the “patrons, protectors and pals” of the criminal-cum-terrorist mafias operating in Karachi. “The military leadership, including the Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, raised the issue countless times at the provincial apex committee and other relevant forums. But, barring some laboured lip-service, the provincial government failed to initiate any meaningful steps,” says a security official, privy to the meetings of the apex committee. The committee has been specially formed to bring the civil and military leadership on the same page in combatting terrorism and crime in Sindh. However, often these meetings – some of which are also attended by General Raheel Sharif, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former president, Asif Ali Zardari – usually end on an uncomfortable note for the PPP leadership. In one such meeting, when faced with severe criticism, the Sindh Chief Minister, Qaim Ali Shah, offered to tender his resignation but was stopped by Zardari, who said he could only resign if asked by the party. However, these differences in the apex committee meetings have so far been kept at a manageable level.

But the ever-deepening crisis of governance in Sindh, stories of mega-corruption and the ties between politicians, criminals and terrorist mafias, have transformed Karachi into one of the most dangerous and lawless megacities of the world.

The ongoing Rangers-led operation against terrorists and criminals has managed to achieve only limited results because, barring the tough action and crackdown by the law enforcers, the civilian government remains unable to do its bit by introducing reforms in the police and the judiciary, providing honest and efficient governance and severing ties between crime and politics. The Rangers’ charge sheet against the provincial government, in fact, says nothing which was not already known before.

The involvement of influential political personalities in Sindh in the multi-billion rupee racket of landgrabbing and extortion in Karachi has long been public knowledge. How this ill-gotten money is used to fill the coffers of super-rich politicians and their lackeys and finance the bands of thugs, militant and terrorist groups is also an open secret. The mention of the Lyari gangsters in the charge sheet – based on the report of Director General of Sindh Rangers, Major General Bilal Akbar, to the provincial apex committee – was also no revelation at all. Neither was the DG Rangers’ assertion that donations (collected in the name of charitable works, including the money from sale of hides of sacrificial animals), were being used to fund criminal activities and for the upkeep of the armed militant wings of political and religious parties. The Sindh Rangers chief hit the bull’s eye when he said that, along with fighting criminals, there remains a need to destroy the terror-funding empire, which flourishes mainly through landgrabbing and extortion. Political parties, city district governments and administrations, police officials, construction companies and real estate agents with ties to high-profile influential political personalities – all remain part of the racket and share in the daily booty worth billions of rupees.

“The problem is that Zardari has changed the complexion of the PPP and transformed it into a giant moneymaking business-venture,” says an old party zealot, who has now been thrown to the sidelines by the post-Benazir Bhutto leadership.

For veteran political commentator and journalist, Zahid Hussain, the PPP’s woes signify that it continues to remaingood in the opposition and bad in the government. “Unlike the past, the PPP was allowed for the first time to complete its term under Zardari’s leadership at the centre,” he said. “This is its second continuous term in the Sindh province. The PPP should offer no excuses for its appalling governance and public perception about its involvement in corruption. In Sindh it got a golden opportunity to rule, which is being squandered away.”

However, even the harshest critics of the PPP and the MQM admit that the two parties – despite the widespread impression of corruption and charges of their alleged involvement in patronising criminals and terrorists – will mostly maintain their electoral turf. The demands from various quarters to reset and reboot the system, starting with Sindh, are indeed growing.

But if the past is any guide, a limited or broad direct military intervention has yet to bring about a sustainable change for the better. In a dysfunctional and flawed democratic order, the reluctance of the civilian stakeholders in pursuing any meaningful reforms proves deadly for the entire system. The one option echoed at various quarters calls for a swift surgical operation not just against criminals and terrorists, but also the corruption mafia and its patrons. Thus, the existing democratic order will remain intact and relatively clean politicians will be allowed to run the show.

Will the establishment be able to make this old dream a reality? The skeptics say no. Attempts to oust controversial leadership failed in the past. Even the most demonised civilian leaders – from Nawaz Sharif to Asif Zardari – managed to bounce back after spending years in the political wilderness. Pakistan’s imperfect democracy is intertwined with the resource-rich scions of the ruling elite, comprising feudal and tribal leaders as well as the super rich industrialists and business people. The interesting part is that they have all managed to expand stakes in each other’s domain. Therefore, despite the never-ending circus on the media, just a Sindh specific rebooting of the system appears unlikely. The aggressive posturing will be there, but in the near-term there appears little threat to the system – no matter how evil and malfunctioning it may appear.

Having said that, the fact remains that the patience of a vast number of people is running thin in the wake of a grim law and order crisis, collapse of governance and the giant socio-economic challenges. Will the politicians of Sindh read the writing on the wall and take it as a warning shot to improve and reform? The present state of affairs is untenable and cannot be allowed to continue. Those in the driving seat will have to change not just the perception, but the reality, in Sindh. 

ENDS

Freedom & Responsibility

By Amir Zia

Monthly Hilal

The Pakistan Armed Forces' Magazine

August, 2015

Joseph Gobbels’ of today’s world are indeed more sophisticated, subtle and greater manipulators of information and disinformation. But unlike the Nazi spin-master, they don’t proclaim that “even propaganda must be mastered.” They just practice and apply it to the perfection, while holding the public posture that resorting to propaganda is something dishonourable, inferior and immoral

In this day and age of instant news, views and battle of ideas, building a national narrative is also a key national security challenge. Whether it is peacetime, an all-out war or a prolonged period of restrained, but cold hostilities, modern states – both democratic and authoritarian – are banking more and more on the soft-power of the mass media to articulate their values, vision and aspirations and promote political, diplomatic and economic interests.

Besides fulfilling the core responsibility of dissemination of news and information, mass media also plays a vital role in building national unity and cohesion on one hand and to divide, undermine, demonize and defeat the internal and the external enemies of the state on the other. The integrated, interdependent globalized world and the state-of-the-art communication technologies have only extended and expanded the reach of the mass media as was never seen before.

Joseph Gobbels’ of today’s world are indeed more sophisticated, subtle and greater manipulators of information and disinformation. But unlike the Nazi spin-master, they don’t proclaim that “even propaganda must be mastered.” They just practice and apply it to the perfection, while holding the public posture that resorting to propaganda is something dishonourable, inferior and immoral. However, among professional, practicing journalists and media persons the debate about press freedom remains as relevant as in the past. Being factual, fair, balanced and objective is still the defining international yardsticks of journalism. Yet, it is also a fact that the mainstream media – be it state-run or private – is very much part of the system and plays according to the rules of the game. The authoritarian states cannot be singled out for using mass media as a persuasive propaganda tool. The “free” media of Western democracies also remains aligned with their national narrative.

A cursory look of conflicts involving Western powers in the late 20th and 21st centuries shows how the mainstream media helped advance interests of their respective states. During 1980s – when the “free world” was pitted against the former Soviet Union and its ideological allies in Afghanistan’s proxy war – the Western media glorified words such as “jihad, mujahid and mujahedeen.” The conservative Afghan tribal culture did not bother the Western sensibilities. Every aspect of Afghan resistance was puffed-up and the tribal traditions romanticized – from the hardy ways of Pakhtoon warriors to that of their strict, puritan adherence to the Islamic code. The mainstream media of the Western democracies aligned itself with goals and aspirations of their respective states in the make-or-break struggle between capitalism and communism. In this conflict, the West saw Islamists as ideological allies and its media glorified them in news, views, movies and works of fiction. But this affair ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially the West became indifferent towards Afghanistan, but this indifference later transformed into all-out hostilities, which reflected in the media coverage of the religiously-motivated militants even in the pre-9/11 days. The mere presentation of facts in a news story – like “the Taliban force men to keep beards” and the “all-enveloping veil” for women – if seen from the Western perspective portrayed Islamists negatively. Words including holy warriors (Mujahideen) and holy war (Jihad) – once used in a positive manner assumed negative connotations against the backdrop of global war against terrorism.

Besides Afghanistan, the US-led Western powers’ other war theatre was the Middle East, which witnessed the first heavily televised conflict in 1990-91 First Gulf War. The US news channels – CBS, ABC and the emerging CNN of those times with its 24-hour coverage – brought this war inside the homes of viewers with non-stop live reporting. These channels helped form public opinion in favour of the conflict as was never done in the history on this mass scale and in such a short span.

The 2003 Iraq War started with the “noble” aim to defang Baghadad of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). This was the narrative orchestrated by the then US administration. The Western media proved an important partner of the US administration not just in shaping up domestic, but the world public opinion in favour of this war. However, the allegation of WMDs eventually proved wrong. But by that time Washington had achieved its goals.

One can give scores of other examples in which the Western media served as a tool to advance the goals of their respective states. Indeed, freedom of speech, diversity of opinion, openness, blunt critical views and breaking scandals are very much part and parcel of the ethos of the mainstream media in the West, but all this is allowed strictly within the ambit of the Western capitalist system. The West has taken upon itself the “sacred duty” of promoting and imposing its brand of democracy and notions of freedom and human rights as core international values. And the Western media serve as the flag-bearer of these concepts. Any alternative discourse or deviation from this “ultimate truth” is considered politically incorrect and flawed in a world dominated by the West.

However, while staying within the system, the Western media operates under an efficient regulatory framework. This means that freedom of expression comes with responsibility, which is not voluntary, but ensured through effective defamation and libel laws. The soft power exercised by the West through mass media, especially the United States, remains an important extension of their hard military, scientific, technological and economic power.

Among developing countries, India offers a strong imprint of soft-power. Indian movies, music, entertainment and news channels are making their presence felt as an effective propaganda tool and help in building image of the “new India,” which takes pride in its military and economic muscle. The Indian news channels are hawkish and known for zealously pushing the “state line” on all the internal security challenges – from curbing the freedom movement in the Indian occupied Kashmir to that of confronting separatists in northeastern India, including Assam, Nagalim and Tripura. There is an unapologetic display of fanaticism by Indian news channels when it comes to relations with Pakistan, which is held responsible even for a firecracker bang there. Regardless of which political party is in power in New Delhi, the Indian state and the media speak with one voice as they attempt to give centrality to terrorism in any diplomatic engagement with Pakistan and try to deflect attention from the core dispute of Kashmir. When the Times of India (ToI) and a major Pakistani media group launched their media-led “peace” movement a few years back, the difference of approach between them proved stark.

While the ToI restricted activities to a handful of track-II discussions and conferences in line with the state policy, its Pakistani counterpart went all-out to promote this campaign here. The local media group devouted entire pages in its Urdu and English language newspapers for this purpose, but the ToI did not carry such propaganda material.

Similarly, the ToI did not allocate any resources to operate propaganda website for this campaign nor pushed it on the news media. This entire operation was operated by its Pakistani counterpart. The local media group tried to involve Western diplomatic missions in this campaign in an attempt to build pressure on the state institutions, but the Indian media group remained committed to its country’s policy that any engagement between the two countries should only be bilateral. In Pakistan, the closed-door engagements with foreign diplomats remained focused on the premise that our armed forces are the main hurdle in relations with India. The campaign focused mainly on the promotion of cultural and economic ties – an old Indian demand – and pushed the core Kashmir dispute and other contentious issues on the back burner. This is only one among countless of such examples in which a key local media house tried to undermine the state institutions and hurt the core national interests.

A look at the Pakistani media scene reveals that it is mostly sensational and often driven by narrow commercial interests, particularly the mainstream news channels. No wonder, in recent years more and more Pakistanis are questioning the overall role and impact of these channels in the society.

If to count the positives, the private channels indeed expanded boundaries of coverage since the last military-led government liberalized the electronic media industry in 2002. Former president General Pervez Musharraf’s decision to end the state monopoly over radio and television brought pluralism and diversity in the news coverage. It allowed the electronic media to explore unchartered frontiers. No topic remained a taboo, making the local media one of the most lively, vibrant and candid in the entire region. However, since 2007 and onwards big media houses brazenly pursued political agendas and served their vested commercial interests at the cost of facts, fairness, balance and objectivity in journalism.

A couple of media tycoons began to see themselves as the “government makers,” assuming the role of prosecutor, judge and the executioner – all rolled in one. These players started promoting negativism with their round-the-clock sensational and superficial journalism, which unfortunately now holds the entire electronic media industry hostage. The sensational journalism is not restricted just for day-to-day politics, but also targets institutions, including the armed forces and undermines core national interests. The propaganda drive launched against the Inter-Services Intelligence by the same big media group after a gunmen wounded one of its anchorpersons in a firing incident in Karachi is a case in point. Similarly, some channels tried to undermine the armed forces and other security agencies while covering the low-scale conflict in Balochistan. Some media persons also tried to make the crackdown on al-Qaeda-linked or inspired foreign and local terrorists controversial. These artificially-created controversies, when our armed forces are confronting the biggest internal security challenges, raise doubts about the agenda of media owners and those toeing their line.

The method in the madness is also revealed the way some channels promote Indian content, which is akin to a soft-power invasion. Certain news channels are also trying to influence foreign and core security policy issues and have run foreign-funded advocacy campaigns. Such problems stem from the weak regulatory framework of the electronic media and the unwillingness of the state to impose its writ. The successive governments have also failed to revise the defamation and libel laws in line with the changed media scene, while the existing ones are not being implanted due to the flawed regulatory and judicial system. The media houses use their clout to stay out of the ambit of the law and dodge justice.

PEMRA – the main regulatory body – is unable to implement the basic conditions such as the one that bar channels from exceeding the allocated quota of advertisement in an hour, let alone effective monitoring of the transmission. Government authorities have to ensure that the mass media plays its role in the best of national interest. This means that news channels fulfill their core responsibility of informing and educating the masses as well as help raise the level of public discourse and awareness. Channels also need to promote national unity and highlight positives of the country by providing serious content rather than banking on sensational and shallow aspects of the news coverage. The mass media is too serious a business to be left on the dictates of narrow commercial interests and dubious political and foreign-backed agendas.

A Time To Kill

By Amir Zia

(A truncated version of this article appeared in the July, 2015 issue of monthly Newsline) 

The ramification of deciding cases on the basis of public perception or direct foreign or local pressure is indeed an ominous trend. State institutions and the government should not yield before such pressures. How Pakistan runs its judicial system is totally our business. The government also needs to give a tough warning to the EU and other foreign players not to blatantly interfere in Pakistan’s internal matters.

Convicted child-killer Shafqat Hussain got another lease of life when his execution, scheduled for June 9, was stayed for the fourth time, barely a few hours before the hanging. On whose orders the jail superintendent deferred the execution initially appeared a mystery as both the President House and the Ministry of Interior denied issuing any such directives. Also, there were no court orders to save Hussain’s life.

“It was Almighty Allah’s will, that’s all I can say,” said a senior jail official with a knowing smile at the Karachi Central Prison. “But eventually he will be hanged. It’s only a matter of time…The case has become a prestige point, both for the superior judiciary and those opposed to Shafqat’s execution.”

Jail authorities maintain that it was the Sindh government, which managed to prevent Shafqat’s hanging as only a day prior to it, a delegation, comprising diplomats from the key EU countries, met Sindh Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah, and urged him to play his role in saving Shafqat’s life. And the PPP government obliged by advising the jail superintendent to postpone the hanging, using the argument that another hearing of the case was due the following day.

The stay prompted an angry response from the federal government, underlining the fact that the tussle over Shafqat Hussain’s fate is far from over. In fact, this tussle has become a defining one in Pakistan where Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif partially lifted the moratorium on the death penalty in December 2014, following the deadly attack on an army-run public school in Peshawar. The national outrage over the massacre of more than 140 people, mostly children, created an unprecedented consensus on crushing terrorism and awarding the death penalty to those convicted for terrorism. In March 2015, the government lifted the moratorium on the death penalty for all heinous crimes under the constitution. 

The anti-death penalty campaigners were caught off-guard, as a broad national agreement emerged on lifting the controversial moratorium on the death penalty placed by the former PPP government in 2008. The moratorium had created a dichotomy in Pakistan’s legal system whereby the judiciary kept on handing down the death penalty under the constitution, but the executive arm was not implementing those orders.

Ironically, instead of going for a constitutional amendment to abolish the death sentence, the PPP, had chosen a short cut because of the fear of a backlash from powerful and radical Islamic groups, which view any attempts to scrap the death penalty as being against the tenets of Islam. Along with the Islamic groups, many secular nationalist Pakistanis, key-decision-makers in the judiciary, members of civil society and the bureaucracy, also oppose banishing the death penalty.

In the wake of this broad national consensus in favour of the death penalty, a few human rights campaigners went for an indirect approach to campaign against the death penalty by picking up Shafqat Hussain’s case. They came out with an allegation that Shafqat was under-age – barely 14 years old or so – when convicted for the kidnapping and murder of a seven-year-old child in 2004. Pakistan’s constitution bars capital punishment for persons under the age of 18 years. These groups also allege that Shafqat’s confession was gleaned through torture.

What followed was a sorry saga of distortion of facts and falsification of documents, including the birth certificate of the convicted killer – all rejected by Pakistan’s superior judiciary. Shafqat’s childhood photo was circulated on social media to win sympathy among the people and cast doubts about the judicial process.

The target appeared simple; sow suspicions about one case and undermine the entire system. But the Justice Project, which came out in Shafqat’s defence, picked the wrong case in an attempt to paint black as white.  

According to the police, it was an open-and-shut case of murder and kidnapping.

Shafqat was 23 or 24 years old when the crime was committed. The photograph taken at the time of Shafqat’s arrest is undeniable proof of this. The body of the victim was found based on information provided by Shafqat, who worked as a security guard at the Karachi apartment building from where the boy was kidnapped.

Shafqat continued to make telephone calls to the victim’s family even after murdering the child, in a bid to collect ransom and was arrested red-handed when he came to collect the money.

From the anti-terrorism court -- authorised to try kidnapping for ransom cases -- to the superior judiciary – all upheld the death verdict handed down to Shafqat. His appeal for clemency was rejected by the president.

All through his trial, the question of Shafqat’s age was never raised. And if some of the so-called rights campaigners are to be believed, then our entire judicial system failed to notice that it had been trying a boy aged barely 14.

The multiple appeals by the lawyers associated with the Justice Project in various courts, including the Islamabad High Court (IHC), failed to win any relief for Shafqat, who had exhausted all the judicial avenues. The IHC on May 21 dismissed the petition calling for the formation of a judicial commission to determine Hussain’s age and termed it unmaintainable. “Nothing has been placed before this court which would indicate any miscarriage of justice or a need for a probe,” IHC Justice Athar Minallah said.

However, the case was picked up by the foreign media which found the false story about the trial of a 14-year old prisoner and his planned execution sellable.

If foreign pressure, along with the local support, somehow manages to save Shafqat from the gallows, it will not just undermine Pakistan’s judicial system, but encourage other pressure groups to opt for similar tactics. These pressure groups can range from various shades of religious extremists to militant groups, which have a far bigger following and popular support base compared to those who are fighting the Shafqat Hussain case mainly on Twitter and Facebook.

The ramification of deciding cases on the basis of public perception or direct foreign or local pressure is indeed an ominous trend. State institutions and the government should not yield before such pressures. How Pakistan runs its judicial system is totally our business. The government also needs to give a tough warning to the EU and other foreign players not to blatantly interfere in Pakistan’s internal matters.

The local rights groups – even those working with the best of intentions – need to do some soul-searching. Unfortunately, they seem more concerned about advocating for the rights of convicted terrorists and criminals rather than standing up for the victims and their families. Of course, they have every right to lobby and campaign against the death penalty, but in their zeal they should not distort facts and forge documents as a handful of them did in Shafqat Hussain’s case.

These groups also need to take into account Pakistan’s priorities: The basic questions to ask are; Have there been more than 60,000 killings by terrorists and extremists (as in Pakistan) over the last one decade in any of those countries which have abolished the death sentence? Do they face similar challenges of crime and lawlessness as that of Pakistan? Is there any parallel between our economies? The answer to these and many other similar questions is a firm “no.” The government needs to hold accountable those people who, perhaps in pursuance of their own agenda, attempted to create confusion about Shafqat Hussain’s case through blatant lies and falsification of documents. Justice must prevail at every cost in line with the constitution of Pakistan.

COVER STORY: Partners, Never Friends

By Amir Zia
Monthly Newsline
March 2015

The list of Karachi’s wounds and grievances is endless, but are any of these issues on the agenda of the elected representatives, who are known more for their greed and corruption than their passion to serve the people?

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is again actively considering whether to rejoin the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led Sindh government or not. Adhering to the spirit of the overused cliché that there are no permanent friends or foes in politics, these two former allies have already decided to cooperate in the upcoming Senate polls – a sign of the growing thaw in their relations. The MQM hopes to get four senators against its retiring three with the PPP’s help in the Senate polls due on March 5.
Once the Senate elections are over, the MQM leadership will start discussions with the PPP the possibility of rejoining the treasury benches. According to sources in both the parties, half the battle for forging unity between these two main political players from Sindh has already been won in London, where Rehman Malik, a close aide of former president Asif Ali Zardari, has held detailed discussions with the MQM’s self-exiled leader, Altaf Hussain.

Malik has continued to enjoy warm relations with the MQM supreme leader regardless of the nature of ties between their parties on the volatile streets of Karachi. During the former PPP rule, when Malik was serving as interior minister, he was the point-person in keeping the MQM on the right side of Zardari – a task which he skilfully managed without offering the MQM anything substantial.
The MQM did sporadically make a big hue-and-cry in regard to various issues, including the support of some PPP stalwarts to Lyari gangsters, as well as the non-holding of local bodies polls. The slashing of powers of many city government departments and the growing control of the provincial government over them were also among the many points of dispute. And the MQM claimed that even the 60-40 per cent power and resource sharing formula between urban and rural Sindh was not being adhered to by the PPP.
But for most of the PPP government’s five-year term (2008-13), PPP negotiators managed to keep the MQM busy in one round of dialogue after another, without conceding to any of their major demands. All the while, the MQM kept threatening to quit the Sindh government. It even walked out of it several times – but only to rejoin after a few days.
The PPP and MQM members in the Sindh Assembly did enact the Sindh Peoples’ Local Government Act towards the fag end of the PPP’s last term, but holding of the polls under it never materialised. The MQM was then left with no choice other than to quit the provincial government shortly before the 2013 general elections, giving the PPP the justification to scrap the mutually agreed upon local bodies’ law altogether.
Since their parting of ways, the PPP leadership has expressed its desire to bring the MQM back into the fold of the provincial government several times.It is not for the numbers the PPP wants the MQM – it already enjoys a comfortable majority in the house. The MQM presence is needed to run Karachi smoothly, where big businesses and politicians of the ruling party have massive financial stakes and interests.
So will the MQM come on board and satisfy itself – as it did during the previous term of government – with just a few ministries and symbolic crumbs of power, or will it now decide to genuinely stand up for the rights of Karachi and its citizens?
Urban Sindh – just like its rural counterpart – has witnessed a crisis of governance since the PPP assumed power in 2008. The PPP rule has been known for unbridled corruption, the rise of various mafias and interest groups (from land encroachment to that of billboards in Karachi), and a steep erosion in the rule of law. The MQM, which remained the PPP’s partner during most of its rule, cannot completely absolve itself from the sins and crimes of the provincial government.
Both the PPP and the MQM remain responsible for the politicisation of crime and criminalisation of politics in Sindh. At one time, their militants were baying for one another’s blood in Karachi, even while the leadership of the two parties was cooperating to guard their respective political and vested interests.
Karachi’s pressing problems – a city whose interests are championed by the MQM – were never taken up seriously. The absence of a mass transit system in a mega-city like Karachi has never been made a top issue by any of the political parties, including the MQM. The party has never even called for any symbolic strike – which it does otherwise at the drop of a hat – to protest the transport problems faced by Karachi’s citizens. Commuters travelling on the roofs of buses has become a common sight in Karachi. Earlier, people used to complain that the meters of taxis and rickshaws were faulty. Now drivers operate without them – no questions asked.
The MQM has also neither raised a voice or launched a public campaign against the new billboard mafia which has occupied space on footpaths, blocked innumerable buildings and wrecked the city’s landscape. Compare this to other major cities, including Lahore and Rawalpindi. At least those who govern there keep the public in mind to some extent. But not so in Karachi where giant billboards are not just eyesores, but also pose a safety hazard to the people.
Like the land encroachment mafia, the water mafia has also gained ground since the return of ‘undiluted democracy’ in Sindh. Water trucks which were available for 2,000 to 2,500 rupees just a few months ago, now charge 6,000-8,000 rupees. Water remains a scarce commodity in neighbourhoods falling under the jurisdiction of various cantonment boards, as well as the city government. But is any political party, including the MQM, raising its voice about this?
A scary recent development is the Sindh government’s controversial plan to encroach on 213 acres of the Malir riverbed to develop residential and commercial plots. Is anyone asking any questions about this new environmental disaster in the making?
The police force under this so-called democratic regime has also been highly politicised and compromised. Professional police officers are being shunted to the sidelines, given marginal assignments, and those who can dance to the tune of their political masters are garnering important positions. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the army chief Raheel Sharif felt compelled to admonish the civilian leadership about this sorry state of affairs during a recent meeting in Karachi in which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, former president Zardari, and the top stalwarts of the Sindh government were present. The message from the army chief was loud and clear: depoliticise the police force and give it operational independence and autonomy.
The list of Karachi’s wounds and grievances is endless, but are any of these issues on the agenda of the elected representatives, who are known more for their greed and corruption than their passion to serve the people?
Will any of these issues even feature during the power-sharing negotiations of the PPP and MQM?
“This time around, if there is any agreement, it will be in black-and-white and presented before the people,” said a senior MQM leader, while stating that in the past his party was taken for a ride by the PPP. “We want the implementation of the 40/60 per cent power and resource sharing formula between urban and rural Sindh.”
However, a strong lobby within the MQM stands firmly opposed to striking a deal with the PPP. “We will have to carry all the excess baggage of the PPP’s poor performance and corruption if we join their government,” said the MQM leader. “That’s the reason many of the party’s senior officials do not want to rejoin the Sindh government.”
A powerful group within the PPP also shares similar sentiments against the MQM, who it accuses of running a militant wing and trying to hold the city hostage.
“We can run the government effectively without the MQM,” said a PPP MPA. “We do not need their numbers, but our central leadership [read Zardari] thinks that keeping the MQM on board is good for peace in Karachi.”
At the end of the day, any decision about the coalition government in Sindh will essentially be made by Altaf Hussain and Asif Ali Zardari. MQM and PPP hardliners, opposed to such a deal, hope that better sense will prevail among their respective bosses.
But whether the PPP continues to fly solo or manages to bring the MQM in its fold, skeptics believe that the fortunes of Karachi and Sindh in general are not going to change any time soon. The province will be as badly managed as it is now, whether it is a coalition or PPP government in Sindh. As for now and the foreseeable future, Sindh continues to remain hostage to PPP and MQM politics.

ENDS

Unlikely Bedfellows

By Amir Zia
Monthly Newsline
March 2015

It was the PPP’s happy-go-lucky culture where Gabol had most of his political grooming. And the PPP, even in its best of days, was never known for being a disciplined and organised party.

Becoming an MQM lawmaker is certainly not only about privileges, power and living in the fast lane. Perks aside, the party supremos and ‘embedded’ Hussain informers alike watch lawmakers a la an Orwellian Big Brother at every step. Lawmakers are supposed to adhere to a disciplinary code, fulfill their assigned duties and responsibilities and stay in touch with workers and supporters in their respective constituencies. Nabeel Gabol, who recently resigned from the National Assembly seat, hit the bulls-eye when he honestly confessed that he was “a misfit” in the MQM’s organisational structure and culture.

It was the PPP’s happy-go-lucky culture where Gabol had most of his political grooming. And the PPP, even in its best of days, was never known for being a disciplined and organised party.

But the MQM’s disciplinary code makes it mandatory for lawmakers – members of the national and provincial assemblies – to visit the party office in their respective constituencies for at least five days a week. And once at the office, they have to spend two to three hours listening to public grievances and meeting workers and residents of the area. Moreover, lawmakers also have to visit the party headquarters in Azizabad, Karachi once every week.

Members of the national and provincial assemblies are also supposed to be with workers and supporters in their moments of joy or sorrow – attending occasions such as weddings and funerals.

The other mainstream conventional political parties, dominated by the feudal and tribal lords or super-rich industrialists and businesspeople do not impose any such conditions on their elected members, many of whom are usually found in their constituencies only at the time of the elections.

Gabol joined the MQM after parting ways with the PPP ahead of the 2013 elections. Earlier, when he was a PPP MNA from Lyari, he was forced out of his traditional constituency by militants belonging to the ironically titled Lyari Aman Committee.

At that time, the committee, comprising notorious gangsters, was being supported by the then home minister Zulfikar Mirza and some other PPP stalwarts close to the former president Asif Ali Zardari. Gabol found himself being eased out of his political space with the PPP central command bent upon awarding Bilawal Bhutto Zardari a ticket for the National Assembly seat from Lyari.

Short of options and bitterly cornered by Lyari gangsters, Gabol opted for the MQM, which gave him its secure and prized NA 246 seat.

The constituency also comprised the Azizabad neighbourhood, where the MQM headquarters ‘Nine Zero’ is located.

According to MQM officials, Gabol was not able to come to the party offices for weeks, even months, due to personal reasons. “He was repeatedly asked to improve his performance… and as a result he opted to resign from the NA seat,” said a senior MQM leader. “We very much want him to stay in the party as he is also a member of our central executive council. In the past, a number of our key members have taken a backseat for personal reasons, but rejoined the mainstream once they resolved their issues.”  However, he conceded that the signs indicate Gabol will part ways with the party. “We wish him good luck,” he said.

Gabol’s decision to quit the NA seat and the MQM has not been on a bitter note. MQM leaders have refrained from levelling any charges against him and Gabol has also not made any adverse remarks against the MQM. However, Gabol’s desertion is a symbolic blow for the MQM which is keen to have prominent personalities from other communities in its ranks to give the party a multi-ethnic image.

In 2002, it awarded the NA 246 ticket from Azizabad to Azizullah Brohi. But the party asked for his resignation within a year on charges of corruption and poor performance. In the by-elections on this seat, another Sindhi-speaking individual, Nisar Panhwar was awarded a ticket. In the 2008 elections, Panhawar was given a provincial assembly seat.

Gabol, who was unable to give time to his Azizabad constituency, maintains that he aims to win back his traditional seat from Lyari where fresh political space has been created as a result of the ongoing Karachi operation against criminals and terrorists.

The recent arrest of Uzair Jan Baloch in the UAE, the kingpin among Lyari gangsters, also favours Gabol.

The PPP, which once was the undisputed political force in Lyari, has seen its support base eroding because of gangsters. In the 2013 elections, gangsters forced the PPP leadership to accept their nominees from this area for the National and Sindh assembly seats.

Gabol, who apparently realised soon after joining the MQM that he is a misfit in this middle class party, is now likely to join a more conventional political force in the coming days. But so far he is keeping all options open – i.e. he could join the PML-N, the PPP or even the PTI. “The PTI is the second biggest party in Karachi, but I have not yet finalised my next move. I will not make any decision in haste,” Gabol told Newsline.

“My only aim is to serve the people and get myself elected from the constituency of Lyari from where my father and grandfather won elections. And in Lyari, though Zardari remains unpopular, people still love the Bhuttos.”

COVER STORY: Is The Party Over?

By Amir Zia
Newsline
March, 2015

One may love him or hate him for his various politically correct or incorrect positions, but the MQM leader clearly cannot be ignored.

2015 – and once again the MQM finds itself in the crosshairs: the smoke from the Baldia factory fire still lingers, but provides no cover. Charges of arson fly fast and furious against the MQM. And whatever the truth of the matter, the allegations of attempted extortion by party cadres and the violent response by them when their demands are not met – as the authorities investigating the Baldia tragedy maintain was the case – are only too plausible given the reputation the party has garnered itself as urban Sindh’s extortion and elimination mafia.

And then there are the investigations against MQM supremo Altaf Hussain by British authorities for alleged crimes in the UK. The charges include complicity in murder and money-laundering.

All this against the backdrop of the ‘Great Leader,’ increasingly seeming to have completely lost the plot – consider his long ramblings, outbursts, verbal attacks against friends and foes alike, and U-turns on just about everything, including the party line.

Yes, the MQM still manages to engender fear in those on its wrong side. Yes, the culture of fear still earns it sizeable and regular bhatta (which the party dubs “donations”), manifest in the increasingly upwardly mobile lifestyle of local MQM leaders – and of their Quaid. And yes, assorted political parties often have to tango with MQM leaders, when they need numbers to bolster their own seats or stances. But the great monolith of the ’80s no longer exists. That past is another party.

Yet, the party’s not quite over. And Altaf Hussain remains firmly entrenched as its godfather.

Whenever he gets on the telephone for a public address from London, for example, the first-tier stalwarts of his party here in Pakistan spring to attention and gird their loins. They listen carefully to each and every word uttered by their Quaid with bated breath, not knowing when there will be a surprise announcement, or yet another off-the-cuff, over-the-top remark.

The once fiery young speaker of the late ’70s and ’80s, still possesses the ability to mesmerise his die-hard followers, even as he approaches his 63rd birthday in September. But while his words may still resonate among the MQM’s rank-and-file, lately Hussain’s telephonic speeches have started to test more and more the fire-fighting abilities of the local leadership: rather than setting the political agenda or mobilising public opinion, local MQM leaders increasingly find themselves on the defensive, scrambling to cover up a gaffe by Hussain.

Sometimes, Hussain’s emotional outbursts are directed against select MQM lawmakers and office-bearers, whom he accuses of corruption, inefficiency in running the party’s organisational affairs and indifference toward the plight of the people. At other times he targets political rivals and elusive MQM enemies within the ranks of the “leviathan civil and military establishment.” He also routinely takes bold positions on assorted issues which conventional wisdom would deem ‘politically incorrect.’ But three decades later, the maverick MQM leader still seems to get away with everything, creating little more than a few ripples. This despite his radical demands and stances, ranging from the imposition of martial law and emergency in the country to that of uprooting the entire political system, raising tricky questions about current religious and historical narratives and heaping ridicule on rivals that belong to mainstream religious and political parties and even to banned extremist groups.

Twenty years down the road, despite his absence from his ideological constituency, comprising among others, a generation that hasn’t even set eyes on him in the flesh, Hussain is seldom found missing from the front-pages of newspapers or from local television news bulletins.

One may love him or hate him for his various politically correct or incorrect positions, but the MQM leader clearly cannot be ignored.

Meanwhile, each time Hussain opens up another can of worms, it is mostly the local MQM leadership which is left to handle the situation for better or worse. In some rare cases though, Hussain himself backtracks on his statements to calm temperatures when matters spin out of control.

The recent nasty war of words between the MQM and the PTI over the below-the-belt remarks of Hussain against Imran Khan’s party information secretary, Shireen Mazari, and women supporters, is one prime example of political bickering that was entirely avoidable if better sense had prevailed.

In the larger scheme of national politics, the PTI-MQM row should not have been more than a minor sideshow. Yet, it dominated the national media for days at the cost of genuine challenges faced by the country, including the spectre of terrorism and extremism.

The PTI and the MQM halted their highly sensational mudslinging match – which also saw Imran Khan making some highly personalised comments against Altaf Hussain – only after the MQM leader tendered an apology.

It was not just Imran Khan and the PTI that became the target of Altaf Hussain’s unsavoury remarks. The MQM supreme leader also castigated the law-enforcement agencies, including the country’s premier Inter-Services Intelligence. However, in this case too, Hussain quickly backed down from his position.

The MQM leader’s apologies and the damage-control measures employed by his lieutenants may have cooled the heightened political temperatures for the time being, but MQM-watchers are left befuddled by the party leader’s twists and turns in day-to-day politics. The party line often swings from one extreme to another: from being the most allied ally of the military establishment on key policy issues, including its unstinting support for Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the establishment of military courts on one hand, to being a bitter critic of the direction of the Karachi Operation on the other. Unsurprisingly then, the MQM’s local leadership usually walks a tightrope.

There are numerous questions about the future of this urban-based party, both at the organisational level and its overall role in national politics, including relations with the key movers and shakers in Pakistan’s power structure.

To begin with, how should one view the growing dissatisfaction of Hussain towards his own local leadership? Is it a sign of fissures within the MQM?

After all, he dissolved the MQM’s coordination committee four times during the past one-and-a-half-years, and that too under full media glare.

On each occasion, Altaf Hussain minced no words while criticising the party’s key office bearers for hiding facts about their performance, patronising corruption, especially in regard to the land-grabbing mafia, and for their overall apathy towards the problems of their respective constituencies.

As to how his party leaders see the MQM’s current situation, a senior MQM leader, requesting anonymity,  said, “In one way it is unfortunate that Altaf bhai asks for public accountability. It provides our rivals an opportunity to jeer at us… but in another it is also a healthy sign. It makes us stand apart from the other conventional political parties which do not have any accountability process. Everyone can be held accountable in the MQM.”

The manner in which Altaf Hussain dissolves and reconstitutes the coordination and other committees or nominates and removes their key members underlines his continuing iron-grip over party affairs – even from thousands of miles away. But the way many of the same old faces manage to insinuate themselves into the folds of the MQM’s top organisational forums also demonstrates Altaf Hussain’s limited choices.

Another MQM leader, who also did not want to be quoted, said that from the first tier leadership down, office bearers at various levels, and the party’s lawmakers, still all draw their legitimacy and powers to act from Altaf Hussain.

“He is the one who makes them heroes or zeros,” he said. “Our workers are only attached to him. And Altaf bhaimakes it a point to stay directly in touch with each one of them, from the sector to the zone and even the unit level, even taking an interest in their personal well-being.”

The personality cult and demi-god like status of Altaf Hussain among workers and supporters keep the party’s office bearers and lawmakers on a tight leash. In fact, they compete with one another to remain on ‘bhai’s’ right side.

And the party’s still sizeable support among Sindh’s urban public is undeniable. According to Wasay Jalil, a senior MQM leader, 10, 20 or maybe even 100 or 200 people can be brought to rallies by force. “But here we are talking about tens of thousands of people who assemble at our rallies on a few hours or a day’s notice. This show of strength cannot be orchestrated by the use of force as many of our opponents want the world to believe.

“Altaf Hussain is the founding leader of our party; he is our nucleus and ideologue. The rest of the party forums, including the coordination committee, are under him.”

Indeed, Hussain has no person holding the number two position within party ranks. Those old guards – such as Azeem Ahmed Tariq and Imran Farooq – who once were tipped as his heirs, are now gone.

As long as Hussain holds the fort, there appears little question of any organised dissent within the party, as the mass of MQM workers and supporters only follow him – even the young workers who have never directly met or seen him.

The one major split, which jolted the MQM, occurred way back in the early 1990s. And that too, was made possible with the active support of intelligence agencies, which brought various disgruntled elements within the MQM under one umbrella to form the Haqiqi faction. The mainstream MQM was pushed against the wall as a result of the double blow of the Karachi Operation of 1992 and the emergence of the establishment-backed Haqiqi. Nevertheless, it survived and managed to bounce back.

The tussle to regain its turf resulted in unprecedented inter-party bloodletting on the streets of Karachi. That is now a dark chapter of its history.  But by hook or by crook, the MQM managed to get back into the saddle. Former military ruler General (retired) Pervez Musharraf also gave the party a helping hand by enabling and encouraging it to rejoin the mainstream, in an attempt to bring normality to Pakistan’s largest city and the country’s main commercial, financial and business hub.

After the early 1990s split, the MQM managed, by-and-large, to keep its ranks intact. Those who fell out of Hussain’s favour for various reasons – from the issues of poor performance and corruption to political differences – chose to bow out silently and in the majority of the cases quit politics altogether, rarely to be seen or heard of since then.

The one apparent exception was the senior MQM leader Imran Farooq, who allegedly tried to form his own faction of the MQM. He was murdered in London under mysterious circumstances on September 16, 2010. Top MQM leaders vehemently contest the claim that Farooq, once considered the party’s main ideologue and hardliner, ever wanted to part ways with Altaf Hussain and deny any involvement of their party in this murder.

However, investigations into Imran Farooq’s murder in the United Kingdom are being seen as make-or-break for Altaf Hussain’s career. The two key suspects allegedly involved in the case and wanted by Britain remain here, in Pakistan’s custody.

According to Sindh government sources, these suspects are being used by the security establishment to keep the MQM in line.

There are also money-laundering charges against Hussain in the United Kingdom.  All these charges have, however, failed to erode Altaf Hussain’s control over the party or the politics of urban Sindh, even though they remain a tough test case.

Then there are other routine day-to-day pressures, which become weightier given the MQM’s typical style of politics in which perhaps no day is a normal day.

“Altaf bhai is under a lot of stress,” confides one MQM source. “He is a heart patient, and his blood sugar level is also high. He has also long been suffering from insomnia.  He has to come up to the expectations of the party workers and supporters. And in this situation, certain issues can trigger an aggressive response from him,” he said while trying to justify his leader’s often controversial speeches and statements.

The swings in Altaf Hussain’s moods, his health condition and the fact that with each passing day he is not getting any younger, raises the question about his succession.

What happens if for health or any other reason Altaf Hussain is not on the scene to lead the MQM from the front for a short or an extended period?

Even for a relatively organised and well-knit party like the MQM, this remains a tricky question, which most of its leaders do not wish to discuss in the open.

Who will fill Altaf Hussain’s big boots? Will there be a collective leadership or is an individual waiting in the wings? Will the party be able to stay united if Altaf Hussain decides to hand over the reins to someone else? Recently, Hussain again expressed the desire to quit the party’s leadership, but following the “demands of workers” decided to stay on a few hours later.

In the coming months and years, the challenge of future leadership will be one key internal challenge which the MQM will face. On the external front too, the party is, increasingly, sailing in choppy waters.

The first big challenge remains of its image problem. Most of its critics and opponents still associate the party with organised violence and crime, including running a sophisticated extortion and land-encroachment racket.

Some of the senior police and security officials consider the MQM the biggest threat to peace in Karachi – perhaps even more deadly than the Taliban.

“The Taliban extremists have the capacity to stage some spectacular terrorist attacks in Karachi. But their threat is manageable as they do not enjoy public support,” said one senior police official, who played a key role in the ongoing Karachi Operation in its initial weeks and months. “But the MQM offers a unique challenge because of its deeply entrenched organisational structure in the city and roots among the local population. It can paralyse Karachi whenever it wants.”

Senior security officials accuse the MQM of maintaining an organised militant wing and blame it for most of the incidents of violence and killing in urban Sindh. They allege that MQM militants also serve as guns for hire. Little surprise, the MQM denies these charges.

Aminul Haq, a senior MQM leader, said that if anyone uses the MQM umbrella to commit crimes, the party immediately takes action and disassociates itself from him.  “We never plead the case of any criminal… we only raise a hue and cry if a genuine political worker is falsely harassed or victimised.”

In fact, the MQM’s biggest complaint remains that the Karachi operation is largely directed towards its party supporters and workers, even though it is the one party which fully backs the authorities’ bid to restore peace in the megalopolis.

According to MQM figures, since January 2014 till the end of February 2015 it has lost more than 150 members in targeted and extra-judicial killings at the hands of political rivals and members of the law-enforcement agencies.

Additionally, since the onset of the Karachi Operation in September 2013, security personnel allegedly picked up at least 25 MQM workers, but MQM officials claim there was no paper trail to prove this arrest on paper. The tortured and bullet-riddled bodies of several of them were later found in various parts of the city.

A former MQM lawmaker, on condition of anonymity, said that none of the party workers offer resistance when arrested. “They go peacefully… and most are picked up from their homes. There is no exchange of gunfire. Had they been terrorists, would they have been so easily found in their homes?”

He said that Altaf Hussain’s bitter remarks against the establishment were the result of the extra-judicial killings of workers. “How can he stay silent over such issues? The establishment should get used to his tone. Why do they forget that we remain their most sincere strategic allies in the war against extremism?” he asked, reiterating his party’s anti-Taliban position and unconditional support to the armed forces in their fight against this grave internal threat faced by the country.

MQM officials maintain that certain political forces want to damage the spirit of Operation Zarb-e-Azb by trying to divert the Karachi Operation against the MQM. “Who is going to benefit if there is friction between the MQM and the law-enforcement agencies? Some myopic PPP leaders think that their party would gain…”

In the highly complex cloak and dagger game unfolding in Sindh, narrow, short-term political and financial interests are stoking friction at one level among various forces and institutions, which practically collaborate and jointly work together at another level.

The killings and arrests of MQM workers, many of whom are being described by the police as wanted in various heinous crimes, remain one key factor in souring its relations with the law- enforcement agencies.

The straining of ties is reflected in the way a joint investigation team (JIT) report about the 2012 Baldia garment factory inferno alleged that some senior MQM leaders and workers were responsible for the tragedy that claimed more than 250 lives. The report alleged that the factory was set ablaze because its owners refused to pay the so-called ‘protection money’ to certain MQM leaders.

The MQM has described the JIT report, based on the statement of one person, as a media trial, while Altaf Hussain has demanded that the army conduct any inquiry into this case. Independent analysts have also raised questions as to why the JIT report was revealed more than two years after the incident, and claim that the confessional statement of one person is unlikely to hold ground in any court of law.

But the report has proved too damaging for the MQM’s image and the charges made in it are too serious to be ignored. It requires a thorough inquiry so that those responsible for the tragedy can be brought to justice, regardless of their political affiliations.

A senior MQM leader believes that tensions with the mighty military establishment remain temporary and will be resolved soon. But in the mid to long run, the MQM’s relations with the law-enforcement agencies will largely depend on its ability to break clean from the criminals and militants it is alleged form a core group within the party.

Is the MQM willing to transform itself and reinvent its image? Will it be able to address the concerns of the security establishment?

As matters stand now, both internal rethinking within its leadership and external factors are trying to nudge the MQM in a new direction. But complete transformation is easier said than done. It will require not just a lot of patience and focus, but a mix of both soft and hard handling. Being a middle-class and urban-based party, the MQM can play a larger role in national politics, provided it can make the world believe that it has completely severed ties with militancy and crime. But until that happens, the fortunes of the MQM and its power base, Karachi, will continue on their roller coaster ride.

ENDS