Search This Blog

Thursday, April 19, 2018

So Far, So Good

By Amir Zia
April 2018
Monthly Newsline

Democracy is not just surviving, but thriving in Pakistan, in the same manner as it does in any other third world country – ie. despite all its flaws and weaknesses...the challenge to democracy, or its own shortcomings, are not as deadly as many contend. In fact...there is a silver lining for democrats and democracy in Pakistan.



At one level, all seems well with Pakistani democracy. An elected government is in place and about to complete its term. Irrespective of performance, participation of members and their quality of debate, both the upper and lower houses of Parliament are functioning. All other state institutions, including the armed forces and the judiciary, are “active and effective” under their constitutional domain – at least in the eyes of the public.
Other optics also support the fact that democracy is not just surviving, but thriving in Pakistan, in the same manner as it does in any other third world country – ie. despite all its flaws and weaknesses. Political and religious parties of every shade lure and draw the masses, even while making their lives difficult by their crimes and sins of omission and commission. Civil society – represented by local and foreign-funded non-governmental organisations and concerned individuals – is active, challenging the government and institutions on assorted issues, including human rights, missing persons, extra-judicial killings and corruption. A lively, noisy media is both, shaping and distorting the public discourse and taking up many of those issues which were once considered taboo in Pakistan’s political and social arena.
All this, and yet there are many prophets of doom and gloom who say that democracy remains under threat, that space for elected governments is shrinking – and shrinking fast. They see the army keeping civilian rulers on a tight leash, allowing them little space to lead on important fronts such as foreign relations and national security – in short to fulfil their mandate.
The long and ever-expanding list of allegations against the military ranges from them orchestrating mini and mega opposition protests against the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government, manufacturing dissent and factions within political parties, and encouraging new alignments and alliances at the cost of old ones. The latest addition to the list of allegations remains the allegation of manipulating the change of face in the Balochistan provincial government and the recent elections for the chairmanship and deputy chairmanship of the Senate.
The vigour with which the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is pursuing select people for corruption and the way the superior judiciary appears focused on cases involving the disgraced ousted prime minister, Nawaz Sharif and his family members along with some of his close aides, are all attributed to the “hidden hands” linked to the mighty military establishment.
Meanwhile, the military spokesperson, Major General Asif Ghafoor, has time and again rejected such allegations, saying that the armed forces remain exclusively focused on their constitutional role.
So the pertinent question remains whether the glass is half-full or half-empty when it comes to democracy and its prospects in Pakistan.
In the country’s present highly polarised atmosphere, the answer to this question would depend on which side of the fence one stands. Those belonging to the small, influential and politically correct and connected segment of society, or falling in the category of activists, would certainly claim that they see democracy under threat and declare the army as the ultimate villain in this game of thrones.
If one falls in the category of the common man – angry and bitter with the present state of affairs – most likely he or she would hold leaders belonging to the mainstream parties responsible for most ills troubling the country and call for flushing out all dishonest politicians from the echelons of power. This common man is not bothered about how the country reaches the elusive goal of achieving effective, honest and pro-people governance – whether through democracy or authoritarian rule. He/she is simply interested in results.
Between these two extremes, lies a middle ground, reflecting the reality. That reality being the fact that the challenge to democracy, or its own shortcomings, are not as deadly as many contend. In fact, in these days of uncertainty, there is a silver lining for democrats and democracy in Pakistan.
“If the military wants to take over (power), it could do so in five minutes, just five minutes,” a senior military official told a select group of journalists on the condition of anonymity. “We wouldn’t even require a sixth minute to complete the task… but the army is committed to its constitutional role and supports democracy.”
So its capacity and ability to stage a takeover does not automatically translate into the army having the intent to seize power, though many, even in the political parties, would love to see such a situation developing.The fact is, since the country’s return to democracy in 2008, the army has not tried to rock the boat as a matter of policy, despite tensions and an ongoing atmosphere of distrust with the civilian rulers.
“The assertion that democracy is under threat in any way is wrong,” says senior political analyst and commentator, Zahid Hussain. “Democracy is not under threat. All this upheaval is part of the democratic process. There are always chances that institutions will find an equilibrium.”
The PML-N’s Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, also sees “no direct threat to democracy.
“But some political parties’ ability to use big money and buy  the electoral process remains a major threat for any transparent democratic process — as we witnessed in the Senate elections, which were marred by horse-trading,” he told Newsline.
When asked about the alleged conspiracies against democracy by some “hidden hands,” Syed said that any covert moves could only be successful if they were made in connivance with the political parties. “I would blame the political parties… in case of any such move, which can’t happen without the willing cooperation of the political parties.”
Qamar Zaman Kaira, the Pakistan Peoples’ Party’s (PPP) Central Punjab President, also rejected the notion of the alleged “shrinking space for democracy. Indeed, a lot of work is required to make democracy deliverable (to the people), but the PML-N and its leadership are the main culprits for weakening democracy as they have a history of undermining the parliament and partnering with dictators and extremists.”
So if there is no direct threat to democracy, with the PML-N government all set to complete its term – the second consecutive elected government to perform this feat – and elections scheduled in 2018, then why do some forces claim that democracy is in danger?
Is it because an elected prime minister – Nawaz Sharif – stands disqualified and faces jail if he gets convicted in any of the five corruption references filed against him and his family members in the accountability courts? Or is democracy weakened because the opposition parties – the PPP and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) – have managed to bury the hatchet, albeit temporarily, and along with dissidents within the PML-N, prevented the ruling party from getting its man elected as chairman Senate?
According to Fawad Chaudhry, the PTI spokesperson, the apparent weakness of democracy is the fallout from Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification. “Our system works on the back of the executive arm, the judiciary and the army. If the political structure (executive arm) gets weak, as has happened, the judiciary and the army dominate, which gives the impression that democracy is on the retreat,” he said. “Had elections been called out immediately after Sharif’s disqualification, this situation wouldn’t have arisen.”
However, the very premise that democracy has weakened is debatable. The disqualification of a sitting prime minister and trial on corruption charges – when his own party remains in power – can be seen as a positive development, strengthening democracy, the system and institutions. This is the first time ever in Pakistan’s history that an all-powerful premier, like Sharif, has been forced out of office through constitutional and legal means.
This is also among those rare occasions in our history that the ruling party has smoothly brought in another man for the top post after the disqualification of its leader.
Yes, PPP’s Yousuf Raza Gilani was also disqualified in 2012 by the Superior Court, and the then ruling party brought in a replacement and finished its term, but the huge difference between then and now remains that unlike Gilani – who was a nominee of the party leader – Sharif was himself the head of the party. In that sense, Sharif is all-powerful, compared to Gilani during whose tenure the real authority was exercised by Asif Ali Zardari, who was, constitutionally, a lame-duck president after giving up the powers under 58-(2) B that empowered him to sack the elected government and dissolve the assemblies. But he continued to control the government as the head of the ruling party.
The disqualification of Sharif and his trial on corruption charges remains a bigger affair than that of Gilani’s disqualification and serves as a litmus
test for the system, the government and the institutions. It has intensified friction within institutions, but also set a precedent that a wrongdoer can be tried and sacked, regardless of his position. In the past, top politicians only faced trial once out of power. And their trials and tribulations were seen more as a victimisation campaign than a fair and transparent accountability process. But Sharif faces accountability with his government in power, and so far, despite fierce attempts by his party stalwarts to save him and his family members, they remain in the dock. Additionally, the judiciary and other state institutions – despite constraints and manipulations by the executive authority – are pursing the accountability process against the Sharifs, signalling that finally efforts to establish the rule of law and supremacy of the constitution are gaining strength and momentum.
Sources say that Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, expressed his support for Nawaz Sharif when he was the prime minister. Bajwa had, according to sources, reiterated that he would support Sharif on any front, barring one: the Panama Scandal. And in regard to the government’s tussle with the judiciary, the army has taken a clear position that it will stand by the courts for the rule of law.
PPP’s Kaira maintains that Sharif and his party are fighting against democracy by trying to undermine the judiciary. “When Prime Minister (Shahid Khaqan Abbasi) says that courts can’t give them justice, they are, in fact, playing with democracy,” he said, referring to a speech delivered by Abbasi in Sargodha on March 30 in which he said that there was no hope of getting justice from the accountability courts.
Abbasi’s bosses, Sharif and his daughter and political heir apparent, Mariam Safdar, have also been vocal in criticising the judiciary and the institutions against the advice of many senior party leaders.
The issue of the Senate elections, that created a crescendo of allegations that democracy is under threat, must also be seen in the right context.
Zahid Hussain says that a combination of factors was responsible for the ruling party’s defeat in the Senate, including “the role of the establishment and the opportunistic alignment of the political forces opposed to Nawaz Sharif.”
According to the PPP’s Kaira, manipulation in the Senate elections has been a tradition in Pakistan and doubts have always been raised about the voting pattern of a few members. “There are allegations that the PPP and the PTI got more votes than their strength, but so has the PML-N. If the allegation that the PPP bought independents was true, they should have joined our party, but this has not happened.”
However, the pro-Sharif lobby says that the alleged manipulation in the Senate elections was aimed at limiting the effectiveness of the government and squeezing space for democratic forces. Mushahid Hussain Sayed says that even the PTI Chairman, Imran Khan, admits there was massive horse-trading in the Senate elections.
But are the charges being levelled by the PML-N the only reason for what transpired, as the followers of the Sharif camp would want us to believe? These accusations notwithstanding, what made the ruling party lose control of the Senate?
The answer to these questions perhaps lies in the fact that most political forces and elements within assorted institutions have long been wary of the “dictatorial mindset” of Sharif and the small clique around him that want to frame laws which are against the spirit of the constitution. The way the ruling party bulldozed an amendment allowing a disqualified and convicted person to lead a political party was just one example. The Supreme Court mercifully threw out this amendment, but the PML -N continues to make efforts to enact laws benefiting an individual against the basic ethos of democracy and the constitution. Speculation is rife that if the PML -N manages to dominate both houses, it will go for legislation limiting the independence and autonomy of the judiciary and make laws that protect and safeguard politicians involved in corruption.
In Pakistan, the issue is not that democracy is under threat, but how to make it pro-people and prevent vested interests from bending laws and distorting the constitution to benefit individuals, condone corruption and perpetuate their rule.
It is ironic that all the mainstream political parties have, in one way or another, played a role in undermining democracy by narrowing its definition just to holding elections and the rule of the majority. In doing so, they overlook fulfilling other conditions which make democracy work, including the spirit of inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, pro-people legislation, democracy within parties, devolution of power to the local government level and merit.
And yes, democracy only thrives when there is a rule of law and political players are prepared to abide by it. No wonder, many critics of political parties view so-called democrats as the biggest enemies of democracy in Pakistan.
Since for the first time the powerful are being held accountable, the process may appear skewed, but it is setting a precedent. And if democracy is to sustain and deliver, the juggernaut of accountability has to expand in the coming days to include other politicians as well.
“If Pakistan is to become a normal state, the rule of law and the writ of the state is imperative,” said a senior military official in his informal briefing.
Certainly the survival of democracy cannot and should not be linked to one person or family. Analysts contend that if Sharif is sent to jail, the country’s institutions would ensure that the system continues to work smoothly. PPP’s Kaira claims that if there is justice, he sees Nawaz Sharif going to the Adiala Jail. And for the PTI’s Fawad Chaudry too, Sharif’s political future appears sealed.
Zahid Hussain, however, maintains that one should never write off a political leader. According to him, “Despite the fact that Sharif is in trouble, he still is the most powerful leader in Pakistan.”
Mushahid Hussain Sayed also challenges the claim that Nawaz Sharif has landed in a blind alley. “Such prophecies proved wrong in the past and will again be proven wrong,” he said. “When Ghulam Ishaq Khan ousted Sharif, there were claims that the party was over for him, but that did not happen. Again, when he went into exile in Saudi Arabia, similar claims were made, only to be proved wrong. Now Sharif is again being written off following his disqualification, but he will bounce back; his narrative is gaining ground.”
Apart from the conflicting predictions about Sharif’s future, for now the former prime minister appears cornered. There is increasing pressure on him from within the party to lower the political temperature as the institutions appear adamant to hold him accountable for his past alleged financial misdeeds, as evidenced by the Panama Papers. While Sharif’s future role in politics remains uncertain, his party still has a role to play in the system, provided the adventurous streak of a few within it can be curtailed and managed.
Sharif’s predicaments won’t derail democracy, despite all its weaknesses, flaws and failure to live up to the expectations of the people. This due to the institutional consensus that the system should work.
With this backdrop, 2018 will be an election year in Pakistan, albeit a messy one. All the major institutional players and the mainstream parties appear on one page regarding the polls. And the change of guard in a democratic manner for the third consecutive time will be done amid increasing pressure on the political parties to clean up their stables and improve their game.
According to Mushahid Hussain Sayed, there is no other alternative but to hold elections. “Pakistan is a complicated federation, facing national security threats on both the eastern and western fronts… the only way forward is elections, which will protect and guarantee the federation. Political parties unite Pakistan by cutting across barriers of provincialism, ethnicity and sectarianism.”

Wednesday, April 18, 2018

Interview: Dr. Ishrat Husain

By Amir Zia
April 2018
Monthly Newsline

n Facts presented in your latest work, Governing the Ungovernable, show that military rulers have provided better governance compared to elected governments, and that elected leaders rolled back many reforms and weakened institutions. How can we manage this dichotomy?
  
Extra-constitutional regimes suffer from illegitimacy and, therefore, deepen democratic malaise. The economic policy reforms create winner and losers and have to be mediated through negotiations, compromises and consensus-building. Only elected regimes can perform this act, as they are aware of the consequences of the choices they make.
There is a clear exit pathway under democratic regimes as voters can throw out the ruling party if they are not satisfied with its performance. This is not possible under any other form of government. Both benign or malevolent autocrats can perpetuate themselves in power because the people have no recourse to remove them and either have to wait and see, or take up arms.
Reforms introduced by the military leaders were reversed because they didn’t enjoy legitimacy. The booms and busts in Pakistan’s economic cycle can be ascribed to this discontinuity in the implementation of economic policies and reforms. India’s economic growth trajectory took off when the BJP government continued the same policies introduced by Congress in 1991. Both foreign and domestic investors got reassured that the old license and permit raj was over and the new liberalised and deregulated regime has taken hold irrespective of the political party in power.

n  You say military rulers lack legitimacy, therefore, their reforms remain unsustainable, but elected leaders are said to be averse to reforms. They are accused of enacting laws, which perpetuate only family and class interests. Isn’t it a catch-22 situation?

The argument presented in the book is that uninterrupted democracy would pave the way for a performance-based electoral screening process. In 2013, Pakistanis exhibited this by rejecting the PPP at the Centre and the ANP at the provincial level. They voted for the PML-N as they felt that the Punjab government acquitted itself relatively well. The quality of political leadership would improve with the passage of time if those who are unable to deliver are routed out in the elections. Only those who do well for the larger collective good would be rewarded.

n  What reforms are needed to ensure that democracy in Pakistan works for the public good rather than serving the interest of the few?

As urbanisation and peri-urban towns expand, and the middle-class connected with the world rises, education will spread and civil society will become vibrant. There will be a shift from patronage-based to performance-based politics, in which the delivery of public goods and services to citizens would carry greater weight in the calculus of choosing parties and candidates at the time of elections.
Historical evidence suggests that the attrition rate among the elected legislators from the urban constituencies is comparatively higher than those from the rural constituencies where biradari, kinship, tribal and feudal infuences are still pervasive. I was disappointed by the results of the 2017 Census, which show a lower ratio of urban population than expected. Other studies and anecdotal evidence show that the urban and urbanising population accounts for at least half of the total population. The entire corridor between Rawalpindi to Lahore, along the GT Road, Lahore-Sheikhupura-Faisalabad and Sialkot-Daska-Gujranwala, are manifestations of this trend.

n  Your book explains that Pakistan was ahead of its neighbours, including India, in the first four decades of its independence. Then we had the unstable ’90s, in which four elected governments failed to complete their terms. The Musharraf-era witnessed high growth, but the economy derailed again. What is the best way to break this cycle? 

Economic growth has to be sustained over time and has to be equitable in the distribution of benefits. Markets and the private sector should be given greater space to improve productivity and efficiency, while the state must tax the rich and spend on basic services, the education, training and skill and asset development of the poor. All political parties should publicly announce that this is the economic pact under which they will work. It will give investors and the public a clear direction and guidance about the future. They must realise that the challenges of globalisation, demography, the youth bulge and growing urbanisation would place an enormous burden on any incoming government. A concerted and continuous attack on each of these problems would take time – longer than a five-year electoral cycle.

n  You hold Zulfikar Ali Bhutto responsible for inflicting two major blows on Pakistan. First, through nationalisation, which hit the private sector; second, the weakening of civil institutions, especially the civil service. Now there is a consensus on privatisation, but no efforts are in sight to reform the civil service. How could one introduce reforms in the civil service given the political parties’ opposition?

You are quite right. No effort has been made by the successive governments, military or civilian, to bring about reforms in the civil service – the backbone of institutions of democratic governance. The report by the National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR) made comprehensive recommendations, but it remains in cold storage since 2008, despite the fact that every prime minister felt that inefficiency and corruption impede economic progress. In the absence of reforms, we may not be able to have a buoyant and dynamic economy that would create jobs for the 1.5 million youth entering the labour force in the coming decades. We would continue to have a burgeoning informal sector, unplanned urbanisation, congested cities and a decrepit infrastructure, which, instead of enhancing productivity, contribute to value subtraction.

n  There is a lot of controversy regarding the 18th Amendment, which empowered provinces and flushed them with resources. But its critics say the amendment has weakened the federation. The key objections are that provinces lack the capacity to handle resources and provincial governments are reluctant to devolve power to the local governments. Do you feel the need to address these concerns?

I am a great believer in the further devolution of powers and decentralisation to local government level. An ordinary citizen’s point of contact with the government is the patwari, SHO, irrigation overseer, head teacher, health practitioner, and water and sanitation official. All these services should be provided at the doorstep of the community and should not be controlled by the provincial capitals. To promote equity, the Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC) should give greater allocations to backward districts. Regular monitoring and evaluation, auditing of financial expenditures and target-setting should be done by the provincial departments. In this way the capacity constraint would be relaxed and the service provision would be responsive to the needs of the communities/villages and financial probity would also be ensured. The National Economic Council (NEC) and the Council of Common Interests (CCI) should be strengthened to bring about greater coordination between the federal and the provincial governments in formulating and monitoring national policies, plans and budgets.

n  Local bodies are seen as the main pillar of any genuine democratic dispensation, but our major political parties stand opposed to it. Why?

The reason for the lack of interest in empowering and resourcing the local governments has to do with the tension between the MPAs, ministers and secretaries on the one hand, and the District Nazims on the other. Under a well-functioning local government system, the powers do pass on from the provincial ministers and secretaries to the Nazims, thereby resulting in dilution of the influence of local MPAs in their constituencies. This has resulted in legislation that has made local government bodies impotent and ineffective. Rather than sabotaging the system, MPAs should contest and capture the positions of Nazims as Shah Mehmood Qureshi did in 2002. With a population of over 200 million, the present concentration of administrative and financial powers in the provincial governments would prove counterproductive for political parties.

n  How do you view the tussle between the key institutions of state?

The tussle has arisen due to imbalances among the three organs of the state. While the executive has become too strong and the judiciary hyperactive, the parliament has had the weakest record so far. The power of oversight and vigilance by parliament, over the abuses and misuse of power by the executive, has been almost non-existent. The opposition has also not played the role that it ought to. The prime minister and ministers do not turn up regularly at the parliamentary sessions, nor do the leaders of the main opposition parties. The Q and A hour, which is a powerful tool for disclosure and accountability, has become perfunctory. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) does not get updated reports, while the competence of officials in the Audit Department is highly questionable. Budget sessions are full of rhetoric and clichés rather than a careful analysis of the documents presented.
A weak parliament has given rise to the ascendancy of the NAB, FIA, media and courts, which have created an atmosphere of fear among the honest and hard-working public servants, who are shy of taking decisions. The military comes into the picture out of its concern for the state of economic, political and social affairs in the country. The vacuum created by the inability of the civilian institutions to deliver has been filled by the military. To give you an example, Karachi became peaceful and free of terrorists only when the Rangers took command, as the police had become too politicised and corrupt.  If each organ of the state remains within its respective boundary and exercises checks and balances, then the need for the military to assert itself may not arise.

n  You have called for the restructuring of institutions. Can you briefly explain the key steps that are required immediately?

As comprehensive reforms of governance are not politically palatable across the board, I identified those key institutions which, when reformed and restructured, may have a spillover effect on the functioning of other institutions. These institutions have been selected to meet four pressing national objectives — growth, equity, security and accountability. Each institution selected has a contribution to make in meeting one of these four objectives. For example, if the Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions are manned by persons of integrity and high competence, they would recruit persons on merit rather than political connections. Once these individuals are assigned to police, customs, districts and so on, they would carry out their duties fearlessly as they do not owe their jobs to any politician.

n  Is ‘governing the ungovernable’ possible? Does our political order allow space for vital reforms, or do we need to reset the system?

I am an eternal optimist and do not give up. When the report of the NCGR (which I headed along with six private sector members and six government secretaries) was not accepted by past governments, my friends advised that it was a waste of my time and energy to persist. I did not accept their advice, and instead changed the strategy. When I realised these comprehensive recommendations have no chance of getting implemented, I pondered at the second or third best solution to this problem. This book is the culmination of that thought process. I have focused on 24 key institutions. Politically, this would not have such wide repercussions and the possibility of getting some traction on these proposals appear fairly reasonable. If that does not happen, I would go back to the drawing board and start thinking and working on an alternate strategy.

Book Review: Governing the Ungovernable

By Amir Zia
April 2018
Monthly Newsline 

Book Review: Dr. Ishrat Husain's "Governing the Ungovernable"

There are many fallacies about Pakistan’s economy and politics, which dominate media and academia and serve as a propaganda tool against the state itself. In the opening pages Husain busts many misconceptions, including, for example, a “popular hypothesis” that Pakistan’s economy suffered mainly due to terrorism in the post-9/11 period, arguing instead that this decline started in the early 1990s – well before the country got “embroiled in the war against terror.”

After Independence, Pakistan was off to a flying start, despite all the mega-problems it faced, including the challenge of rehabilitating millions of refugees. In the first four decades of its independence, the country’s economic and social indicators were among those of the top 10 developing countries. But since the early ’90s, Pakistan started to fall behind on both these fronts, even in comparison to its South Asian neighbours.
What factors halted Pakistan’s stint as a top performer? When did the institutional decay set in? Who remains primarily responsible for dragging the country down to its current position as an ungovernable state? Why did Pakistan’s ruling elite fail to build a national consensus on key issues? Where is Pakistan headed in the wake of rampant corruption and a self-defeating system of patronage and nepotism? And lastly, how can Pakistan revive economic progress and ensure the well-being of its citizens?
These are some of the key themes that Dr Ishrat Husain, former dean of IBA and former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, addresses in his seminal work, Governing the Ungovernable. He weaves the country’s political, social and economic history in his work to underline the challenges, point out the mistakes and suggest a way forward to rebuild civilian institutions and improve governance.
Every one of the 18 chapters is a paper in itself on any single aspect of Pakistan, including its history, economy, polity, society, federal and provincial governments, the civil service, the judiciary, the military and the private sector. The author provides a 360-degree view on each topic – incorporating opposing viewpoints – to provide a complete picture, analysing the past and present through meticulous research. Husain manages to give a fresh perspective on assorted challenges faced by the country.
There are many fallacies about Pakistan’s economy and politics, which dominate media and academia and serve as a propaganda tool against the state itself. In the opening pages Husain busts many misconceptions, including, for example, a “popular hypothesis” that Pakistan’s economy suffered mainly due to terrorism in the post-9/11 period, arguing instead that this decline started in the early 1990s – well before the country got “embroiled in the war against terror.”
He contends that between 2002 and 2008, “which was a period of acute violence and terror activity in Pakistan – including assassination attempts and terrorist attacks on the sitting president and prime minister – the country recorded a remarkable turnaround. The growth rate touched 6 to 7 per cent on average. The investment/GDP ratio peaked at 23 per cent and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows exceeded US$5 billion.”
Taking on another popular ‘myth,’ according to which “generous foreign assistance has been the principal determinant of Pakistan’s economic success or failure,” Husain explains that even during periods of elected governments, the country received more aid from friendly countries, yet failed to boost economic growth or improve social indicators. According to the author, it is governance and not foreign aid that is the greatest determinant of an economic turnaround.
Another ‘misconception’ which Husain contests, pertains to the belief that the US and western countries in general, supported military rulers at the expense of elected governments. The book explains that “the US suspended or curtailed economic and military assistance at crucial times in Pakistan’s history,” when the military was in power. “US aid was suspended soon after the 1965 war with India, the 1971 separation of East Pakistan, and under the Symington Amendment in the early period of Zia-ul-Haq’s rule. Sanctions were imposed when General Pervez Musharraf took over the reins of the government.”
Washington took all these steps when a military strongman was in power. The book underlines America’s role in facilitating Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, after which Musharraf was eased out of office.
While some analysts attribute “Pakistan’s poor performance to the ‘Garrison State’ syndrome” – that the country diverts its resources to defence, nuclear capability and other security-related expenditure at the cost of education, health and human development — the author argues, “the ratio of defence expenditure to GDP was consistently high in the first 40 years (when Pakistan was among the top performers) and is now 2.9 per cent of the GDP, almost one-half of what it was in the ’80s.” He reveals that “In FY 2016, the budgetary allocation for education was 2.7 per cent. Combining health and education, the budgetary allocation is 3.7 per cent, higher than that of defence and internal security.”
As regards the corporate interests of the armed forces, the author maintains that proceeds from business enterprises operated by their foundations and trusts are used for the welfare of pensioners, particularly soldiers who retire at an early age.
While giving credit to the military for providing better governance than elected representatives, the author is quick to add that “the actions of those who usurped power by removing elected governments and retarded democratic continuity cannot be condoned.”
However, the biggest blow to Pakistan’s march forward, according to the author, came in the ’70s, under the premiership of the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who stifled the private sector through a nationalisation drive. Over the years, nationalised institutions opened the doors of corruption as they became a drain on the national exchequer.
The author holds Bhutto responsible for systematically destroying institutions, particularly the civil service. “[Bhutto’s] disdain for the civil service’s CSP cadre was reflected in the summary dismissal of 1,300 officers soon after he assumed power as Martial Law Administrator…. The seeds of recourse to extra-constitutional measures were sown during this period.”
Interestingly, when General Zia came to power, he did not try to undo what Bhutto did to the institutions or go for a complete reversal on the economic front. The book quotes Mahbub-ul Haq – finance minister in the Zia-era: “We have not been able to deregulate the economy… despite seven years of trying, because the politicians and officials like the system Bhutto put in place.”
Perhaps the biggest disappointment for the ardent supporters of democracy came in the ’90s, during the tenures of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who “used the institutions of governance and civil servants to dispense favours and patronage, engaging in a dubious game of co-option or coercion of their opponents and excessive misuse of the discretionary powers of the office.”
The author points out that as the role of the bureaucrats was curtailed, important decision-making went into the hands of politicians who were not qualified for the job. However, Sharif did manage to make some important decisions on the economic front, that included pushing the privatisation programme and deregulation of the economy.
With the October 1999 coup of President Pervez Musharraf, the reform process was launched with a fresh vigour. On the one hand, restructuring and reforms in some key public sector institutions were carried out, the privatisation process was resumed and regulatory bodies were empowered; on the other hand, powers were devolved to the grassroots level in the form of empowered local governments. However, the author maintains that “the abolition of the offices of the deputy commissioner and assistant commissioners and their substitution by the elected nazims…was a step too much in advance of its time.”
For the first time in Pakistan’s history, one elected government completed its five-year term and the second is about to do the same, but as in the decade of the 1990s, this period too remained marred by political instability and economic and administrative mismanagement, amidst allegations of massive corruption.
Husain advocates reforms in every sector to boost economic growth and improve social indicators and calls for democratic practices to be observed in the running of political parties. He emphasises a merit-based recruitment system, the devolution of power and a need for consistency in policymaking. “The growing demand for good governance and its shrinking supply,” is identified as the principal reason for the overall deterioration in the economy.
The author proposes slashing down the number of federal ministries from 27 to 18 and the number of divisions from 35 to 23. But while disbanding or merging old ministries, he wants the creation of new ministries for energy, technological development, social protection and infrastructure development.
The book is a crucial addition to the canon on Pakistan’s economy, politics and governance. It is a highly recommended read for our politicians – if they are serious in restoring Pakistan’s image as a top performer in economic and social development.

Education & Media: Tools of National Cohesion

By Amir Zia Monthly Hilal December 2022 Without a common education system, and a common and shared story of our history, the nation building...