By Amir Zia
The News
Sunday, May 20, 2012
The all-out confrontationist approach, which our American “friends” want Pakistan to adopt against radical groups, is seen as leading to more trouble instead of solutions in a country where more than 35,000 people, including several thousand personnel of the security forces, have been killed in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In terms of human losses, this is a far higher price compared to the combined casualties suffered by the Nato and Afghan forces in this period in Afghanistan.
Hafiz Saeed and his followers are the latest addition to the growing list of major irritants that plague Pakistan-US relations these days. The United States’ decision to put Saeed – the founder of the outlawed militant Lashkar-e-Taiba and the reformist Islamic organisation Jamaat-ud Dawa – on its most-wanted list of terrorists has deepened the mistrust between Washington and Islamabad that do not see eye to eye on their strategies to combat terrorism in the region.
While India has hailed the US announcement of a $10-million reward for any information leading to Saeed’s arrest and conviction for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Pakistan has become more sceptical about the intentions of its uneasy ally in this exceedingly controversial war on terror.
If, on the one hand, the move reflects US insensitivities and an apparent lack of understanding towards Pakistan’s problem of extremism, on the other it underlines Islamabad’s diplomatic failure in presenting its case. The Pakistan People’s Party-led government and the military establishment proved unsuccessful in explaining their limitations in the fight against terrorism and to convince Washington about the rationale of their strategy of categorising militant groups and their selective handling in line with their security concerns.
The US move has put an already embattled government and the military in a tight spot in a highly polarised political atmosphere where they face the wrath of an organised and deeply entrenched religious rightwing which remains opposed to Pakistan’s cooperation in the US-led war. It seems ironic that following the US announcement of reward on Saeed, even some Pakistani liberal and secular forces, which remain opposed to Saeed’s political philosophy and radical interpretation of Islam, have been left with no option but to defend him. Saeed, a disciple of Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, apparently dissociated himself from Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2002 when the former military-led government banned the organisation along with several others in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States. However, he continues to lead the Jamaat-ud-Dawa-an Islamic reformist and social work organisation – that proved its mettle in the aftermath of some of the worst natural disasters that hit Pakistan in recent years, including the 2005 earthquake, and the 2010 and 2011 floods.
Saeed and his followers vehemently deny any role in the Mumbai attack – which killed 166 people, including six Americans. The Pakistani government has been asking New Delhi to give concrete evidence, without which it refuses to act against him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan already acquitted Saeed in 2010 for lack of evidence that might implicate him in the Mumbai terror plot. Now this soft-spoken but hard-line cleric continues to be active on the political scene not just from the platform of Jamaat-ud-Dawa but also the Pakistan Defence Council (PDC), an umbrella of about 40 religious groups that is in the forefront of opposition to the resumption of Nato supplies to Afghanistan through Pakistan and to enhanced trade and friendly relations with India.
The Pakistani establishment and many independent analysts feel that Saeed and his likeminded rightwing leaders should be allowed to present their case openly, as long as they use peaceful channels to do so. The PDC rallies have so far failed to create any big waves and attracted only activists of these groups, which in no way can be seen as a game-changer. The strategy seems correct as it helps release the pent-up rage of the radical forces and allows them a role in the mainstream politics where they have to play according to the rules of the game.
The all-out confrontationist approach, which our American “friends” want Pakistan to adopt against radical groups, is seen as leading to more trouble instead of solutions in a country where more than 35,000 people, including several thousand personnel of the security forces, have been killed in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In terms of human losses, this is a far higher price compared to the combined casualties suffered by the Nato and Afghan forces in this period in Afghanistan.
From Pakistan’s point of view, Saeed and his followers stand in contrast to those hard-line groups, including Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, Jaish-e-Mohammed or Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, which have ties with the Afghan Taliban and their rank and file inspired by Al-Qaeda ideology. These groups got divided and subdivided into small faceless cells, which became the backbone of the terror network that unleashed high-profile suicide attacks and bombings across Pakistan, on their own or at the behest of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, to punish the country for its support to the US-led war. Faced with an ideological dilemma, they also turned their guns on Pakistan’s military, which once nurtured and patronised them. But Saeed and his Jamaat-ud-Dawa openly criticised the trend of suicide bombings and violence in Pakistan.
“In Pakistan, resorting to violence and suicide bombings is haraam (against Islam),” Saeed told select journalists during a recent visit to Karachi. “It is not jihad, but a conspiracy against jihad...we have been speaking against it all this time despite the threat to our lives.”
Saeed, who increased his activities following the US reward announcement, has been touring cities and towns. “I am not hiding...I am working openly. If they need my address, I can provide it to them,” he said in a lighter mood.
Jamaat-ud-Dawa says that it remains open to engaging with Washington and is ready to defend its leader even in US courts. While the Pakistani state did little to rehabilitate and de-radicalise militants following its policy shift in 2002, when it banned several militant groups, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa focused on humanitarian work, keeping its supporters busy.
The group now operates nearly 160 schools, 45 seminaries, three universities, four hospitals and 150 dispensaries across Pakistan. It does social work not just in Punjab, Kashmir and Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa but also in some remote parts of Sindh and Balochistan.
The critics of Jamaat-ud-Dawa say that the social work is a facade for its broader fundamentalist agenda, but this provides the establishment an opportunity to engage and help de-radicalise this major group and try to push it in mainstream politics. Removing its leadership from the scene may compound the internal threats, which the country can ill-afford at present.
The American approach whether driven by its frustration over the closure of Nato supplies – which are likely to resume any day now – or by its desire to appease India, remains flawed and makes the task of fighting extremism more difficult. The overt pressure and threats squeezes options for Pakistan. However, continued silent engagements, understanding one another’s concerns and limitations works best in these tough times. Pakistan-US relations are too important a matter, not just in the context of fighting extremism but also for regional peace and stability. Brinkmanship and aggressive public posturing is not the way forward.
The News
Sunday, May 20, 2012
The all-out confrontationist approach, which our American “friends” want Pakistan to adopt against radical groups, is seen as leading to more trouble instead of solutions in a country where more than 35,000 people, including several thousand personnel of the security forces, have been killed in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In terms of human losses, this is a far higher price compared to the combined casualties suffered by the Nato and Afghan forces in this period in Afghanistan.
Hafiz Saeed and his followers are the latest addition to the growing list of major irritants that plague Pakistan-US relations these days. The United States’ decision to put Saeed – the founder of the outlawed militant Lashkar-e-Taiba and the reformist Islamic organisation Jamaat-ud Dawa – on its most-wanted list of terrorists has deepened the mistrust between Washington and Islamabad that do not see eye to eye on their strategies to combat terrorism in the region.
While India has hailed the US announcement of a $10-million reward for any information leading to Saeed’s arrest and conviction for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Pakistan has become more sceptical about the intentions of its uneasy ally in this exceedingly controversial war on terror.
If, on the one hand, the move reflects US insensitivities and an apparent lack of understanding towards Pakistan’s problem of extremism, on the other it underlines Islamabad’s diplomatic failure in presenting its case. The Pakistan People’s Party-led government and the military establishment proved unsuccessful in explaining their limitations in the fight against terrorism and to convince Washington about the rationale of their strategy of categorising militant groups and their selective handling in line with their security concerns.
The US move has put an already embattled government and the military in a tight spot in a highly polarised political atmosphere where they face the wrath of an organised and deeply entrenched religious rightwing which remains opposed to Pakistan’s cooperation in the US-led war. It seems ironic that following the US announcement of reward on Saeed, even some Pakistani liberal and secular forces, which remain opposed to Saeed’s political philosophy and radical interpretation of Islam, have been left with no option but to defend him. Saeed, a disciple of Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, apparently dissociated himself from Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2002 when the former military-led government banned the organisation along with several others in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States. However, he continues to lead the Jamaat-ud-Dawa-an Islamic reformist and social work organisation – that proved its mettle in the aftermath of some of the worst natural disasters that hit Pakistan in recent years, including the 2005 earthquake, and the 2010 and 2011 floods.
Saeed and his followers vehemently deny any role in the Mumbai attack – which killed 166 people, including six Americans. The Pakistani government has been asking New Delhi to give concrete evidence, without which it refuses to act against him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan already acquitted Saeed in 2010 for lack of evidence that might implicate him in the Mumbai terror plot. Now this soft-spoken but hard-line cleric continues to be active on the political scene not just from the platform of Jamaat-ud-Dawa but also the Pakistan Defence Council (PDC), an umbrella of about 40 religious groups that is in the forefront of opposition to the resumption of Nato supplies to Afghanistan through Pakistan and to enhanced trade and friendly relations with India.
The Pakistani establishment and many independent analysts feel that Saeed and his likeminded rightwing leaders should be allowed to present their case openly, as long as they use peaceful channels to do so. The PDC rallies have so far failed to create any big waves and attracted only activists of these groups, which in no way can be seen as a game-changer. The strategy seems correct as it helps release the pent-up rage of the radical forces and allows them a role in the mainstream politics where they have to play according to the rules of the game.
The all-out confrontationist approach, which our American “friends” want Pakistan to adopt against radical groups, is seen as leading to more trouble instead of solutions in a country where more than 35,000 people, including several thousand personnel of the security forces, have been killed in more than a decade-long war on terrorism. In terms of human losses, this is a far higher price compared to the combined casualties suffered by the Nato and Afghan forces in this period in Afghanistan.
From Pakistan’s point of view, Saeed and his followers stand in contrast to those hard-line groups, including Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, Jaish-e-Mohammed or Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, which have ties with the Afghan Taliban and their rank and file inspired by Al-Qaeda ideology. These groups got divided and subdivided into small faceless cells, which became the backbone of the terror network that unleashed high-profile suicide attacks and bombings across Pakistan, on their own or at the behest of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, to punish the country for its support to the US-led war. Faced with an ideological dilemma, they also turned their guns on Pakistan’s military, which once nurtured and patronised them. But Saeed and his Jamaat-ud-Dawa openly criticised the trend of suicide bombings and violence in Pakistan.
“In Pakistan, resorting to violence and suicide bombings is haraam (against Islam),” Saeed told select journalists during a recent visit to Karachi. “It is not jihad, but a conspiracy against jihad...we have been speaking against it all this time despite the threat to our lives.”
Saeed, who increased his activities following the US reward announcement, has been touring cities and towns. “I am not hiding...I am working openly. If they need my address, I can provide it to them,” he said in a lighter mood.
Jamaat-ud-Dawa says that it remains open to engaging with Washington and is ready to defend its leader even in US courts. While the Pakistani state did little to rehabilitate and de-radicalise militants following its policy shift in 2002, when it banned several militant groups, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa focused on humanitarian work, keeping its supporters busy.
The group now operates nearly 160 schools, 45 seminaries, three universities, four hospitals and 150 dispensaries across Pakistan. It does social work not just in Punjab, Kashmir and Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa but also in some remote parts of Sindh and Balochistan.
The critics of Jamaat-ud-Dawa say that the social work is a facade for its broader fundamentalist agenda, but this provides the establishment an opportunity to engage and help de-radicalise this major group and try to push it in mainstream politics. Removing its leadership from the scene may compound the internal threats, which the country can ill-afford at present.
The American approach whether driven by its frustration over the closure of Nato supplies – which are likely to resume any day now – or by its desire to appease India, remains flawed and makes the task of fighting extremism more difficult. The overt pressure and threats squeezes options for Pakistan. However, continued silent engagements, understanding one another’s concerns and limitations works best in these tough times. Pakistan-US relations are too important a matter, not just in the context of fighting extremism but also for regional peace and stability. Brinkmanship and aggressive public posturing is not the way forward.
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