By Amir Zia
Monthly Newsline
June 2018
"The book effectively highlights some important details about Nawaz Sharif’s advent and ascent in politics under the patronage of General Zia-ul-Haq and his close military aides. The writer also points out the important role the then Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief, General Hameed Gul, played at crucial make-or-break points of Sharif’s political career."
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain is one of Pakistan’s
frontline politicians, who remained on the right side of the “powers that be”
through almost his entire political career spanning nearly five decades. As a
young scion of a political family, he witnessed from close quarters, the major
ups and downs of the country’s often traumatic history since the late 1960s.
However, he started dabbling directly in politics from the early 1970s, under
the tutelage of his father. He became a political player in his own right in
1983, when the then military ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq, nominated him to the
Majlis-e-Shura – almost two years after the assassination of his father,
Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi.
Hussain, who himself has remained mired in
controversies and was often accused of wheeling and dealing during his long and
eventful political career, has a huge number of stories to tell about the major
turning points in our history, as well as offer insights into the good, the bad
and the seamy side of Pakistan’s politics.
His recently-published memoirs, Succh Tu Yeh Hai (Truth Is This),
include some carefully selected “facts” and give a glimpse of the intriguing
world of the country’s politics in which kingmakers often lose control of their
own creations. While the book provides some interesting background about the
political players and the games they play, the reader is left craving for more
detail, retrospection and analysis, which are unfortunately missing from this
otherwise fairly readable book.
These appear to have been left out deliberately. In
the foreword, the narrator writes that he has tried to present “the truth”
without any exaggeration or ambiguity. But in this simple narration of “truth,”
the author paints a one-sided and incomplete picture.
However, the book effectively highlights some
important details about Nawaz Sharif’s advent and ascent in politics under the
patronage of General Zia-ul-Haq and his close military aides. The writer also
points out the important role the then Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief,
General Hameed Gul, played at crucial make-or-break points of Sharif’s
political career.
The book depicts Nawaz Sharif as a man who failed to
honour the promises he made to his allies and hurt those who were good to him.
Hussain also pinpoints Sharif’s inability to tolerate dissent, his utter
disregard for institutions and his dictatorial mindset.
Chapter 7 of the book titled, ‘Nawaz Sharif’s repeated
breaking of pledges,’ provides interesting details of the time his name was
first floated for the Punjab Chief Minister’s post in 1985, and of how the
military bigwigs requested Chaudhry Shujaat to ensure that his group of Punjab
Assembly members supported this relatively new face from urban Punjab, who was
a stranger to the landed political elite. In a show of gratitude, Sharif made
promises, under oath, to take all decisions in consultation with his backers.
But soon after he assumed power with the support of Chaudhry Shujaat and his
group, Sharif started to undermine their leadership by buying out their provincial
assembly members in a bid “to cut (them) down to size.”
The aforesaid chapter claims that Sharif’s negative
attitude forced Hussain’s group to move a no-confidence motion against the
chief minister in Parliament, but the then ISI Chief, Hameed Gul, stepped in
and convinced General Zia-ul-Haq to help foil this attempt which, ironically,
was undertaken with the military ruler’s blessings. This chapter also gives
details of a meeting held at the residence of one Brigadier Qayyum, and also
attended by General Jillani along with Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, in which the
two rival factions of the party were asked to bury their differences and shake
hands. The writer claims that the Sharif brothers tendered an apology and asked
the Chaudhrys of Gujrat (as Hussain’s family is known in political circles) to
forgive and forget.
“I remember, on this occasion Nawaz Sharif kissed
Pervaiz Elahi’s forehead twice. And Shahbaz Sharif embraced Pervaiz Elahi 10
times in 10 minutes,” shares the author.
But the writer says that the truce was violated by
Nawaz Sharif yet again. This was the point, he claims, at which General
Zia-ul-Haq intervened and sternly told Nawaz Sharif in a meeting to take back
Pervaiz Elahi and his team in the cabinet.
In the chapters that follow, the author keeps giving
examples of how Nawaz Sharif betrayed and ditched allies and party leaders,
including then prime minister, Mohammed Khan Junejo, and managed to secure the
support of the army to make it to the country’s top slot. While these details
shed light on Nawaz Sharif’s nature and character, they also highlight the
murky side of our politics and the manner in which political developments are
orchestrated and the peoples’ mandate manipulated. The author, unintentionally,
also reveals that he and his family remained loyal to the kingmakers despite
being undermined by them many times, from the days of General Zia-ul Haq to
those of General Pervez Musharraf.
However, it was under Musharraf’s rule that the
Chaudhrys of Gujrat reached their zenith of power and glory. Pervaiz Elahi
became Punjab Chief Minister, while the author himself led the ruling Pakistan
Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) faction and became caretaker prime minister
after Zafarullah Jamali was shown the door by the military ruler.
The book throws light on Sharif’s second stint as
prime minister and how he opened fronts against institutions, including the
armed forces and the judiciary. The author writes that Nawaz Sharif was briefed
twice about the Kargil Operation in advance – first on January 29, 1999 in
Skardu, and then again on February 5, 1999 in Keil, AJK. There was another
meeting in Lahore on March 12, 1999 about which General (R.) Abdul Majeed Malik
told the author that Nawaz Sharif prayed for the success of the Kargil Operation
at the end of a huddle of civil and military leaders. But when tensions with
India escalated and Nawaz Sharif planned a trip to the United States, he
expressed ignorance about the operation in front of the civil and military
leadership, upon which General Musharraf took out a notebook and read out
details of the briefings made to the prime minister on the issue.
In chapter 13 of the book, the author argues that if
Sharif had not tried to sack the army chief and divert his aircraft, the army would
not have overthrown the government in October 1999. This chapter reveals some
interesting details about Shahbaz Sharif’s nervousness on the day his elder
brother tried to remove Musharraf and get him arrested, but failed.
This chapter and the one following also tell readers
about how, without taking his jail mates into confidence, Sharif suddenly
struck a deal with the military and fled to Saudi Arabia from the Chaklala Air
Base, in the dark of the night. Sharif had signed an agreement that he would not
take part in politics for the next 10 years, which he showed to his lawyer,
Ejaz Hussain Batalvi, in the Attock Jail, says the book.
A significant portion of the book also focuses on the
PML-Q government and its “achievements” and “record of services” between
2002-07, including how the author got Mir Zafarullah Jamali elected as the
prime minister, why Musharraf decided to remove him and how he was subsequently
elevated to the post.
Hussain sounds bitter about the last days of
Musharraf’s rule, especially the developments of the pre-2008 election days in
which the military ruler struck a deal with Benazir Bhutto and passed the
infamous National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), paving the way for her return
to the country and giving a lease of political life to many others accused of
corruption and wrongdoing. The author claims that the 2008 elections were
manipulated to ensure that the PML-Q did not emerge as a major parliamentary
force as it had already been decided to bring back the PPP to power. He also
accuses the United States of playing a role in this arrangement.
The initial portion of the book is dedicated to
Chaudhry Shujaat’s family history, its business ventures and details of his
father, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s, rivalry with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s.
All in all, Succh
Tu Yeh Hai is an interesting study of how a traditional political
family climbs the ropes of power by building the right connections, coopting
the conservative and orthodox religio-political forces, and remaining on the
right side of the establishment.
Chaudhry Shujaat’s memoirs may appear shallow and
superficial because of the absence of details and analysis and, above all, his
one-sided views, but for those interested in Pakistan’s politics, they do shed
a light on what’s wrong with the country’s politics and its ruling elite.
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